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ABSTRACT 
Much of Hume scholarship in the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries has focused on 
developing naturalistic interpretations by way of combating the traditional skeptical 
reading of Hume. While on the skeptical reading Hume is engaged in a project of 
dismantling our fundamental areas of knowledge—like causation, the external world, and 
the self—on naturalistic readings Hume approaches these subjects as a scientist and 
ultimately advances positive epistemological aims. However, naturalistic interpreters have 
neglected to address an important theme of the skeptical reading: that Hume is a skeptic 
about knowledge of the past. My dissertation addresses this theme by developing 
naturalistic interpretations of Hume’s accounts of memory, temporal concepts, and belief 
about the past. I argue that, together, these accounts constitute a positive epistemology. My 
arguments engage with historical and contemporary literature on time and temporal 
experience as well as with debates in Hume scholarship. 
My first chapter clarifies some important preliminaries, specifically, Hume’s views 
on how the mind represents objects and on the role of experience in delimiting what the 
mind can represent. My second chapter defends Hume’s criteria for memory. Hume 
characterizes memories as ideas that feel a certain way and that correspond to the 
experiences from which they derived. I argue that these criteria achieve two aims: they 
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classify ideas for the purposes of scientific explanation and they define the term ‘memory.’ 
My third chapter shows that Hume has a robust and attractively simple theory of temporal 
experience: experience directly manifests time by being successive. This theory allows 
Hume to explain how concepts like ‘time,’ ‘simultaneity,’ and ‘tense’ originate in 
experience. Finally, my fourth chapter applies my findings in the previous chapters to 
explaining Hume’s views on how the mind forms beliefs about the past. Drawing on the 
scholarship on Hume’s views on knowledge, I argue that for Hume our typical beliefs about 
the past constitute knowledge, rather than mere belief. In this way, knowledge of the past 
is not the gap in Hume’s philosophical system that many have believed it to be, but is rather 
a credit to his system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the mid twentieth century, much of Hume scholarship has focused on answering a 
charge that had already been levelled against Hume in his own time, and that Hume himself 
had tried to answer: the charge of maintaining ‘universal skepticism,’ ‘doubting everything 
except his own existence,’ and deeming it a ‘folly’ to ‘pretend to believe anything with 
certainty.’1 Similar charges of skepticism continued to be levelled against Hume for 
centuries to come. Reid wrote of Hume’s philosophy that ‘it can have no other tendency, 
than to shew the acuteness of the sophist, at the expence of disgracing reason and human 
nature, and making mankind Yahoos’ (1764/1997, 21). Beattie, accordingly, saw Hume 
engaged in a ‘demolition of common sense’ and in the ‘rearing of a fabric of doctrine, upon 
which engines might easily be erected sufficient to overturn all belief, science, religion, 
virtue, and society, from the very foundation’ (1778, 215). Although Kant celebrated 
Hume’s insights on inductive reasoning, referring to them as ‘the first spark of light’ 
(1783/1977, 260), he still declared Hume to have ‘ran his ship ashore, for safety’s sake, 
landing on skepticism, there to let it lie and rot’ (262). In his introduction to what became 
a standard edition of Hume’s works (1874), T. H. Green described Hume’s legacy to be an 
experiment with Lockean principles, the upshot of which is that ‘knowledge is impossible’ 
and ‘philosophy futile’ (1874/2011, 2). Russell followed suit and described Hume as a 
                                               
1 Hume stated and addressed this charge in A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh 
(1745). The letter was a response to a published document that aimed to discredit Hume’s candidacy 
for Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, titled A Specimen of the 
Principles concerning Religion and Morality, maintain’d in a Book lately publish’d, intituled, A 
Treatise of Human Nature. 
  2 
 
 
sceptic and as a ‘dead end’ in A History of Western Philosophy (1947, 685). Evidently, 
until more recently, Hume’s own denial of these charges did not hold sway.2 
It has been a dominant trend among twentieth- and twenty-first century scholars to 
combat this negative perception of Hume.3 This trend can be largely attributed to Norman 
Kemp Smith’s ‘naturalistic’ interpretation, according to which ‘Hume’s philosophy can be 
more adequately described as naturalistic than as sceptical’ (1941, 84). Kemp Smith and 
the many other interpreters who have followed in his footsteps emphasize the strong 
scientific currents in Hume’s philosophy.4 After all, Hume explicitly labelled his work a 
‘science of human nature’ (T 1.1.1.12 SBN 7) and ‘an attempt to introduce the experimental 
method of reasoning into moral subjects’ (subtitle to A Treatise of Human Nature). Kemp 
Smith argues that what Hume sought most to establish was not a skeptical conclusion, but 
a scientific thesis about human psychology: that ‘feeling, not reason or understanding… is 
the determining influence in human, as in other forms of animal life’ (1941, 11, 84-85); in 
establishing this thesis, Hume in fact shows ‘certain beliefs or judgments...to be ‘natural,’ 
‘inevitable’, and ‘indispensable’, and thus removed beyond the reach of our sceptical 
doubts’ (87). In a similar vein, scholars now tend to interpret Hume’s arguments on 
inductive reasoning, demonstrative reasoning, the idea of the external world, and the idea 
                                               
2 Hume writes in Letter from a Gentleman: ‘In Reality, a Philosopher who affects to doubt of the 
Maxims of common Reason, and even of his Senses, declares sufficiently that he is not in earnest, 
and that he intends not to advance an Opinion which he would recommend as Standards of 
Judgment and Action’ (L 21 Nor 425-6). 
3 Note, however, that some scholars continue to read Hume as a skeptic, e.g., Waxman (1994), 
Baxter (2008), and Meeker (2013). 
4 This emphasis is reflected in numerous references to Hume as ‘the Newton of the moral sciences’ 
(e.g. Passmore 1968, 131; Noxon 1973, 29; McIntyre 1994; Morris 2019) 
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of the self—arguments that were previously viewed as unequivocally skeptical—as 
concerned primarily (even if not solely) with the scientific explanation of the mental 
processes behind these ideas and forms of reasoning.5 Moreover, many scholars have 
offered interpretations of Hume’s theory of epistemic value according to which, on that 
theory, our basic beliefs about causation, the external world, and the self are epistemically 
valuable despite the threat of skeptical doubts; contrary to the traditional reading, Hume is 
not a skeptic about these areas of knowledge.6 
 Yet, one theme of the traditional skeptical interpretation has received little 
commentary—that Hume is committed to skepticism about knowledge of the past. Reid’s 
rejection of the ‘theory of ideas’ (to which Hume subscribed) places stock in an argument 
that the theory leads to skepticism about the past—not only (as was already suspected) 
about the external world. The ‘theory of ideas’ is the standard framework among early 
modern philosophers for explaining the mind. On this framework, the mind is immediately 
acquainted only with certain mental entities (ideas). Reid contrasts this view of the mind 
with the ‘vulgar’ or common sense view that the mind can be (and usually is) immediately 
acquainted with objects that are part of the world at large, including external objects and 
past objects. Whereas on the theory-of-ideas framework memory can offer knowledge of 
the past only via ideas of past objects, on the common-sense view (as Reid understands it) 
‘memory is an immediate knowledge of something past’ (1785/2002, 287). Reid defends 
                                               
5 See, e.g., the interpretations of these arguments in Stroud 1977; Garrett 1997, 2015; Mounce 1999; 
Owen 2002. 
6 See, e.g., Baier 1991; Garrett 1997, 2015; Loeb 2002. §4.3 gives a more extensive overview of 
these interpretations. 
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the common-sense view as correct and insists that no explanation is needed of how we have 
such immediate knowledge of the past: ‘memory is an original faculty...of which we can 
give no account, but that we are so made’ (255). The theory-of-ideas framework, in 
contrast, invites the question of how we can know that our ideas are in fact epistemic 
vehicles to external objects or past objects. Just as this framework is consistent with the 
non-existence of the external world (as Descartes’ ‘dream doubt’ suggests), so it is 
consistent with the non-existence of the past:  
There is the same need of arguments to prove, that the ideas of memory are 
pictures of things that really did happen, as that the ideas of sense are 
pictures of external objects which now exist. In both cases, it will be 
impossible to find any argument that has real weight. (290) 
 
Skepticism about the past would be an especially undesirable consequence of a theory of 
mind. It would restrict the things we can know to what we are experiencing in the present 
moment. 
 Reid backs this charge of skepticism with specific objections to Hume and Locke’s 
accounts of memory. One objection is that their accounts presuppose the mind’s immediate 
acquaintance with the past (even though the ‘theory of ideas’ does not allow for such an 
acquaintance). Thus, when Locke characterizes memories as ideas that ‘the mind 
previously had’ and that are accompanied by ‘a perception of having had the idea before,’ 
Reid argues, ‘this perception, one would think, supposes a remembrance of [i.e. immediate 
acquaintance with] those [ideas] we had before, otherwise the similitude or identity could 
not be perceived’ (285). Similarly, when Hume characterizes memories as ideas that 
constitute ‘the second appearances of previous impressions,’ he seems to presuppose an 
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ability to know that the ideas are in fact second appearances; in doing so, Reid writes, ‘he 
takes for granted that kind of memory which he rejects [i.e. immediate acquaintance with 
the past]’ (287). Another objection is that their accounts fail to offer sufficient criteria for 
memory. Locke’s criteria are met by impressions that resemble previous impressions, such 
as the impression of looking at an object the second time (285). Hume’s criteria are also 
met by twice-around impressions, at least provided that they are fainter than the original 
(289). 
 In addition, Reid criticizes Locke’s proposal that our idea of time can be attributed 
to an experience of succession—a proposal that Hume endorses, albeit not in all its 
particulars. Tracing the idea of time to origins in experience is paramount in Locke and 
Hume’s philosophical systems, since they view experience as the source of all ideas. Reid 
rules out the possibility of experiencing succession. It was generally assumed in the early 
modern period that only the present moment exists (Falkenstein 2013, 103-4). On this 
assumption, Reid argues, ‘no kind of succession can be an object either of the senses, or of 
consciousness; because the operations of both are confined to the present point of time [i.e. 
they can occur only in the present point, since only that point exists], and there can be no 
succession in a point of time’ (270). Reid also argues that, even if we could experience 
succession and obtain an idea of succession from it, the idea of time could not originate in 
this idea of succession. In order for a succession to be temporal and thus generate an idea 
of time, the members or the minimum intervals in the succession would have to be 
themselves temporal, otherwise the totality of the elements could not be. Here, Reid 
assumes that the properties of a complex object must be given in the simples that compose 
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it, in other words, that ‘every part is similar to the whole, and of the same nature’ (273)—
what Kemp Smith calls the ‘composition theory’ (1941, 279). However, the members and 
minimum intervals of a succession are not themselves successions; hence, they would have 
to be temporal without being successions. It follows that time is antecedent to the sort of 
temporal succession that could generate an idea of time; succession is not the origin of the 
idea (272). Without an adequate account of the idea of time and its origins, Locke and 
Hume’s philosophical systems seem indeed ill-equipped to answer the charge of skepticism 
about knowledge of the past. Reid’s own view is that the idea of time is generated by 
memory (258), that it represents ‘one of the simplest objects of thought,’ and that ‘it must 
be purely the effect of our constitution, and given us by some original power of the mind’ 
(273). 
 The claim that the idea of time is not traceable to experience, but is part of the 
constitution of the mind, is also a key feature of Kant’s rejection of Hume’s approach. In 
agreement with Reid, Kant states, 
Time is not an empirical concept that has been derived from any experience. 
For neither coexistence nor succession would ever come within our 
perception, if the representation of time were not presupposed as underlying 
them a priori (1781/1929, A29/B46).  
 
Rather than something we can experience, time is a built-in form or structure in the mind 
under which all experience is subsumed; Kant labels it a ‘form of sensibility’ or ‘form of 
intuition.’ As such, time is a necessary mark on all experience: ‘it can never be omitted’ 
and it ‘precedes the actual appearance of objects, since in fact it makes them possible’ 
(1783/1977, 283-284). As a necessary a priori mental structure, time allows us to derive 
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from it principles that are synthetic (i.e. not analytic) but still a priori and necessary, for 
instance, that ‘time has only one dimension,’ and that ‘different times are not coexistent 
but successive’ (1781/1929, A29/B46). These principles also include, most importantly, 
the fundamental principles of arithmetic. It is because arithmetical principles are derived 
from the temporal structure of the mind that arithmetic has the status of a pure science 
(Prolegomena 1783/1977, 283). Kant diagnosed it as a ‘great mistake’ on Hume’s behalf 
and as the main reason for his ‘landing on skepticism’ that he failed to recognize that 
concepts and laws could be derived from the necessary structure of the mind in this way 
(1783/1977, 272-273, 313). Had Hume realized that mathematics has these origins, and 
that, consequently, the same origins are also possible for metaphysics, he would have 
‘saved metaphysics from the danger of a contemptuous ill-treatment’ (273). 
 Despite its role in the traditional skeptical interpretation of Hume, the criticism that 
Hume cannot account for knowledge of time and the past has gone largely unanswered, 
even as other themes of the skeptical interpretation have been vigorously debated. What is 
more, the overall trend in the relatively scant literature on Hume’s theories of time and 
memory has been to sanction the Reidian and Kantian assessments, not to oppose them. 
Hume’s theory of memory has had an especially bad reputation—it has been described as 
‘most unsatisfactory’ (Price 1940, 5), ‘notoriously weak’ (MacNabb 1966, 41), and even 
as ‘inconsistent in epic proportions’ (Passmore 1968, 94). Some of the most focused 
treatments of it have aimed not at defense but at unveiling or excusing Hume’s 
misconceptions and errors (i.e. Noxon 1976; Pears 1990; McDonough 2002). One of the 
most sympathetic treatments (i.e. Johnson 1987, 1995) in fact endorses the Reidian 
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interpretation of Hume as a skeptic about knowledge of the past. The sympathetic non-
skeptical treatments (i.e. Flage 1985 and Traiger 2011), as I note later, do not fully resolve 
the main complications in the theory. The literature on Hume’s theory of time, in turn, has 
shown a tendency to reverberate the Reidian-Kantian doctrine that experience alone cannot 
acquaint us with time; many scholars consider the idea of time to be an exception to—if 
not a downright problem for—Hume’s ‘content empiricism,’ the principle that experience 
is the source of all mental content (i.e. Kemp Smith 1941, 273-4; Hendel 1963, 409; 
Mijuskovic 1977, 387; Johnson 1989; Waxman 1994, 116; Frasca-Spada 1998, 75; Bardon 
2007; Allison 2008, 51). Even though there have been in-depth sympathetic readings of 
Hume’s theory of time in recent years, which directly address some of the Reidian-Kantian 
concerns (e.g. Baxter 2008; Falkenstein 1997, 2006, 2017), these do not yet amount to a 
complete account of Hume’s views on temporal knowledge—for instance, they do not 
address the question of how knowledge of tense is possible on Hume’s theory of mind.7 
 The aim of this dissertation is to fill this lacuna in the scholarship by offering a 
comprehensive naturalistic interpretation of Hume’s theory of knowledge of the past. I 
consider the interpretation I develop ‘naturalistic’ in that, like other interpretations in this 
tradition, it emphasizes the scientific character of Hume’s approach to the subject, as well 
as its fit with a positive epistemology that regards our fundamental beliefs as epistemically 
valuable. Ultimately, I argue that Hume offers compelling theories of memory, temporal 
                                               
7 Baxter’s interpretation in particular ultimately views Hume as a ‘Pyrrhonian skeptic’ who ‘finds 
no final reason actively to endorse any views as true’ (2008, 4, 9).  
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concepts, and belief about the past, which together comprise a rigorous account of 
knowledge of the past. 
 It is worth emphasizing that my aims are both interpretive and evaluative. I aim to 
offer an accurate portrayal of Hume’s views on the subject at hand, but, in addition, I aim 
to defend the plausibility of Hume’s views and of his overall framework for approaching 
the subject. I pursue these aims in tandem because they are mutually complementary (if 
not interdependent): arriving at the most accurate interpretation of a text usually involves 
weighing in considerations about plausibility, at least insofar as the author is unlikely to 
have advanced implausible views; conversely, arriving at an interpretation on which the 
author’s views are compelling is usually furthered by careful examination of the text, at 
least insofar as such examination reveals details and nuances that enhance the complexity 
and plausibility of the author’s position. Thus, my interpretation of Hume’s views 
sometimes draws on plausibility considerations (as will be clear from my language) and 
my defense of his views sometimes draws on textual details that other interpreters have 
overlooked.  
In working towards the evaluative aim—specifically, the aim of showing the 
capacity of Hume’s philosophical framework—this dissertation covers topics that Hume 
himself did not dwell on but that nonetheless test his framework in important ways. In 
some cases, I consider how Hume could respond to objections that Hume scholarship or 
contemporary philosophical literature have brought into focus. In other cases, I expound 
on how Hume’s framework could encompass explanations of phenomena that might seem 
to resist a Humean analysis and yet are crucial to a theory of knowledge of the past—
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phenomena like mental representation, the concept of simultaneity, and the concept of 
tense. 
 Also in the service of the evaluative aim, I sometimes appeal to contemporary 
insights that help us to recognize the plausibility of Hume’s views, even if Hume did not 
anticipate these insights. For instance, in Chapter 2 I argue that Putnam’s arguments about 
definition show Hume’s approach to definition to be coherent. In such instances, I am not 
attributing to Hume the contemporary insights—an attribution that is likely be 
anachronistic. Rather, I am arguing that Hume’s own insights deserve to be taken seriously 
because more recent developments in philosophy have revealed that they are not as flawed 
as scholars previously thought. 
Since the nature of mental representation determines how the mind represents (and 
ultimately has knowledge of) the past, Chapter 1 examines Hume’s views on mental 
representation. Specifically, Hume’s ‘content empiricism’ constrains his theory of 
knowledge of the past insofar as it posits, as a condition for that knowledge, that experience 
present us with the contents of our ideas about time. I offer a precise statement of content 
empiricism. Drawing on the existing interpretations, I also delineate Hume’s views on the 
nature and causes of mental representation. 
Chapter 2 examines Hume’s theory of memory. Hume characterizes memory using 
two kinds of criteria: ideas’ phenomenal character and their correspondence to the past 
experiences from which they derived. I defend Hume’s criteria by showing that they 
achieve two theoretical aims: a scientific classification of ideas and a definition of 
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‘memory.’ In particular, as noted above, I argue that Hume’s definition of ‘memory’ is 
coherent in light of Putnamian considerations about definitions. 
In Chapter 3, I show that, in keeping with his ‘content empiricism,’ Hume grounds 
the contents of our temporal concepts in experience by identifying time with succession, 
where succession is an aspect that impressions instantiate. An impression like that of a 
musical melody instantiates time or succession by being made up of parts ‘disposed in a 
certain manner,’ namely, in a successive manner (T 1.2.3.4 SBN 34). Our ideas represent 
time as a result of copying such impressions and their manner of disposition. I argue that 
this seemingly rudimentary view of time is robust enough to encompass explanations of 
such complex phenomena as the experience of movement, the notion of time without 
change, the concept of simultaneity, and the concept of tense. While Hume does not discuss 
the concept of tense, I propose that he could have explained it by means of what I call the 
‘tense principle:’ when the idea of a succession is simultaneous with an impression of a 
member of the succession, it represents that member as present. 
Finally, Chapter 4 applies my findings in the previous chapters to explaining the 
nature of knowledge of the past. I show that Hume’s theory of belief, his theory of the 
causes of representation, his conception of memory as ideas that correspond to the past, 
and the ‘tense principle’ together entail that memories are beliefs about the past. I then 
explain the sources of non-mnemonic beliefs about the past using Hume’s theory of causal 
inference. Finally, I draw on existing interpretations of Hume’s views on epistemic 
normativity—interpretations showing that for Hume our beliefs in causation, the external 
world, and the self constitute knowledge, rather than mere belief—to argue that, by the 
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same reasoning, for Hume our typical mnemonic and non-mnemonic beliefs about the past 
also constitute knowledge. In this way, Hume’s theory of knowledge of the past is 
continuous with the positive epistemology that the naturalistic interpretations have brought 
to light. 
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CHAPTER 1: MENTAL REPRESENTATION 
1.1. Introduction 
As is well known, the early modern framework for studying the mind postulates the 
existence of certain mental entities—generally called ‘ideas’—in terms of which all mental 
phenomena are understood. Hume adopts this framework, but instead of referring to these 
entities as ‘ideas’ he labels them ‘perceptions.’ He divides perceptions into impressions, 
the lively entities we generally call ‘feelings’ or ‘experiences,’ and ideas, the faint entities 
we call ‘thoughts’ (T 1.1.1.1 SBN 1). He also divides perceptions into simple and complex: 
the simple being perceptions that cannot be divided into parts, and the complex those that 
are composites of the simple (T 1.1.1.2 SBN 2). 
 In order to understand how, on Hume’s philosophical system, the mind achieves 
knowledge of the past, we must understand how Humean perceptions make it possible. 
One challenge to this task is the Reidian challenge (noted in the Introduction) of how to 
infer that that our perceptions of past objects are ‘pictures of things that really did happen’ 
(1785/2002, 290). A more fundamental challenge, however, is how to account for 
perceptions’ capacity to represent or be pictures of past objects in the first place. For Reid 
and Kant, the capacity to represent time and the past is a built-in feature of the mind. For 
Hume, however, perceptions’ capacity to represent any content is ultimately dependent on 
experiences of that content—or so Hume’s reputation as a ‘content empiricist’ suggests. 
What is perplexing is how experience could be a source of contents as complex as time and 
the past. As noted earlier, many scholars regard the idea of time as an exception to Hume’s 
content empiricism.  
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The first step to tackling the subject of how perceptions represent time and the past 
is to clarify Hume’s content empiricism (his exact view on the empirical limits to mental 
representation) as well as his more general theory on the nature of mental representation 
(how perceptions represent anything at all). Both are contentious topics in the scholarship. 
In this chapter, I offer a precise statement of Hume’s content empiricism (§1.2.1); I discuss 
the evidence for attributing content empiricism as I define it to Hume as well as its relation 
to Hume’s famous ‘Copy Principle’ (§1.2.2 and §1.2.3). I then discuss the various 
interpretations of Hume’s theory of mental representation; as a reconciliation of the 
existing interpretations, I propose that we interpret Hume’s theory to be that a perception’s 
representation of an object consists in its playing the same causal or functional role as the 
object, and that ideas come to represent objects in this way by copying impressions that 
instantiate them. The picture of mental representation that emerges here will later be crucial 
for grasping some important features of Hume’s treatment of memory, temporal concepts, 
and belief about that past. 
1.2. Content Empiricism 
 1.2.1. Statement of content empiricism 
I will argue that Hume implicitly maintains the following principle on how experience 
delimits the mind’s representational capacities: 
In order for an idea to represent an object, an impression must first 
instantiate the object or its basic aspects. 
 
Hume introduces the notion of an ‘aspect’ in his discussion of ‘distinctions of reason’ (T 
1.1.7.18 SBN 25). He indicates that an aspect is a point of resemblance between two or 
more objects. Whiteness is an aspect of a white globe in that it is a point in which the globe 
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resembles a white cube; spherical shape is another aspect in that it is a point in which the 
globe resembles a black globe. Hume stresses that aspects need not be distinct or separable 
from one another. Whiteness and sphericality are not distinct or separable parts of the 
globe; rather, they are resemblances the globe bears to other objects. A ‘distinction of 
reason’ is our ability to consider the globe ‘in different aspects:’ we consider it qua white 
object by ‘turning our view’ to its resemblance with the white cube, and qua spherical 
object by turning our view to its resemblance with the black globe. 
 Hume implies that, even though the imagination cannot separate certain aspects 
(such as color and shape), it can nevertheless combine these aspects in different ways. What 
Hume denies in T 1.1.7.18 is that we could imagine sphericality on its own, without at the 
same time imagining other aspects of the spherical object such as color (in the case of a 
visual object) or texture (in the case of a tactile one): ‘a person, who desires us to consider 
the figure of a globe of white marble without thinking on its colour, desires an 
impossibility.’ However, Hume is not denying that we could combine sphericality with 
some other color and thereby imagine, for instance, an orange globe. He explicitly allows 
for this imaginative capacity in noting that we can imagine golden pavements and ruby 
walls (T 1.1.1.4 SBN 3). In the Enquiry, he observes, ‘when we think of a golden mountain, 
we only join two consistent ideas, gold, and mountain, with which we were formerly 
acquainted’ (E 2.5 SBN 19). Hume is not suggesting that the idea of gold ‘with which we 
were acquainted’ is an idea of goldenness devoid of shape. He is saying, rather, that the 
imagination can combine the idea of a gold object (comprising both goldenness and shape 
as aspects) and the idea of a mountain to form the idea of a golden mountain.  
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 By ‘basic aspect’ I understand an aspect that is not reducible to other aspects—an 
aspect such that, if the mind had no prior idea of it, it could not come to represent it by 
combining ideas of other aspects. Greenness is a basic aspect. The shape of a unicorn, in 
contrast, is an aspect that the imagination could represent by combining ideas of spatial 
arrangements such as lines, curves, and spatial depth. What I am calling a ‘basic aspect’ is 
what Locke called a ‘simple idea,’ an idea that ‘contains in it nothing but one uniform 
appearance’ (II.ii.1). As Ayers describes it, a Lockean simple idea is ‘a limit in phenomenal 
discrimination;’ it is also indefinable, or impossible to convey in words (1991, 40; see also 
Chappell 1994, 36). Hume does not himself introduce the notion of a basic aspect. In 
contrast to Locke, he uses ‘simple idea’ to refer to an idea that ‘admits of no distinction nor 
separation’ (T 1.1.1.2 SBN 2). On Hume’s view, the simple perceptions comprising the 
complex perception of a white globe are not perceptions of whiteness and sphericality—
Hume indicates that whiteness and sphericality are not parts of a perception (T 1.1.7.18). 
Rather, the simple perceptions are perceptions of minimum visible points. Basic aspects 
are distinct from Humean simple perceptions in that the former, unlike the latter, can be 
made up of parts (e.g. a globe’s spatiality is made up of spatial minima); in addition, simple 
perceptions can instantiate multiple basic aspects (e.g. a minimum visible white point 
instantiates both whiteness and minimality).8 In any case, as I show in the next section 
                                               
8 Hakkarainen argues that simple perceptions must be ‘qualitatively simple’ because if they had 
multiple qualities (such as greenness and minimality) they would divide into those qualities, and 
hence not be simple (2012, 60, 62-63). However, Hume’s discussion of ‘distinctions of reason’ 
clearly emphasizes that objects do not divide into their qualities. A white globe does not divide into 
whiteness and sphericality (T 1.1.7.18 SBN 25). If qualities are not parts of perceptions, a 
perception can be simple yet instantiate multiple qualities.  
  17 
 
 
(§1.2.2), Hume implicitly holds that the idea of any basic aspect requires a prior impression 
of that aspect.9 
 An impression instantiates an object or aspect by being itself an instance of that 
object or aspect. An impression might instantiate a white globe by being itself a white 
globe, or whiteness by being itself white. In §3.2.1, I show that for Hume an impression 
instantiates space or time by being itself spatial or temporal. 
Hume is standardly considered to be one of the greatest champions of a view 
variously labelled as ‘content,’ ‘concept,’ or ‘meaning’ empiricism—broadly construed, 
the view that experience somehow delimits what the mind can represent. In attributing to 
Hume the above-stated principle, I am following this interpretive tradition; hence, I will 
refer to the above-stated principle as ‘content empiricism.’ My articulation of content 
empiricism is congruous with other articulations in the literature (note, however, that since 
content empiricism is often articulated only in broad strokes, these other articulations might 
not correspond precisely to my own). Consider Bennett’s statement of Hume’s ‘meaning 
empiricism:’ ‘no classificatory word makes sense to us unless (a) we have sensorily 
encountered things to which it applies, or (b) we can define it in terms of words which 
satisfy (a)’ (1971, 26). While Bennett focuses on the conditions for a word’s having 
meaning, for Hume words have meaning by being associated with mental representations;10 
thus, Bennett’s ‘meaning empiricism’ also indicates a condition for the mental 
representation of an object—that experience first acquaint us with the object or with its 
                                               
9 As I note in §1.2.4, however, this principle admits of exceptions, like the ‘missing shade of blue.’ 
10 See §2.3.3 and Ott (2006, 235-236, 241-242). 
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semantic components. Garrett defines ‘conceptual empiricism’ as ‘the view that the 
semantic content of thought is always fully derived from things or features of things as they 
have been encountered in sensory or reflective experience’ (1997, 33). Similarly, Winkler’s 
‘content empiricism’ is ‘the view that the content of any conception can be expressed, at 
least in part, in experiential terms’ (2010, 48-51). Interpreting ‘semantic content’ and 
‘content’ to refer to what thoughts and conceptions represent,11 these statements also 
express the notion that experiences of an object or of its basic aspects are what enable the 
mental representation of that object.12 
1.2.2. Evidence that Hume maintains content empiricism 
Content empiricism is clearly in the background of Hume’s proposal and subsequent uses 
of the Copy Principle: the principle that ‘all our simple ideas in their first appearance are 
deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly 
represent’ (T 1.1.1.7 SBN 4). Hume explicitly states that the Copy Principle is Locke’s 
‘no-innate-idea’ thesis expressed in different terms: ‘it is probable that no more was meant 
by those, who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions’ (E 1 
Note A SBN 22). His reason for expressing Locke’s thesis differently is that Locke’s use 
                                               
11 In standard philosophical usage, ‘content’ refers to the object of a representation. It is clear from 
the context of Garrett and Winkler’s articulations that they use the term standardly. 
12 Bennett and Garrett’s articulations in their more recent work do not indicate any significant 
changes (Bennett 2001, 213-215; Garrett 2015, 44). Other articulations of Hume’s content 
empiricism that are closely in keeping with my definition include: Strawson, ‘[an idea’s] content—
its true content—is ultimately just the result of some process of copying (and perhaps combining) 
the contents of impressions, and is wholly derived from these impressions’ (1989, 102); Noonan, 
‘a simple (indefinable) general term can only be understood if something which falls under it has 
been encountered in veridical sensory experience’ (1999, 66); and Broughton, ‘our experience is 
what can explain what we are able to think about’ (2006, 52). 
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of ‘idea’ is too broad. Locke uses ‘idea’ to refer, approximately, to the mental entities 
responsible for not only thought but sensation as well. Hume argues that, because the term 
‘innate’ is ambiguous, the doctrine that no ideas (in Locke’s sense) are innate is misleading. 
If, on the one hand, we take ‘innate’ to mean ‘natural,’ it follows that all our ideas are 
innate; if, on the other, we take it to mean ‘contemporary to our birth,’ it is not clear why 
it matters philosophically whether or not ideas are innate; moreover, insofar as passions 
like self-love can reasonably be deemed innate under most definitions of the term, Locke’s 
doctrine seems plainly false. By using ‘idea’ more narrowly (to mean faint perceptions) 
and by distinguishing ideas from impressions (or lively perceptions), Hume can define an 
‘innate’ perception as a perception not copied from another perception, and thus more 
clearly articulate Locke’s doctrine as the principle that ideas (in Hume’s sense) are always 
copied from other perceptions. Notwithstanding this critique of Locke’s terminology, 
Hume clearly indicates that he intends the Copy Principle to express the same thesis (T 
1.1.1.12 SBN 7; Abstract 6 SBN 647; E Note A SBN 22). 
 Locke’s no-innate-idea thesis, in turn, can safely be interpreted as the view that 
what the mind represents is never innate, but is always traceable to experience.13 Although 
                                               
13 Locke’s rejection of innate ideas is more nuanced than this brief synopsis might suggest. Locke 
focuses on arguing that, since experience sufficiently explains everything the mind represents, the 
notion that any ideas are innate is explanatorily superfluous. Some might interpret this argument as 
stopping short of the conclusion that innate ideas do not exist; however, Locke clearly states that 
the notion of innate ideas is false as well as superfluous, because its superfluousness is indicative 
of its falsity: ‘it would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this 
supposition [that innate ideas exist], if I should only show … how men, barely by the use of their 
natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate 
impressions’ (I.ii.1).  
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Locke’s term ‘idea’ is notoriously ambiguous, and although the literature on its meaning 
is vast, there is nonetheless a fair amount of consensus that the term refers (at least on many 
of Locke’s uses of it) to the objects of mental representations (to what our mental states are 
of or about) (see, especially, I.i.8, II.viii.8, and IV.xxi.4). Some contemporary labels for 
what Locke calls ‘ideas’ are ‘representational content,’ ‘semantic content,’ or ‘intentional 
object.’ For present purposes, I will set aside the question of the metaphysical nature of 
ideas. It must be noted, however, that ideas are distinct from external-world objects: for 
example, the object of my thought of a unicorn is not an external-world object. It should 
also be noted that, since external-world objects can be objects of representational mental 
states (i.e. mental states can be of or about them), ideas are not the only objects of such 
states. Ideas are, rather, the immediate or proximate object of a representational mental 
state: they are the immediate datum in the mind (an image of a tree, for instance) in virtue 
of which the mind can also represent other objects (like an external-world tree).14 What is 
crucial for present purposes is that for Locke ideas are closely associated with 
representational mental states, in that every such state represents an idea (even if it 
represents other objects as well), and every idea is an object of such a state (though not 
necessarily the only object).15 
Taking ‘ideas’ in this sense, the no-innate-idea thesis is a thesis about the conditions 
for mental representation. In saying that no ideas are innate, Locke is saying that what our 
                                               
14 I take the term ‘proximate content’ from Ainslie (2015, 67; see also 45-46). 
15 The consensus on this view includes Mackie (1985), Ayers (1986), and Chappell (1994). Yolton 
is also part of this consensus insofar as he takes ‘idea’ to refer to ‘cognitive content,’ though on his 
view ‘idea’ refers also to the mental states or acts that are directed at this content (1975, 384). 
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representational mental states are of or about (that is, their immediate contents) is not 
innate. Locke also expresses the no-innate-idea thesis by stating that every idea is 
‘imprinted’ on the mind by experience (i.e. by sensation or reflection) (II.i.5); in stating so, 
he means that what a mental state is of or about must be given in experience. 
More precisely, Locke’s position is that every simple idea is imprinted on the mind 
by experience. Simple ideas for Locke are the ‘uniform appearances’ or basic aspects that 
our mental states represent (II.ii.1). The mind can generate complex ideas out of simple 
ones by ‘repeating, comparing, and uniting them’ (II.ii.2). The resulting complex ideas 
would not be ‘imprinted on the mind by experience,’ but would be composed of ideas that 
are. Ultimately, Locke holds that every idea must be either found in experience or 
composed of basic aspects that are found in experience. Locke also maintains that ideas are 
‘all the materials of thinking’ (II.i.2): ‘in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders in 
those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those 
ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation’ (II.i.24). Here, Locke 
indicates that, even though the mind can represent objects other than ideas (such as 
external-world objects), it cannot represent any objects the aspects of which cannot be 
reduced to ideas that it acquired through experience. The no-innate-idea thesis is thus 
equivalent to content empiricism: it states that in order for the mind to represent an object, 
it must first have ideas (in Locke’s sense) of it or of its basic aspects, and the mind can 
only have these ideas if experience imprinted them on it. In introducing the Copy Principle 
as an equivalent of that thesis, Hume implies that he intends the Copy Principle to express 
content empiricism. 
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Hume also implies this intention in his uses of the Copy Principle in his skeptical 
arguments. At several critical points in the Treatise, Hume draws an inference from the 
fact that we lack an impression of a certain object to the conclusion that we lack an idea 
that represents that object (T 1.1.6.1 SBN 15-16; T 1.3.14.11 SBN 160-1; T 1.4.6.2 SBN 
251-2). For instance, from the observation that there is no impression that instantiates a 
simple and identical self, Hume draws the conclusion that there is no idea of such a self (T 
1.4.6.2 SBN 251-2). Hume appeals to the Copy Principle as an intermediate link in these 
inferences. However, the Copy Principle supplies the necessary inferential link only if it 
regulates what ideas can represent—specifically, if it limits what ideas can represent to 
objects or basic aspects that are found in experience. Thus, Hume seems to identify (or, at 
the very least, closely associate) the Copy Principle with content empiricism. 
I noted in the previous section that Hume himself does not introduce the notion of 
a basic aspect. Yet, his endorsement of Locke’s no-innate-idea thesis gives us reason to 
think that he requires any basic aspects that the mind represents to first be found in 
experience. It is important to note here that an object’s simple parts—in Hume’s sense of 
‘simple’—do not always comprehend its basic aspects, either individually or collectively. 
For instance, an object’s spatiality or temporality is not given in any single one of its parts 
or in the mere aggregate of the parts—it consists in a certain ‘manner of appearance’ of 
those parts (T 1.2.3.4 SBN 34; Kemp Smith 1941, 271).16 We should not interpret Hume’s 
content empiricism as the principle that an idea’s representation of an object requires an 
                                               
16 Kemp Smith observes that for Hume space and time are features that are not found in simple 
parts or in mere aggregates of simple parts (1941, 279).  
  23 
 
 
impression of the object or of its parts (rather than of its aspects): if we did, Hume’s content 
empiricism would allow for ideas of some basic aspects where there are no impressions of 
those aspects. Hume’s views on the empirical limits of mental representation would then 
depart considerably from Locke’s. Hume is committed to a stricter principle—the principle 
that an idea’s representation of an object requires experiences of the object or of its basic 
aspects.17  
 1.2.3. Mapping the Copy Principle onto content empiricism 
Despite the fact that Hume implies the Copy Principle to be an expression of content 
empiricism, it is not easy to ascertain how the literal meaning of the principle corresponds 
to content empiricism. This difficulty stems from the fact that the meaning of the principle 
(even its literal meaning) is not obvious to begin with. Hume’s articulations of the principle 
are generally variants of his initial statement of it, ‘all our simple ideas in their first 
appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and 
which they exactly represent’ (T 1.1.1.7 SBN 4) (see, e.g. T 1.1.7.5 SBN 19; T 1.2.3.1 SBN 
33;  T 1.3.14.11 SBN 160-1; T 2.1.11.7 SBN 318-9). An obstacle to interpreting this 
principle is understanding the exact nature of the entities that Hume labels ‘perceptions,’ 
‘impressions,’ and ‘ideas’ and that he regards as the basic constituents of any mental state 
or activity. It is a matter of scholarly debate whether Hume views these entities as the 
immediate objects of mental states (as what our mental states are of or about, just as Locke 
                                               
17 This principle is stricter because basic aspects are more exhaustive of representational contents 
than parts. If a mind can represent all possible basic aspects, it can represent all possible parts (note, 
here, that spatial minimality is a basic aspect). Yet, a mind that could represent all possible parts 
would not thereby be able to represent all possible aspects (since, as noted above, an object’s parts 
do not always comprehend its basic aspects). 
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views ‘ideas’), or whether he instead views them as mental states in their own right, which 
can be representational and be directed at (or be of) objects, but which can also consist of 
(either partly or entirely) non-representational phenomena in the mind.18 In defense of the 
first alternative (that perceptions are intentional objects), one might cite Hume’s apparent 
disapproval of a ‘philosophical view’ that distinguishes between perceptions and their 
objects in T 1.4.2 (Waxman 2016, 144-145). In defense of the second alternative (that 
perceptions are mental states), one might cite Hume’s appeals to features of perceptions 
that cannot easily be construed as features of intentional objects, such as liveliness and ‘the 
action of the mind’ (Ainslie 2015, 211-217). The Copy Principle closely approximates 
content empiricism if we interpret ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’ as intentional objects (at least 
provided that we also attribute to Hume Locke’s view that ideas as such are ‘all the 
materials of thinking’ and cannot themselves represent anything that is not reducible to 
ideas). If we interpret ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’ as mental states, however, the Copy 
Principle does not so much regulate mental representation as it regulates those mental states 
themselves qua mental states. Note, specifically, that the Copy Principle as such would not 
set limits to what an idea can represent (i.e. it would not stipulate anything that an idea 
cannot represent). It would require that every simple idea represent an impression (namely, 
the impression from which it is derived), but it would not limit what the idea represents to 
                                               
18 I mention only two interpretive options (out of potentially many more) because they suffice for 
the purposes of highlighting the ambiguity of the Copy Principle. For instances of the first reading 
(i.e. the intentional-object reading), see Kemp Smith (1941, 11); Bennett (1971, 222); Penelhum 
(1975, 28-9); Stroud (1977, 17-18); and Waxman (1994, 10, 18; 2016, 144-145). For instances of 
the second reading (i.e. the mental-state reading) see Ainslie (2015, 211-217) and Alanen (2006, 
193). 
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just that impression.19 Thus, on the second alternative, the Copy Principle would not be 
equivalent to content empiricism; content empiricism does set limits on what an idea can 
represent—namely, contents that are found in experience. 
 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to properly defend a view on whether 
perceptions are intentional objects or mental states—a task that hinges on the interpretation 
of some notoriously challenging parts of Hume’s philosophy, like his theories of the mind 
and of the external world (T 1.4.6 and T 1.4.2). Hence, this dissertation will remain neutral 
on this point. In other words, my analyses of memory, temporal concepts, and belief about 
the past in the following chapters will be compatible with both an ‘objects’ reading of 
‘perceptions’ and a ‘mental states’ reading. 
 One way to map the Copy Principle onto content empiricism is to attribute to Hume 
a theory of mental representation on which copying (i.e. causal derivation and resemblance) 
is essential to representing, such that an idea can represent something only if it is a copy 
of it. The Copy Principle tells us that simple ideas are always copies of simple impressions. 
If so, then simple ideas are not copies of anything else (on the safe assumption that an 
object can be related by both causal derivation and resemblance to only one object). It 
follows from these premises that what a simple idea represents is entirely determined by 
the impression it copies. Thus, the Copy Principle together with this view of mental 
representation entail a thesis that closely approximates content empiricism: that for the 
                                               
19 If the Copy Principle stipulated that a simple idea (understood as a mental state) represents only 
the impression from which it derived, it would conflict with Hume’s discussion of abstract ideas. 
In that discussion, Hume indicates that a simple idea can represent more than the impression from 
which it derived; when a simple idea of green is associated with the term ‘green,’ for instance, it 
represents greenness in general (T 1.1.7.7 SBN 20-21). 
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mind to have a simple idea of something an impression must first instantiate that 
something. As I observe in §1.3.2., several scholars have in fact attributed to Hume such a 
theory of mental representation. 
I propose that, rather than constrain our interpretation of Hume’s views on the 
nature of perceptions and mental representation by an attempt to salvage the precision of 
his writing (i.e. by mapping the literal meaning of the Copy Principle onto content 
empiricism), we instead interpret the principle non-literally. As I showed in the previous 
section, Hume clearly intends the Copy Principle as a statement of the empirical limits to 
the representational capacities of the mind. What is more, Hume’s defense of the Copy 
Principle is a defense of precisely these empirical limits. Hume marshals the following 
evidence in defense of the Copy Principle: 
When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact 
representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of 
the one, which is not to be found in the other. (T 1.1.1.3 SBN 2-3) 
 
I can imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose pavement 
is gold and walls are rubies, tho' I never saw any such. I have seen Paris; 
but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city, as will perfectly 
represent all its streets and houses in their real and just proportions? (T 
1.1.1.4 SBN 3) 
 
To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the 
objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressions; but proceed not 
so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce the impressions by exciting the 
ideas. (T 1.1.1.8 SBN 4-5)  
 
We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine-apple, without 
having actually tasted it. (T 1.1.1.9 SBN 5) 
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Hume’s observations constitute evidence that the mind’s representation of an object is 
always preceded by an experience of that object (as in the case of ideas of colors and tastes) 
or else by experiences of the object’s aspects (as in the case of the ideas of Paris and New 
Jerusalem). In other words, every ‘circumstance’ in the objects that the mind represents is 
‘to be found’ in something it has experienced. Experience supports an inductive 
generalization that the mental representation of an object must be preceded by an 
experience that instantiates either the object or its basic aspects.20 Thus, Hume not only 
intends the Copy Principle as content empiricism—his evidence for the Copy Principle is 
evidence for content empiricism specifically. Given that Hume clearly states that he intends 
the Copy Principle to designate content empiricism, and, moreover, given that his evidence 
for the Copy Principle is evidence for content empiricism specifically, it is interpretively 
appropriate to read the Copy Principle as a statement of content empiricism, whether or not 
its literal meaning corresponds to the principle. My view here is not that the literal meaning 
of the Copy Principle does not map onto content empiricism, but rather, that ascertaining 
this correspondence is not necessary for our interpretation of it, given that Hume clearly 
states what he intends the principle to designate; in other words, it does not seem out of the 
question to read the principle non-literally. In addition, if the literal meaning of the 
principle did not map onto content empiricism, it would not affect Hume’s grounds for 
maintaining content empiricism, since Hume offers evidence of content empiricism itself 
                                               
20 I here follow Garrett (1997, 43-50) in interpreting the arguments in T 1.1.1 as inductive 
arguments. 
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(i.e. as opposed to offering evidence for a separate view that would entail content 
empiricism).21 
 1.2.4. A corollary 
Hume’s defense of the Copy Principle indicates that he also maintains the following 
principle: 
In order for the mind to have an idea that represents an object, it is sufficient 
that it have an impression that instantiates the object. 
 
Hume observes that we can reliably introduce an idea of an object by introducing an 
impression of the object, as when we produce an idea of scarlet in a child by conveying an 
impression of scarlet; he also observes that impressions are constantly followed by ideas 
of what they instantiate (T 1.1.1.8 SBN 4-5). These observations support a sufficient causal 
condition for the mind to have an idea that represents a certain object, namely, that it have 
an impression that instantiates the object. This principle must be qualified by a distinction 
between the occurrence of an idea and the disposition to have an idea. Hume’s examples 
show that it is sufficient for the occurrence of an idea of an object at time t2 that the mind 
have an experience of that object immediately prior (i.e. at time t1). Moreover, it seems 
that the experience of an object is generally sufficient for a disposition to have an 
(occurrent) idea of the object in the future in certain circumstances, for instance, when 
                                               
21 Hume has often been charged with trying to derive conclusions about representation, concepts, 
and meaning from the Copy Principle, even though the Copy Principle as he phrases it cannot ‘bear 
the weight’ of conclusions about these subjects (Bennett 2001, 211-216; Landy 2012, 24). We can 
read Hume’s arguments more charitably, however. Hume gives us reason to think that he intends 
the Copy Principle as content empiricism; moreover, Hume has adequate grounds for maintaining 
content empiricism. As content empiricism, the Copy Principle can in fact support Hume’s 
conclusions. 
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having an experience of an associated object. Clearly, however, the experience of an object 
is not in and of itself sufficient for the occurrence of an idea of the object at any given time 
t after the experience. 
Both content empiricism and the above corollary are empirical generalizations 
rather than necessary laws. As such, they admit of exceptions. Hume discusses the idea of 
‘the missing shade of blue’ as a possible exception to content empiricism (T 1.1.1.10 SBN 
5-6). We might likewise envision exceptions to the above corollary—cases where 
experiences fail to register immediate occurrent ideas or dispositions to ideas. Nonetheless, 
as Hume observes, exceptions to an empirical generalization do not invalidate the 
generalization (T 1.1.1.10 SBN 5-6). The regularity backing content empiricism in 
particular is strong enough that Hume appeals to the principle throughout the Treatise as 
though it were true of all cases of mental representation. 
1.3. Mental representation 
 1.3.1. Methodological preliminaries 
Hume holds it to be a brute fact that resemblance, contiguity, and causation link ideas in 
the mind (T 1.1.4.6 SBN 13); that pride and humility are directed at the self (T 2.1.3.3 SBN 
280); that pride is pleasant and humility painful (T 2.1.5.4 SBN 286); and that benevolence 
is conjoined to love and anger to hatred (T 2.2.6.6 SBN 368). In each of these instances, 
Hume comments that the causes of the principle in question are ‘original qualities of 
human nature,’ or features of the mind’s ‘original constitution.’ While he hints that these 
‘original qualities’ are physiological (T 1.2.5.20 SBN 60), he stresses that attempting to 
explain them would be ‘presumptuous’ and produce only ‘obscure and uncertain 
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speculations’ (T Intro 8, SBN xvii; T 1.1.4.6 SBN 13). He cautions against the ‘intemperate 
desire of searching into causes:’ some principles about the mind cannot be attributed to any 
further principle or cause, but must be assumed to be simply a function of the mind’s basic 
structure (T 1.1.4.6 SBN 13). 
 Hume supposes that mental representation is not a brute fact of this kind when he 
inquires after the causes of various mental representations, including seemingly 
fundamental ones like that of external objects and that of the self. This assumption might 
be challenged: why assume that we can identify the causes of mental representation? Might 
not the representation of external objects and that of the self be simply functions of the 
mind’s original constitution?22  
 One reason for Hume’s supposition that mental representation is explainable is his 
methodology. Hume follows a Newtonian methodological directive to subsume natural 
phenomena under a small number of universal principles: ‘we must endeavour to render 
all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and 
explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes’ (T Intro 8 SBN xvii). He 
explicitly applies this directive in arguing that moral sentiments admit of causal 
explanation: 
                                               
22 Several scholars have argued that Hume has a naturalistic theory of mental representation—a 
theory that explains mental representation in terms of relations found throughout the natural world 
(Garrett 2006; Hamid 2015, 172; Cottrell 2018). Note, however, that establishing that Hume has a 
naturalistic theory of mental representation does not answer the above question. Naturalistic 
theories still allow some qualities to be ‘original’ (i.e. explanatorily basic). If so, we can still ask 
what Hume’s reasons are for assuming that mental representation does not belong in this category 
of ‘original qualities.’ 
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It may now be ask’d in general, concerning this pain or pleasure, that 
distinguishes moral good and evil, From what principles is it derived, and 
whence does it arise in the human mind? To this I reply, first, that ’tis absurd 
to imagine, that in every particular instance, these sentiments are produc’d 
by an original quality and primary constitution. For as the number of our 
duties is, in a manner, infinite, ’tis impossible that our original instincts 
should extend to each of them, and from our very first infancy impress on 
the human mind all that multitude of precepts, which are contain’d in the 
compleatest system of ethics. Such a method of proceeding is not 
conformable to the usual maxims, by which nature is conducted, where a 
few principles produce all that variety we observe in the universe, and every 
thing is carry’d on in the easiest and most simple manner. ’Tis necessary, 
therefore, to abridge these primary impulses, and find some more general 
principles, upon which all our notions of morals are founded. (T 3.1.2.6 
SBN 473) 
 
Hume’s argument is that, were we to allow that moral sentiments arise in certain 
circumstances simply in virtue of the mind’s ‘original constitution,’ then, given how 
numerous and diverse these circumstances are, we would be allowing natural phenomena 
to be highly irregular. Doing so would be contrary to the Newtonian directive to view 
nature as regular. Just like moral sentiments, mental representations arise in a wide variety 
of circumstances. Ideas can represent both particular objects and general classes of objects 
(T 1.1.7.6 SBN 19-20). Qualitatively identical ideas can represent different objects, while 
qualitatively different ideas can represent one same object (T 1.1.7.8-9 SBN 21-22). Both 
impressions and ideas can represent (T 1.2.3.15 SBN 38-39; Garrett 2006, 304). In keeping 
with the Newtonian directive, then, Hume cannot regard all these instances of 
representation as explanatorily basic, or as simply functions of the mind’s original 
constitution, but must seek general principles regulating them. 
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Before examining what general principles regulate mental representation for Hume, 
it is worth noting two desiderata suggested by Hume’s methodology for the interpretation 
of these principles. First, the Newtonian directive just noted (to ‘render all our principles 
as universal as possible’ and to ‘explain all effects from the simplest and fewest causes’) 
means that Hume would approve of a theory of mental representation in proportion as it is 
parsimonious—in proportion as it uses the fewest possible principles to account for all 
instances of mental representation. In fact, on the Newtonian directive, a theory that 
accounted for both mental and non-mental representation on the fewest possible principles 
would be even more preferable. Hume describes children as representations of their parents 
(T 2.1.9.13 SBN 308-309), money and riches as representations of ‘the goods of life’ (T 
2.2.5.6 SBN 359-60), and ‘the giving of stone and earth’ as a representation of the transfer 
of property (T 3.2.4.2 SBN 515-6). A maximally parsimonious theory of representation 
would be one that attributes representation across both the mental and non-mental domains 
to the same underlying causes. 
 Second, Hume’s theory of mental representation must be one that explains not just 
its causes but also its constitutive nature. Hume maintains that philosophical relations—
his term for any relation that we might posit between two objects when comparing them—
reduce to seven basic kinds: resemblance, identity, relations of time and place, proportion 
in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, contrariety, and causation (T 1.1.5.1-2 SBN 
13-14; T 1.1.3.1 SBN 69-70). Insofar as representation is a philosophical relation, its 
omission from this list implies that for Hume representation reduces to, or is constituted 
by, these other relations, and that an explanation of the constitutive nature of representation 
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is required. One might wonder whether Hume is in fact warranted in deeming 
representation to be thus reducible—or even in assuming his list of basic philosophical 
relations to be complete (Beebee 2011, 248, note 7). Here again, Hume’s methodology 
clarifies his reasons. The Newtonian directive aforementioned indicates that a philosophy 
that reduces representation to more basic relations (provided, of course, that it does so 
cogently), and that thereby limits the number of its basic explanatory principles and 
concepts, is preferable to one that construes it as an additional basic relation. As we will 
see, the recent literature on Hume’s views on representation suggests that Hume does 
cogently reduce representation in this way. 
 1.3.2. Hume’s theory of mental representation 
On one interpretation of Hume’s theory of mental representation, a perception’s 
representation of an object consists in its copying the object, that is, in its resembling and 
being caused by the object.23 This interpretation is built on the observation that, at least in 
the case of simple ideas, the representation relation seems very closely connected to 
(maybe even identical with) the copy relation: a simple idea that represents a blue point 
does so by being a copy of a blue point. Though not as obvious in the case of complex 
ideas—which often represent objects from which they are not copied, such as fictional 
cities (‘The New Jerusalem’)—even then representation seems closely connected to 
copying. Complex ideas are arrangements of simple ideas. We can reasonably suppose that 
their representational capacity is fixed by their constituent simple ideas and their 
                                               
23 Cohon and Owen (1997) and Landy (2012, 2017) are proponents of the copy interpretation. 
Falkenstein suggests a similar interpretation: that representation can be identified with resemblance 
(2015, 49).  
  34 
 
 
arrangement—that they represent the objects that their constituent simple ideas represent, 
and represent them arranged in the same way those ideas are arranged (Landy 2017, 4-5; 
Cottrell 2018, 4). Because simple ideas represent by being copies, on this view copying 
would still be central to representation in complex ideas. Hume seems to attest to the 
connection between copying and mental representation in his statement of the Copy 
Principle: ‘all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple 
impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent’ (T 1.1.1.7 
SBN 4). In another passage, he seems to suggest that resemblance is necessary for 
representation: ‘... had we any idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an 
impression of it; which is very difficult, if not impossible, to be conceiv’d. For how can an 
impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it?’ (T 1.4.5.3 SBN 232-
233).  
 On a second interpretation of Hume’s theory, a perception’s representing X consists 
in its assuming the causal or functional role of X. I will refer to a perception’s assuming an 
object’s role as its mirroring that object. For a perception to mirror an object is for it to 
produce effects that are the same or parallel to those that the object would produce (Garrett 
2006, 310). Thus, for instance, a perception might represent fire by producing the same 
effects that fire would produce (e.g. fear), or, alternatively, by producing parallel effects 
(e.g. ideas of heat and smoke, which parallel the heat and smoke that fire itself would 
produce). This interpretation is motivated by Hume’s discussion of cases of both mental 
and non-mental representation in which an object seems to represent another object not by 
copying it, but by mirroring it in the way described. Thus, for instance, when an idea 
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represents a general kind, such as the class of all gold objects, it seems to do so not by 
copying the class, but by producing effects that parallel the effects that the class would 
produce. Thus, the class of all gold objects would produce impressions of particular 
instances of gold, wealth, or solubility in aqua regia; the idea of the class mirrors it by 
producing ideas of these things. Similarly, when money represents ‘the goods of life’ (T 
2.2.5.6 SBN 359-60), it does so not by copying those goods, but by producing the same or 
parallel effects as they would produce. 
 A third interpretation combines both of these interpretations into a ‘hybrid’ 
interpretation. On the hybrid model, an idea’s copying an object is responsible for its 
representation of the object’s intrinsic features, whereas an idea’s mirroring an object is 
responsible for its representation of the object’s relations to other objects (Schafer 2013, 
998). Thus, an idea of a gold object represents its color in virtue of copying it; yet, it 
represents the object’s membership in the class of all gold objects in virtue of mirroring 
the class. This interpretation incorporates the notion that copying is closely connected to 
representation: it views copying as the basis of the representation of intrinsic features; 
moreover, given that an idea must first represent an object’s intrinsic features before it can 
represent the object’s relations to other objects, this interpretation in fact views copying as 
essential to any kind of representation (Schafer 2013, 996-997). At the same time, the 
interpretation also incorporates the notion that the representation of certain objects (such 
as general kinds) consists not in copying but in mirroring.24 
                                               
24 Similar hybrid interpretations have been proposed by Ainslie (2010; 2015, 64-69) and Hamid 
(2015). Hamid identifies representation with signification; I read his interpretation as a hybrid one 
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 An advantage of the second interpretation—henceforth the ‘mirroring 
interpretation’—over both the ‘copy’ and ‘hybrid’ interpretations is that it offers a more 
unified account of the constitutive nature of representation. I noted in §1.3.1 that Hume 
needs an account of the constitutive nature of representation; he does not consider 
representation to be a basic or irreducible relation. On the copy and hybrid interpretations, 
the constitutive nature of representation cannot be uniform across all cases of 
representation. As I have already suggested, representation is not constituted by copying 
in many cases (e.g. an idea’s representation of a general kind25 or money’s representation 
of the goods of life), and so the copy interpretation must explain representation in such 
cases as constituted differently.26 Similarly, on the hybrid interpretation, the representation 
                                               
because he explains signification as a Berkeleyan relation that consists sometimes of resemblance 
(as in the case of images) and sometimes of suggestion (as in the case of words) (2015, 181).  
25 Landy defends the copy interpretation on this score by arguing that the representation of general 
kinds is in fact constituted by copying. He notes that an idea represents a general kind by 
representing a class of objects related to each other by resemblance; for instance, an idea represents 
the class of all gold objects by representing a class of objects resembling each other in terms of 
goldenness. If we think of such an idea as a complex idea, where its parts represent certain objects 
(such as gold objects) by being copies of them, and where these parts themselves resemble each 
other in terms of goldenness, then this complex idea represents a class of objects in the same way 
any other complex idea represents its object: namely, by having parts that represent certain objects 
and that are related in certain ways. Because the idea’s parts represent their respective objects by 
being copies of them, the idea’s representational capacity seems ultimately reducible to copying 
(Landy 2017, 10-13). However, while Landy’s proposal might explain how an idea represents a 
limited number of objects resembling each other, it does not explain how an idea represents all 
objects of a certain kind resembling each other—an idea cannot be made up of as many parts as 
there are gold objects. Hume clearly maintains that ideas of general kinds represent all objects of a 
certain kind (T 1.1.7.2 SBN 17-18; 1.1.7.7 SBN 20-21). He also explicitly states that these ideas 
represent those objects without ‘drawing them all out distinctly in the imagination’—that is, 
without having parts that are copies of those objects (T 1.1.7.7 SBN 20-21). 
26 Landy in fact suggests that representation by depiction (as when an image represents an object) 
is constituted by copying, but representation by proxy (as when a lawyer represents a client) is 
constituted by mirroring (2017, 7).  
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of intrinsic features is constituted differently than the representation of extrinsic features: 
in the former case representation is constituted by copying, in the latter by mirroring. Thus, 
the copy and hybrid interpretations do not specify a representation relation common to all 
cases of representation, but instead posit different constitutive natures in different cases. 
Because the mirroring interpretation does specify a common constitutive nature—
mirroring27—it offers a more parsimonious account of representation. 
 An advantage of the copy and hybrid interpretations, however, is that they are more 
congruous with Hume’s emphasis on the connection between copying and representing. 
Hume repeatedly associates copying and representing. As I noted in §1.2.2 and §1.2.3, he 
views the Copy Principle as a principle that regulates mental representation (i.e. as content 
empiricism). An interpretation on which copying is essential to representation helps to 
explain why Hume uses the language of copying in his discussion of representation. In 
contrast, the mirroring interpretation seems to leave Hume’s emphasis on copying 
                                               
27 It has been objected that the mirroring interpretation explains only the representation of an 
object’s relational or structural features; it does not explain the representation of an object’s 
intrinsic features, or the representation of an object as having certain features (Schafer 2013, 993-
994; Landy 2017, 7). Thus, in mirroring a piece of gold, an idea represents features like its effects 
or its membership in different classes of objects, not features such as its particular color or shine; 
representation of the latter features consists in copying or picturing the object, not in mirroring. 
However, while this objection captures the intuition that copying or picturing are importantly 
relevant to representation of intrinsic features, it is not obvious why, even in these cases, the 
representation relation would not be ultimately a matter of mirroring. That is, it is not obvious why 
an idea’s representing a piece of gold as having a particular color would not be ultimately a matter 
of its assuming the causal-functional role of a piece of gold of that particular color. Note that, in 
insisting on the mirroring interpretation, one is not proposing that the idea lacks phenomenology 
or that its phenomenology (or its being a copy, for that matter) is irrelevant to its representational 
capacity. One is only identifying the representational capacity with mirroring; phenomenology 
might still be crucial to that capacity—for instance, perhaps phenomenology is what enables the 
mirroring that constitutes representation of intrinsic features. 
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mysterious: if representation is simply a matter of assuming a causal or functional role, 
why are the impressions that an idea copies relevant to determining what it can and cannot 
represent? 
 One way to reconcile these various interpretations while preserving the virtues of 
each is to interpret the constitutive nature of mental representation as mirroring, but its 
causal basis as copying. That is, an idea’s representation of an object like a piece of gold 
is constituted by its mirroring the object; yet, what causally enables the idea to mirror the 
object in that way is its copying certain relevant impressions, such as an impression of a 
piece of gold. We have already seen that the mirroring interpretation is a strong candidate 
as an interpretation of the constitutive nature of representation, since it attributes 
representation across all the cases Hume discusses to a common relation. The ‘copy’ 
interpretation, in turn, is a strong candidate as an interpretation of the causal basis of mental 
representation. To see why, consider, first, that there seems to be a close affinity between 
the properties of a representational object and the properties of the object it represents, 
insofar as having certain properties seems to better enable an object to mirror objects that 
have those properties. A photograph of a person mirrors that person as a result of 
resembling (i.e. having some of the same visual properties) as the person. If so, as Garrett 
(2006) notes, copying is naturally conducive to representation across both the mental and 
non-mental domains: when an object copies another, it acquires some of the properties of 
that object, which naturally facilitates its mirroring that object (311). More crucially, in the 
case of ideas, their mirroring an object seems to always involve their copying impressions 
of the object or of its basic aspects (even though, as we will see later, it often involves 
  39 
 
 
imaginative mechanisms as well). Even when ideas represent general kinds, copying an 
instance of the kind is a necessary (though not sufficient) causal factor in their mirroring 
the kind (312-313). Thus, even though the mirroring interpretation better captures the 
constitutive nature of representation, it is nevertheless fitting that Hume emphasizes the 
role of copying in mental representation, since copying is its causal basis.  
 The notion that copying is the causal basis of mental representation complements 
Hume’s content empiricism. If the mind’s representation of an object consists in its having 
an idea that assumes the causal or functional role of the object, and if what enables this 
mirroring is the idea’s copying impressions of the object or of its basic aspects, then these 
impressions are required before the mind can represent those objects.  
It is worth noting that the literature on Hume’s theory of representation often fails 
to distinguish between a theory of the causes of representation and a theory of its 
constitutive nature. Thus, for instance, Schafer relies on the language of ‘determination’ 
when stating the different theories that could be attributed to Hume: ‘what an idea 
represents is determined by…’; ‘what an idea represents is the product of’ (2013, 983, 985, 
996, 998); yet, this language leaves it ambiguous whether the theories in question concern 
the causes or the constitution of representation. Landy and Cottrell also rely on similarly 
ambiguous language: ‘any representation that represents its object as having some feature 
does so by being a picture of that object’ (Landy 2017, 2); ‘a perception represents that of 
which it is a copy’ (Landy 2017, 2); ‘x represents y iff…’ (Cottrell 2018, 4, 6). In all these 
instances, the language (i.e. the underlined terms) can be interpreted in either a causal or a 
constitutive sense. When we distinguish between a causal and a constitutive theory, 
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however, it becomes clear that the mirroring interpretation offers the most compelling 
account of Hume’s constitutive theory, while the copy interpretation offers the most 
compelling account of his causal theory. 
 1.4. Conclusion 
It is common to attribute to Hume the view that experience constrains what the mind can 
represent, yet this view is seldom articulated in detail. This chapter has established that 
Hume is committed to the principle that in order for an idea to represent an object, an 
impression must first instantiate the object or its basic aspects. I have proposed that we 
read the Copy Principle as a non-literal expression of content empiricism. Hume suggests 
that he intends the Copy Principle as an expression of this principle; moreover, the evidence 
Hume marshals in favor of the Copy Principle is evidence for content empiricism 
specifically. 
 This chapter has also established that Hume’s theory of mental representation must 
account for both its constitutive nature and its causes. Interpreting a perception’s 
representation of an object as constituted by its mirroring the object does justice to Hume’s 
commitment to ‘rendering all our principles as universal as possible,’ since mirroring 
seems to be common to all cases of representation, both mental and non-mental. 
Interpreting an idea’s representation of an object as caused by its copying impressions of 
the object does justice to Hume’s frequent appeals to copying as the basis of mental 
representation. 
 Thus, a preliminary expectation on how ideas represent temporal and past objects 
is that, as a result of copying impressions that instantiate such objects (or at least their basic 
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aspects), ideas come to mirror the objects. Chapter 3 develops a more detailed account on 
this schema. 
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CHAPTER 2: MEMORY28 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Contemporary philosophers distinguish between three kinds of memory: remembering an 
experience, such as watching the sunset, via a mental state that copies or ‘brings back’ 
that experience; remembering a fact that one did not directly experience or cannot ‘bring 
back,’ for instance, that Rabat is the capital of Morocco, or having been born on a sunny 
day; and remembering how to do something, like how to ride a bike (Deutscher and 
Martin 1966, 161-164). Early modern philosophers did not clearly distinguish between 
these kinds of memory. While Hume’s ‘memory’ clearly encompasses the first kind, it is 
unclear that it includes the other two. Remembering how to do something consists in an 
ability to replicate behavior, but for Hume memory is a capacity for ideas. Similarly, 
Hume describes memories as lively and as corresponding to the impressions from which 
they derived; yet, remembering facts like the aforementioned does not typically involve 
ideas fitting this description. Thus, I interpret Hume’s ‘memory’ as referring only to 
memory of experiences; accordingly, I will use the term to refer only to memory of 
experiences.  
Hume specifies that in the context of the memory-imagination distinction, 
‘imagination’ refers not just to fanciful ideas, but to any ideas that are not memories, 
                                               
28 With the exception of §2.4, most of the content of this chapter has previously been published in 
Cruz, Maité. 2019. ‘Hume’s Dual Criteria for Memory,’ Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 
(2019): 336-358. The structure of the content has been modified. The explanation in p.48 bottom 
(paragraph beginning ‘The terms…’) has been modified. The explanation in p.61 bottom 
(paragraph beginning ‘One might challenge..’) has been modified. 
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even to beliefs and ideas about demonstrative proofs (note that he uses ‘imagination’ 
differently in the context of distinguishing between reasoning and non-reasoning ideas) 
(T 1.3.9.19n22 SBN 117). Given the restriction of ‘memory’ to memory of experiences, I 
will accordingly use ‘imagination’ to refer to ideas that are not memories of experiences. 
Hume lays out the entirety of his account of memory over the course of two brief 
sections of the Treatise. In ‘Of the ideas of the memory and imagination,’ he introduces 
two kinds of criteria for an idea’s being a memory: a criterion related to the idea’s 
phenomenal character and a criterion that the idea correspond to the past experience from 
which it derived (T 1.1.3 SBN 8). In ‘Of the impressions of the senses and memory,’ he 
raises what seems to be a skeptical doubt regarding our knowledge of ideas’ 
correspondence to past experiences, a doubt that would reduce his initial criteria for 
memory to only the phenomenal criterion (T 1.3.5 SBN 84). 
The bad reputation of this account (as noted in the Introduction) owes mostly to 
Hume’s lack of clarity on the relation between the two criteria. Hume is unclear on 
whether he ultimately maintains or revokes the criterion of correspondence to the past. 
Scholars who read him as revoking it are faced with a highly counterintuitive definition 
of memory as nothing but phenomenal character.29 On the other hand, scholars who read 
him as maintaining correspondence to the past find few resources in the text by way of 
understanding how the two criteria jointly characterize memory (how they amount to 
necessary and sufficient conditions) and by way of reaching a verdict on problematic 
                                               
29 Johnson (1987, 1995) admits to attributing to Hume a highly counterintuitive notion of memory. 
I discuss Johnson’s interpretation in §2.2 and §2.3.2. 
  44 
 
 
cases (ideas that conform to one criterion but not the other, like so-called ‘false 
memories’).30 
This chapter clarifies and defends Hume’s theory of memory. After reviewing 
Hume’s criteria and the existing interpretations (§2.2), I examine the criteria in the 
context of two distinct theoretical aims: scientific classification and definition (§2.3.1). I 
argue that, qua scientific classification, Hume’s criteria cross-classify ideas according to 
both phenomenal character and correspondence to the past (§2.3.2); qua definition of 
‘memory,’ Hume’s criteria are cogent on a Putnamian conception of definition, according 
to which a definition is a specification of the various linguistic categories associated with 
a term, rather than of the necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in its 
extension (§2.3.3). I then address Hume’s reasons for excluding representation of the self 
and representation of the past from the criteria (§2.4). These clarifications show that, 
while only the nuts and bolts of an account of memory, Hume’s criteria are much more 
coherent, intuitive, and philosophically promising than has standardly been supposed. 
2.2. The dual criteria for memory 
As we saw in Chapter 1, Hume holds that all ideas—both memories and imaginings—are 
copies of impressions and represent objects the aspects of which were instantiated in 
                                               
30 Noxon (1976), McDonough (2002), and Traiger (2011) interpret Hume as maintaining the 
correspondence criterion. I address their interpretations in §2.2. Flage (1985) reads the criterion as 
necessary and sufficient for memory. He interprets the criterion as causal reference: memories 
differ from imaginings in that a memory refers to a corresponding impression as its cause. 
However, while Hume describes the correspondence criterion as involving a causal connection 
between a memory and a past impression (see §2.2), he never describes it as requiring that a 
memory refer to a cause. Flage’s interpretation departs too widely from the text to adequately 
reflect Hume’s views. 
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impressions.31 Memories and imaginings are different kinds of copies.32 Hume’s first 
criterion has been labelled the phenomenal criterion because it specifies differences 
between these kinds that are immediately accessible to introspection, or, to use Hume’s 
word, ‘sensible.’ 
We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the 
mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after 
two different ways: either when in its new appearance it retains a 
considerable degree of its first vivacity, and is somewhat intermediate 
betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it intirely[sic] loses that 
vivacity, and is a perfect idea. The faculty, by which we repeat our 
impressions in the first manner, is called the Memory, and the other the 
Imagination. ’Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the memory are 
much more lively and strong than those of the imagination, and that the 
former faculty paints its objects in more distinct colours, than any which are 
employ’d by the latter. When we remember any past event, the idea of it 
flows in upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the 
perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv’d 
by the mind steddy[sic] and uniform for any considerable time. Here then 
is a sensible difference betwixt one species of ideas and another. (T 1.1.3.1 
SBN 8-9) 
  
                                               
31 Passmore interprets Hume’s frequent appeals to ‘impressions of the memory’ throughout the 
Treatise (e.g. T 1.3.4.1 SBN 82-83; T 1.3.5.1 SBN 84; T 1.3.6.6-7 SBN 89; T 1.3.9.7 SBN 110; T 
2.3.1.17 SBN 406) as inconsistent with his official classification of memories as ideas (Passmore 
1968, 96). However, given that when Hume first introduces the locution he prefaces it by 
mentioning that he regards memories as equivalent to impressions (T 1.3.4.1 SBN 82-83), 
‘impression of the memory’ should not be interpreted literally, as suggesting that memories are 
impressions, but instead as shorthand for ‘impression-equivalent memory idea.’ 
32 Even though Hume repeatedly appeals to memory and imagination also as faculties for ideas (T 
1.1.3.1 SBN 8-9; T 1.3.9.19n22 SBN 117; T 1.4.6.18 SBN 260), he distinguishes between these 
faculties by distinguishing between the kinds of ideas they produce. Hence, I focus on the difference 
between the ideas. I leave any difference between the faculties above and beyond the differences 
in the ideas as a question for another investigation. 
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The phenomenal criterion is sometimes interpreted as simply the greater degree of 
liveliness that memories have over imagination ideas. While greater liveliness is certainly 
a crucial distinguishing trait of memory, Hume also mentions greater sharpness or acutance 
(memory ‘paints its objects in more distinct colours’) and greater persistence (memories 
can be ‘preserved by the mind steady and uniform for a considerable time’) (Broughton 
1992, 157; Traiger 2008, 61-62). The phenomenal criterion is the set of differentiating 
features pertaining to the ideas’ phenomenal character. In some passages, Hume 
distinguishes memories by reference to liveliness alone (e.g. T 1.3.5.3-7 SBN 85-86). I 
interpret ‘liveliness’ in these passages as shorthand for the entire set of phenomenal 
features.33 Accordingly, in what follows I also use ‘liveliness’ as shorthand. 
The second criterion has been labelled the ‘epistemic,’ ‘formal,’ and ‘constitutive’ 
criterion because it specifies a difference between memories and imaginings that is not 
accessible to introspection, but that we theorize to exist between them. I call this criterion 
the isomorphism criterion. 
There is another difference betwixt these two kinds of ideas, which is no 
less evident, namely that tho’ neither the ideas of the memory nor 
imagination, neither the lively nor faint ideas can make their appearance in 
the mind, unless their correspondent impressions have gone before to 
prepare the way for them, yet the imagination is not restrain’d to the same 
order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a 
manner ty’d down in that respect, without any power of variation. 
  
’Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its 
objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in 
                                               
33 Interpreting ‘liveliness’ more literally in these passages would be uncharitable given that Hume 
never revokes the remaining phenomenal features and that his account is much more plausible if 
the phenomenal difference comprises all these features. 
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recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that 
faculty. An historian may, perhaps, for the more convenient carrying on of 
his narration, relate an event before another, to which it was in fact 
posterior; but then he takes notice of this disorder, if he be exact; and by 
that means replaces the idea in its due position. ’Tis the same case in our 
recollection of those places and persons, with which we were formerly 
acquainted. The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple 
ideas, but their order and position. (T 1.1.3.2-3 SBN 9)  
  
The isomorphism criterion is much more difficult to interpret. Recall that ideas can be 
complex (made up of parts) or simple (indivisible). Hume distinguishes complex memories 
from complex imaginings by the fact that only the former are ‘restrain’d’ or ‘ty’d down’ to 
the same order of parts of the complex impressions from which they derived. My memory 
of Boston Commons is restrained to the parts-order of my impression of Boston Commons: 
if the state house was up the hill in the impression, it must be up the hill in the memory. 
Here, the terms ‘restrain’d’ and ‘ty’d down’ are ambiguous. They are commonly 
interpreted to suggest a constitutive feature of memory: that is, a memory is restrained to 
the order of its source impression in the sense that its being a memory logically implies 
that it corresponds to that order (e.g. Flage 1985, 172; Johnson [1987, 345; 1995, 55]; 
McDonough 2002, 74; Traiger 2008, 62-3). On the other hand, in the second paragraph 
above Hume suggests that an idea that departs from its source impression’s order could 
still be a memory, but it would be a defective memory. Thus, ‘restrain’d’ and ‘ty’d down’ 
could instead refer to a normative standard: a memory is restrained to an order in the sense 
that, if it deviates from that order, it is a defective or imperfect memory. On this alternative, 
the criterion distinguishing memory and imagination is not that the former’s order 
corresponds to past impressions and the latter’s does not, but rather, that a normative 
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standard applies to memory that does not apply to the imagination (Allison 2008, 26; 
Bennett 2001, 208). Isomorphism is required for memory’s adequacy, whereas imagination 
has no such standard of adequacy. 
I adopt the ‘constitutive’ interpretation of the criterion. Both in this passage and in 
T 1.3.5 Hume describes memory as in fact preserving—not just as aiming to preserve—the 
order of its source impressions: ‘Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form 
…’; ‘tho’ it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position 
of its ideas …’ (T 1.3.5.3 SBN 85). Nonetheless, in prescribing isomorphism as constitutive 
of memory the criterion need not prescribe full or exact isomorphism (McDonough 2002, 
74; Traiger 2008, 63). If the criterion prescribes only partial isomorphism, an idea can still 
be a memory if it departs from the original order to some extent. Consistently with this 
criterion, we might hold memories to a normative standard according to which the greater 
their isomorphism with their original source, the better they are as memories. If so, some 
lack of isomorphism can be a ‘defect or imperfection’ in a memory without preventing it 
from being a memory: a memory might correspond enough to be a memory, yet not enough 
to be a good memory.  
The terms ‘form,’ ‘order,’ and ‘position’ in Hume’s description also require further 
clarification. One question is whether they refer to space or time: is the isomorphism 
between memories and their source impressions one of spatial arrangement, temporal 
arrangement, or both? (Traiger 2008, 62-3). In contrasting memories with imaginings like 
ideas of ‘winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstruous giants,’ Hume indicates that 
memories preserve the spatial arrangement of their source impressions (T 1.1.3.4 SBN 10). 
  49 
 
 
In comparing memories to historical narrations, which aim to accurately represent the 
temporal order of events, Hume indicates that memories also preserve temporal 
arrangement (T 1.1.3.3 SBN 9).  
A second question is whether ‘form’ and ‘order’ refer only to the spatial and 
temporal order of the simple ideas making up a memory, or whether they refer, in addition, 
to the spatial and temporal order of a memory itself with other memories. On the latter 
alternative, memories’ spatiotemporal relations to other memories must correspond to their 
source impressions’ spatiotemporal relations to other impressions. Since there are no 
obvious reasons to prefer one of these alternatives to the other, I will remain neutral 
between the two.34 
Jeffrey McDonough describes an example where an idea coincidentally 
corresponds to a past impression despite the absence of a causal connection between the 
two; he alleges that such an idea meets the isomorphism criterion yet is not a memory 
(2002, 76, 81). However, Hume’s description of the criterion indicates that it consists not 
simply in an idea’s correspondence to any past impression, but in its correspondence to the 
impression from which it is derived: ‘the imagination is not restrain’d to the same order 
and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner ty’d down in that 
respect…’ (T 1.1.3.2 SBN 9, my emphasis). A causal connection between the form of an 
                                               
34 The isomorphism criterion has also sometimes been interpreted as a phenomenal difference. 
Hume’s descriptions of it in terms of ‘restraint’ and ‘powerlessness’ suggest that there is a feeling 
of difficulty or strain in an attempt to change the order of parts of a memory, while in contrast one 
can change the order of parts of an imagining at will (Price 1940, 4; Kemp Smith 1941, 233-4; 
Falkenstein 2013, 116). Notwithstanding this additional phenomenal difference, Hume makes it 
clear that the criterion is not only phenomenal. 
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idea and that of a past impression is thus built into the isomorphism criterion. For the same 
reason, Reid’s counterexample to Hume’s theory—that hitting your head softly against the 
wall after having hit it forcefully meets Hume’s criteria for memory (1785/2002, 289)—
misses the mark. 
It is not a failing of Hume’s account that it does not specify the precise degrees of 
liveliness or of isomorphism requisite for an idea’s being a memory. Many ideas are not 
clearly memories or imaginings, but sit right at the threshold, such that ‘we are frequently 
in doubt concerning the ideas of the memory’ (T 1.3.5.5 SBN 85). Our introspective 
capacities may be too limited to discern minute differences in degrees. Hume does not need 
to ascertain a threshold to be warranted in claiming that some degrees of these features are 
responsible for an idea’s being a memory. 
Hume’s account of memory differs from most other early-modern accounts in that 
the latter typically focus on determining the physiological basis for memory.35 Hume, in 
contrast, seldom ventures into investigations of the physiological causes of mental 
phenomena.36 While Locke discusses memory in some detail (II.x and II.xix), Hume 
seems to borrow little from Locke’s account, despite his reliance on Locke on other 
subjects. There is no clear precedent to Hume’s phenomenal criterion in Locke. Locke 
does employ a criterion of correspondence to past experiences—‘remembrance’ and 
                                               
35 Descartes and Malebranche explained memory in terms of the traces or flexibility that the brain 
fibers retain after the spirits have passed through them, which allows for the easy passage of the 
spirits through those fibers at subsequent times (Descartes Treatise on Man §177-8; Malebranche 
Search 106). Hobbes considered memory to be the continuation of the motions that external objects 
cause in the sense organs (Leviathan Chapter II). 
36 T 1.2.5.20 is a rare instance of a physiological explanation in Hume. Wright (1983, 216-221) 
discusses the influence of physiological explanations on Hume’s thought. 
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‘memory’ consist in the recurrence of a same past idea (II.X.2, II.XIX.1)—but he does 
not specify this criterion as isomorphism (that is, as correspondence in the order of 
parts). 
Hume states the two different criteria in T 1.1.3 without specifying how they 
function as a characterization of memory. He does not indicate, for instance, whether he 
intends each criterion as sufficient or as necessary. Is an idea a memory if it is isomorphic 
with a past impression but not lively? Is it a memory if it is lively but not isomorphic? 
Understanding the precise relation between the two criteria—how it is that they jointly 
characterize memory—is the principal challenge to interpreting Hume’s theory of memory. 
This challenge becomes especially difficult when considering Hume’s development 
of his views in T 1.3.5: 
When we search for the characteristic, which distinguishes the memory 
from the imagination, we must immediately perceive, that it cannot lie in 
the simple ideas it presents to us ... These faculties are as little distinguish’d 
from each other by the arrangement of their complex ideas. For tho’ it be a 
peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position 
of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as it 
pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their 
operation, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to 
recal[sic] the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present 
ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. Since therefore 
the memory is known, neither by the order of its complex ideas, nor the 
nature of its simple ones; it follows, that the difference betwixt it and the 
imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity. (T 1.3.5.3 SBN 85) 
  
Hume seems to state that we have no way of ‘recalling’ past impressions, and so no way 
of directly comparing an idea to its source impression, as reason for questioning the 
isomorphism criterion. Yet, his final stance on the criterion is ambiguous. It is not clear if 
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Hume is revoking it, so that isomorphism with impressions is not a feature distinguishing 
memories from imaginings, or if, instead, he is simply observing it to be somehow 
useless—we cannot refer to isomorphism to distinguish memories and imaginings in 
practice, even if it constitutes a difference between the two. The second of these readings 
might seem paradoxical: if we cannot refer to a feature to distinguish a class of objects in 
practice, in what sense is the feature a criterion? 
Before arguing for my interpretation of Hume’s criteria and their relation, I want to 
address the existing interpretations. Oliver Johnson (1987, 1995), who reads the above 
passage as a revocation of the isomorphism criterion, argues that Hume’s epistemology 
ultimately commits him to a definition of memory that appeals only to phenomenal 
character, and not to any connection to the past like isomorphism. Johnson claims that, in 
order to characterize memory by a connection to the past, Hume would need to provide 
justification for the supposition that the connection exists, but the fact that we can never 
‘bring back the past’ so to speak means that we can never have the justification (1987, 352; 
1995, 143-144 & 148). While Johnson acknowledges that he is attributing to Hume a 
definition of memory that ‘few people would accept,’ he maintains that Hume’s 
epistemology rules out our common ways of thinking about memory as connected to the 
past, and that Hume himself came to this realization in T 1.3.5 (1995, 150). Johnson thus 
upholds the traditional Reidian interpretation of Hume as a skeptic about knowledge of the 
past. 
         There are at least three reasons to resist Johnson’s interpretation. First, Hume’s 
comment that we have no direct acquaintance with the past might imply that Hume is not 
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a direct realist about knowledge of the past, but it need not entail that he is a skeptic about 
it. Scholars have reconciled Hume’s theoretical framework to various accounts of how 
beliefs about external objects are epistemically justified (e.g. Loeb 2002 and Kail 2007), 
even though Hume’s framework does not allow for direct acquaintance with external 
objects. In the same way, it is not unfathomable that Hume could provide an explanation 
for the justification of beliefs about the past. Johnson is thus too quick to assume that Hume 
cannot defend the isomorphism criterion (I return to this issue in §2.3.2, §4.2.2 and §4.3). 
Second, while some textual segments lend support to Johnson’s interpretation, there are 
also segments that contradict it. Even in the critical passage at T 1.3.5.3, Hume states, ‘tho’ 
it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position’ 
(emphasis added). In the immediately following paragraphs, Hume writes, ‘as an idea of 
the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degenerate to such a degree, as to be 
taken for an idea of the imagination; so on the other hand an idea of the imagination may 
acquire such a force and vivacity, as to pass for an idea of the memory’ (T 1.3.5.6 SBN 86, 
emphasis added). If the phenomenal criterion were the only criterion for memory, as 
Johnson proposes, a memory that lost the typical phenomenal character would become an 
imagining, not merely be taken for one, and an imagining that acquired the character would 
become a memory, not simply pass for one. Johnson dismisses this passage as a confusion 
on Hume’s part (1987, 348-9; 1995, 146-147), but a more charitable reading would 
recommend instead that Hume does not subscribe to a purely phenomenal characterization 
of memory. Third, and most importantly, the skepticism about the past that Johnson 
attributes to Hume is not only counterintuitive, but inconsistent with much of Hume’s 
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psychological theory. It would imply that Hume should revoke not only the isomorphism 
criterion, but also his fundamental empiricist principle that ideas are copies of past 
impressions. Johnson acknowledges this implication but does not appreciate how powerful 
of an incentive it is for an alternate reading of Hume’s theory (1995, 148-149). 
 Another interpretation is that Hume intends the two criteria to be coextensive. Thus, 
phenomenal character would be indicative of isomorphism for Hume: what we identify as 
memories using the phenomenal criterion are always ideas that are isomorphic with past 
impressions. This interpretation is implicit in discussions by James Noxon (1976) and 
Jeffrey McDonough (2002). Noxon and McDonough criticize Hume for helping himself to 
treating the two criteria as coextensive. Noxon charges Hume not only with supposing that 
the criteria are ‘correlative’ (174), but even with ‘failing or refusing to recognize their 
logical independence’ (277). He presents examples where they come apart—i.e. cases of 
lively non-isomorphic ideas—as problem cases for Hume’s theory (275). Although 
McDonough recognizes that Hume is ultimately aware of the logical independence of the 
two criteria (83), like Noxon he regards the fact that the phenomenal criterion does not line 
up with the isomorphism criterion as a ‘tension’ and ‘puzzle’ in Hume’s theory (73), a 
criticism that assumes that Hume’s theory somehow depends on the criteria lining up.37 
                                               
37 McDonough interprets the isomorphism criterion as Hume’s answer to the question, ‘what 
constitutes the difference between an idea of memory and an idea of imagination?’ and the 
phenomenal criterion as his answer to, ‘what are the marks which we, in practice, use to distinguish 
(what we take to be) ideas of the memory from (what we take to be) ideas of imagination?’ He then 
claims that, as the answer to the second question, the phenomenal criterion ‘appears to completely 
undermine’ Hume’s answer to the first question, or the isomorphism criterion (73). However, the 
phenomenal criterion would ‘completely undermine’ the isomorphism criterion only if Hume 
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 The fact that, as Noxon and McDonough observe, phenomenal character clearly 
comes apart from isomorphism with the past (as in cases of pseudomemory) is not so much 
an objection to Hume’s theory as it is a reason to resist attributing to Hume the notion that 
the criteria are coextensive in the first place. Hume never attests to the coextensiveness. 
On the contrary, he takes special pains to discuss cases where the criteria come apart, like 
the case of the liar whose ideas are so enlivened through repetition as to pass for memories 
(T 1.3.5.6 SBN 86). 
         Traiger (2008) reads the isomorphism criterion as constitutive of memory and the 
phenomenal criterion as symptomatic of memory (in the sense of being a fallible indication 
of an idea’s being a memory) (66). Contrary to Noxon and McDonough, Traiger 
emphasizes that Hume presents the two criteria as non-coextensive (66). The interpretation 
I defend in the next section endorses Traiger’s view of the phenomenal criterion as 
symptomatic of isomorphism. However, on my reading the criterion is part of the meaning 
of ‘memory,’ whereas on Traiger’s it seems to be only incidentally or concomitantly 
connected to memory. Hume describes liveliness as ‘the difference between memory and 
imagination’ (T 1.3.5.3 SBN 85, my emphasis); he also describes a scenario where an idea 
‘becomes immediately an idea of the memory’ upon acquiring liveliness (T 1.3.5.5 SBN 
85, my emphasis). These descriptions indicate that the relation between liveliness and 
memory is more fundamental than Traiger supposes. 
                                               
intended the former to be one-for-one correspondent with the latter. McDonough thus seems to 
suppose that Hume intends the two criteria to be coextensive. 
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         One particular argument from McDonough deserves mentioning. McDonough 
draws a distinction between two ways of drawing the memory-imagination distinction: 
1) (accurate memories and inaccurate memories) vs. (mere imagination) 
2) (accurate memories) vs. (inaccurate memories and mere imagination) 
Distinction (1) privileges the subjective experience of memory over accuracy as necessary 
and sufficient for memory, while distinction (2) privileges accuracy. McDonough contends 
that it is ‘important to have either (1) or (2) clearly in mind’ when distinguishing memory 
from imagination philosophically, yet Hume does not have either (1) or (2) clearly in mind 
(82). According to McDonough, Hume wavers between offering criteria for ‘(accurate and 
inaccurate memories)’ as opposed to ‘(imaginings)’—namely, the phenomenal criterion—
and offering criteria for ‘(accurate memories)’ as opposed to ‘(inaccurate memories and 
imaginings)’—the isomorphism criterion (82-4). This wavering, McDonough suggests, 
explains Hume’s ‘otherwise strange performance with regards to memory’ (84).38 In the 
next section, I defend an interpretation on which Hume does not waver between (1) and 
(2), and on which, more crucially, Hume does not need to adopt either (1) or (2). 
2.3. Scientific classification and the definition of ‘memory’ 
 2.3.1. Hume’s aims 
As a first step to understanding Hume’s theory of memory, it helps to identify Hume’s aims 
in presenting the theory. Hume’s central project in the Treatise and first Enquiry is a 
‘science of human nature,’ a project that crucially involves ‘knowing the different 
operations of the mind, separating them from each other, and classing them under their 
                                               
38 Pears (1990, 41) raises the same criticism. 
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proper heads’ (E 1.13 SBN 13). He aptly describes this part of his project as an ‘anatomy 
of human nature’ (T 1.4.6.23 SBN 263) and as a ‘mental geography, or delineation of the 
distinct parts and powers of the mind’ (E 1.13 SBN 13). He presents the criteria for memory 
at the outset of the Treatise, in the context of introducing the basic taxonomies that guide 
his subsequent investigations. An important aim of his criteria for memory, then, is to 
classify mental phenomena into scientific categories. By ‘scientific category,’ I mean a 
category useful for the purposes of scientific explanation. 
         A second possible aim is to define the term ‘memory’ as it is standardly used. Hume 
implies many times that the semantic analysis of some terms can be crucial for clarifying 
philosophical and scientific debates (e.g. Tn12 SBN 638-639; T 1.3.14.35 SBN 171; T 
3.1.2.10 SBN 475; E Note A; E 8.23-25 SBN 95-96). One specific advantage of semantic 
analysis is that it can restrict the possible meanings of terms. For instance, it can restrict 
the meaning of ‘necessity’ to constant conjunction and psychological inference (E 8.5, E 
8.21), and the meaning of ‘liberty’ to the ability to act according to the will (E 8.23-24 
SBN 95). Restricting meanings in this way helps to prevent debates about phenomena 
whose existence is scientifically spurious, since such debates often stem from supposing, 
incorrectly, that a term signifies the phenomenon. Hume argues that the free-will debate 
has been misguided by assumptions that ‘necessity’ signifies something over and above 
regularity and ‘liberty’ chance, even though these objects are unintelligible or non-existent 
(E 8.25 SBN 95-96). Given the value Hume attaches to questions of meaning, the aim of 
his criteria for memory could be both scientific and semantic. I examine how Hume’s 
criteria achieve these aims in turn. 
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 2.3.2. Scientific classification 
As an attempt at scientific classification, Hume’s criteria distinguish between ideas along 
two axes: phenomenal character and isomorphism with past impressions. These axes divide 
ideas into four scientific categories: isomorphic ideas (i.e. ideas isomorphic with their 
source impressions), non-isomorphic ideas, lively ideas (i.e. ideas with the phenomenal 
character specified under the phenomenal criterion), and non-lively ideas. While these 
categories are logically independent and non-coextensive—no two categories have the 
same extension—there is significant overlap between them, so that ideas can be cross-
categorized as follows: 
 
 
If these categories really are scientific, we can expect Hume to apply them to explain a 
range of phenomena in addition to memory. And in fact he does. The category of lively 
ideas has a broad application in Hume’s philosophy—for instance, in his explanation of 
why recent experiences have stronger effects on the judgment and passions (T 1.3.13.2 
SBN 143-144), why recent pleasures have stronger effects on the will (T 2.3.6.5 SBN 426), 
Ideas
Isomorphic
Lively Non-Lively
Non-isomorphic
Lively Non-lively
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and why impressions, memories, and beliefs form a ‘system of reality’ (T 1.3.9.3 SBN 107-
108)—but its most prominent role is in Hume’s account of causal inference. Specifically, 
Hume relies on the category to explain why ideas that are products of causal inferences, 
such as the idea that the sun will rise tomorrow, are beliefs and not mere imaginings. Hume 
argues that the belief attending these ideas is nothing but a certain feeling (T 1.3.7.5 SBN 
96; T App 2-9 SBN 623-627; E 5.11-12 SBN 48-50). He describes the feeling as liveliness 
(presumably, the feeling is distinct, at least in degree, from the liveliness by which Hume 
characterizes memory). In a causal inference, an impression or lively idea (like a memory 
of the sun setting) transfers liveliness to an idea of a constantly conjoined object (like an 
idea of the sun rising) thereby turning it into a belief (T 1.3.8.6 SBN 100-101). 
         Hume appeals to memory’s ‘tenacity’ in explaining the inference behind our 
tendency to believe testimony (E 10.5 SBN 111-2); one of the causes of our belief in 
testimony is our recognition that human beings have ideas that are isomorphic with past 
experiences and that allow for the accurate reporting of past events. Where the category of 
isomorphic ideas is paramount, however, is in Hume’s account of the idea of personal 
identity. In fact, in that account his two memory categories—both lively and isomorphic 
ideas—play complementary roles. Hume begins the account by observing that, when 
different successive objects are connected by resemblance, contiguity, or causation (for 
instance, a small plant and a large tree), we tend to imagine that they constitute a single 
enduring object (T 1.4.6.7 SBN 255). He proceeds to argue that, in the same way, were the 
different successive perceptions in the mind connected by these relations, we would 
imagine them to be one same object, namely, a self. The category of isomorphic ideas is 
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precisely a category of ideas that resemble past impressions. In this respect, memory (as 
the category of isomorphic ideas) ‘contributes to the production’ of the idea of the self by 
itself supplying one of the relations on which the idea is built (T 1.4.6.18 SBN 260-1). An 
even more extensive relation among perceptions is causation (T 1.4.6.19 SBN 261). Hume 
states that memory ‘discovers’ the idea of the self because, in order to realize that these 
relations (resemblance and causation) run through the successive perceptions in the mind, 
we first need, as Hume puts it, an ‘acquaintance with the continuance and extent of this 
succession of perceptions;’ it is reasonable to suppose (though Hume does not spell out 
how) that ideas that belong to both the lively and isomorphic categories supply this 
acquaintance (T 1.4.6.20 SBN 261-2). Hume still needs to explain how even perceptions 
‘beyond the reach’ of this mnemonic acquaintance (for instance, the perception of tasting 
a tomato for the first time) are imagined to belong to the self. The explanation is that we 
draw causal inferences from our lively isomorphic ideas to these perceptions: we ‘extend 
the same chain of causes’ (T 1.4.6.20 SBN 261-262). As per Hume’s account of causal 
inference, we believe in the existence of these perceptions, even though we have no 
memory of them, because our lively ideas transfer liveliness to them. The isomorphic and 
lively categories thus allow Hume to clarify the many different roles that memory (as the 
conglomerate of these categories) plays in the development of the idea of the self. 
         Although Hume does not himself propose it, the category of isomorphic ideas can 
also be used to explain why some ideas are lively. Hume’s ‘rules by which to judge of 
causes and effects’ suggest a causal relation between isomorphism and liveliness (T 1.3.15 
SBN 173). Isomorphism seems to be constantly conjoined to liveliness (except in cases of 
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pseudomemories, in which ‘contrary causes’ likely operate [T 1.3.12.5 SBN 132]). A lack 
of isomorphism seems to be constantly conjoined to a lack of liveliness. The more 
isomorphic an idea is with its source impression, the greater its liveliness. Together with 
Hume’s rules, these considerations suggest that ideas ‘retain a considerable degree of the 
vivacity of the original impressions’ (T 1.1.3.1 SBN 8) in virtue of retaining the 
impressions’ form.   
 One might challenge the scientific status of the isomorphic and non-isomorphic 
categories by contending, like Johnson, that Hume’s epistemology cannot account for 
knowledge of isomorphism with past impressions. I answer this challenge fully in Chapter 
4; there, I argue that Hume can in fact explain how we form beliefs about ideas’ 
isomorphism with past impressions and how these beliefs constitute knowledge (§4.2.2 and 
§4.3). For now, it is worth addressing Hume’s statement that ‘[isomorphism] is not 
sufficient to distinguish [memory and imagination] in their operation, or make us know the 
one from the other; it being impossible to recal[sic] the past impressions, in order to 
compare them with our present ideas…’ (T 1.3.5.3 85). As I read it, what Hume is denying 
in this passage is not our knowledge of isomorphism per se, but rather, our knowledge of 
it via ‘recalling’ or ‘bringing back’ a past impression. As I explain in §4.2.2 and §4.3.2, we 
do not have a memory-independent way of knowing memories’ isomorphism to past 
impressions, but in fact, we know of it through memory. Specifically, we know that an idea 
corresponds to an impression by having a second-order idea that represents the first idea 
and the correspondence. The second-order idea is a belief—and thus a basis for 
knowledge—on account of its liveliness. In fact, the second-order idea is a memory: it is 
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both lively and isomorphic to past experience (as a third-order idea would reveal). The fact 
that our knowledge of isomorphism depends on second-order lively ideas of the sort 
described means that isomorphism in and of itself is not sufficient for distinguishing 
memories from imaginings. If memories were not generally lively, we would never have 
knowledge of memories’ isomorphism, because we would have only faint ideas of other 
ideas’ correspondence to past impressions. As Hume notes, ‘there would be no possibility 
of distinguishing [an imagining] from a remembrance of a like kind, were not the ideas of 
the imagination [i.e. in general] fainter and more obscure’ (T 1.3.5.3 SBN 85). Hume’s 
point in the passage is not that isomorphism cannot be known, but that it is not sufficient 
as a source of our knowledge of the memory-imagination distinction. 
To the extent that Hume’s account of memory identifies scientific categories, it 
succeeds qua scientific classification. Hume does not need to choose between 
McDonough’s distinctions in order to sort ideas into scientific categories. He would hold 
both of McDonough’s distinctions—which correspond to the distinctions between lively 
and non-lively, isomorphic and non-isomorphic—to be scientifically relevant. These two 
distinguishing axes entail four possible kinds of ideas (as per the foregoing chart): 
isomorphic and lively; non-isomorphic and non-lively; isomorphic and non-lively; and 
non-isomorphic and lively. If isomorphism is indeed causally connected to liveliness, as I 
have suggested, the last two kinds in this list are atypical. 
Hume presents the ‘isomorphic’ and ‘lively’ categories not only as a scientific 
classification, but as a characterization of memory. He appeals to everyday descriptions of 
memory to support the phenomenal criterion—‘I think I remember such an event, says one 
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…’ (T 1.3.5.6 SBN 86). He relies on the term ‘memory’ to denote sometimes isomorphic 
ideas (e.g. T 1.4.6.18 SBN 260) and other times lively ideas (e.g. T 1.3.5.3 SBN 85). Thus, 
however successful as a scientific classification, one can still reasonably demand an 
explanation of the relation between this classification and ‘memory,’ and of Hume’s rather 
ambiguous use of the term. I answer this demand in the following section. 
2.3.3. The definition of ‘memory’ 
To see how Hume’s criteria are cogent as a definition of ‘memory,’ we need to break with 
a conception of definition as a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
inclusion in the extension of a term. Hume’s criteria do not fit this model of definition: the 
phenomenal criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient for inclusion in the extension of 
‘memory’—as when a faint idea ‘is taken’ for an imagining and a lively idea ‘passes for’ 
a memory—and yet nonetheless Hume claims that ‘the difference between memory and 
imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity.’ The phenomenal criterion defines 
‘memory’ without being necessary or sufficient. 
         An alternative conception of definition that supports the legitimacy of Hume’s 
definitional approach—not only in the account of memory, but in other subjects, as we are 
about to see—is that developed by Hilary Putnam in his papers ‘Is Semantics Possible?’ 
(1970), ‘Explanation and Reference’ (1973), and ‘The Meaning of ‘Meaning’’ (1975). 
Putnam argues that the meaning of most general terms cannot be ascertained by a list of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. The meaning of ‘lemon,’ for example, cannot be 
ascertained by listing yellowness, roundness, tartness, and the like, because the word’s 
meaning includes something beyond any such set of characteristics: namely, the underlying 
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nature of the objects to which we ostensively apply the term. The fact that we can 
coherently apply ‘lemon’ to an object not yellow, round, or tart (namely, an abnormal 
lemon) shows that these properties do not fix the meaning of ‘lemon.’ Similarly, the fact 
that we would continue to apply ‘lemon’ to the same objects if we discovered that they 
were not really yellow, round, or tart (suppose that we were under a widespread delusion 
about lemons) shows that the meaning of ‘lemon’ is fixed, at least in part, by the kind of 
entity the objects we call ‘lemons’ are in reality. Given that meaning has this ostensive 
component, and given that our knowledge of the underlying nature of lemons is empirical 
and hence subject to revision by scientific research, most terms simply do not admit of 
definition by way of necessary and sufficient conditions (1970, 140-141). Putnam 
considers this conclusion to be true of most kinds of terms, not only natural-kind terms 
(1975, 242). Note, also, that Putnam’s criticisms of the traditional view of definition are 
closely related to, but independent of, his meaning externalism; those criticisms would be 
true even if meaning externalism were false.39 
 In place of the traditional view, Putnam proposes that in order to capture a term’s 
meaning a definition must take the form of a vector—a sequence of different kinds of 
linguistic categories (1970, 246, 269). The definition of a natural-kind term in particular 
could capture the term’s meaning by specifying four categories associated with the term: 
                                               
39 The primary aim of Putnam’s 1970 and 1973 papers is to refute the traditional view of definition. 
He later used many of the same observations to argue, famously, that ‘meanings aren’t in the 
head’—that is, that knowing the meaning of a word is not purely a matter of being in a 
psychological state (1975, 227). The latter argument does not concern us here. It is possible to 
accept Putnam’s model of definition, and even his view that the underlying nature of objects can 
determine the meanings of words, while holding on to the view that knowledge of meaning is 
internal to psychological states (see, e.g., Talmage 1998). 
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syntactic markers, semantic markers, stereotype, and extension (1970, 150; 1973, 204; 
1975, 269).40 The most innovative aspect of this proposal is the distinction between 
stereotype and extension. The extension of a natural-kind term consists in the natural kind 
to which the objects that we ostensively apply the term to belong; for ‘lemon,’ the extension 
might be organisms with a certain DNA. The stereotype consists in the conventional notion 
of the characteristics of a normal member of the kind, such as our notion that lemons are 
yellow, round, and tart (1970, 150; 1975, 230, 249). 
         I have outlined Putnam’s model of definition not in order to argue that Hume 
anticipated it—while Hume was interested in the semantic analysis of some terms, he did 
not develop his own theory of language, reference, or meaning—but in order to argue that 
Hume’s definition of ‘memory’ is intelligible in light of it. I propose that we interpret 
Hume’s definition as a vector of different kinds of linguistic categories, rather than as a list 
of necessary and sufficient conditions. Before developing this proposal, I want to suggest 
that, in fact, other Humean definitions are also more intuitive under Putnam’s model than 
under the traditional model. Hume seems to approach the task of defining a term along 
Putnamian lines in several instances. We can plausibly surmise that, not only in relation to 
‘memory,’ but more generally, Putnam’s model of definition is one that Hume would 
welcome. 
         Throughout his writings, Hume suggests that every meaningful term is connected 
to an idea (e.g. T Abs. 7 SBN 648-649; T App. 11 SBN 633). I here follow Walter Ott in 
                                               
40 Syntactical markers are the parts of speech that apply to a term (e.g. noun for ‘lemon’). Semantic 
markers are the semantic categories under which a term can be classified (e.g. fruit).  
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interpreting the connection as one of signification: terms are signs of ideas in the sense of 
being grounds for inferring the presence of certain ideas in speakers’ minds (not in the 
sense of referring to ideas) (Ott 2006, 235-236; 241-242). Hume’s account of abstract ideas 
implies that general terms are signs of classes or sets of ideas. A general term is a term we 
attach to every member of a set, where the set consists of objects that resemble each other 
in some aspect (T 1.1.7.7 SBN 20). To continue with the previous example, ‘lemon’ is the 
term we attach to every member of the set of objects that resemble each other with respect 
to lemonhood. Uttering or hearing a general term induces the mind to represent the entire 
set of objects to which the term is attached. The mind achieves this general representation, 
according to Hume, via a particular idea of one member of the set and a readiness to form 
ideas of the other members. A general term thus comes to signify a set of ideas, where these 
ideas are ‘not really and in fact present’ in a speaker’s mind, but are potentially present or 
present ‘in power’ (T 1.1.7.7 SBN 20). To use Don Garrett’s term, a general term signifies 
a revival set—the set of ideas that the mind is ready to entertain in connection with the 
term (1997, 24). 
Hume also implies that defining a term consists, at least in part, in conveying the 
idea that the term signifies (e.g. T 1.2.4.26, SBN 49-50; T 2.1.2.1 SBN 277; M 3.42, SBN 
202). Since general terms signify revival sets, defining a general term consists in somehow 
conveying its revival set to another person (Garrett 1997, 102-103; 2015, 124-125). As 
noted above, Hume characterizes membership in a revival set in terms of aspects or points 
of resemblance: members of a revival set resemble each other in some aspect. It seems, 
then, that conveying a term’s revival set involves specifying the relevant resemblance. 
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Hume leaves it ambiguous what resemblance counts as relevant for this purpose, however. 
Scholars have argued that membership in a revival set is not subjective or arbitrary. The 
resemblance that fixes the revival set for ‘lemon’ is not just whatever resemblance happens 
to induce my mind to attach ‘lemon’ to an object; I would be mistaken about what ‘lemon’ 
signifies, for instance, if I understood its revival set to include limes or to exclude abnormal 
lemons (e.g. Ainslie 2010, 50; Cottrell 2016, 58). Even then, the requirement that revival-
set membership be objective or public still leaves membership indeterminate, as there can 
be multiple, equally objective ways of specifying the resemblance that fixes a set’s 
membership. One can still ask, does resemblance with respect to color, shape, and taste 
determine the revival set of ‘lemon,’ or does resemblance with respect to DNA? 
Hume’s own definitions reflect this indeterminacy. We have seen that Hume’s 
criteria for memory identify two points of resemblance in relation to ‘memory,’ namely, 
liveliness and isomorphism. As a definition of ‘memory,’ these criteria seem to specify two 
non-coextensive revival sets for the term. Hume’s definition of ‘cause’ is especially famous 
for its ambiguity. Hume asserts that ‘cause’ admits of two definitions: 
We may define a cause to be ‘An object precedent and contiguous to 
another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac’d in like 
relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the 
latter.’ If this definition be esteem’d defective, because drawn from objects 
foreign to the cause, we may substitute this other definition in its place, viz. 
‘A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united 
with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the 
other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.’ 
(T 1.3.14.31 SBN 169-170) 
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Whereas according to the first definition objects in the revival set for ‘cause’ resemble each 
other in being constantly conjoined to other objects, according to the second definition they 
do so in disposing the mind to draw a certain inference. This dual definition leaves the 
revival set for ‘cause’ ambiguous because, notoriously, its two prongs seem to be neither 
logically equivalent nor coextensive.41 Hume’s definition of ‘virtue’ exhibits a similar 
duality and ambiguity (Garrett 1997, 107). At times, Hume defines ‘virtue’ as ‘every 
quality of the mind, which is useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others’ (M 
9.12 SBN 268); other times, as ‘whatever mental quality or action gives to a spectator the 
pleasing sentiment of approbation’ (M App1.10 SBN 289). 
         Hume’s definition of ‘cause’ has been particularly controversial. Scholars have 
attempted to resolve its ambiguity in numerous ways.42 While there is much more to this 
issue than this chapter can address, it is worth considering, as an alternative to these 
attempts, whether a Humean definition in fact needs to specify a determinate revival set. 
Suppose that Hume subscribes to the Putnamian rather than the traditional model of 
definition. He would then hold that, for at least some terms, a definition is not a description 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the term’s extension, but a vector 
comprising several linguistic categories, like an extension and stereotype. In Hume’s 
terminology, Putnam’s model suggests that some terms are associated with more than one 
                                               
41 Cases of undiscovered constant conjunctions show that objects can fit the first description and 
not the second; cases of inferences based on unrepresentative samples show that objects can fit the 
second description and not the first (Garrett 1997, 98-99). 
42 Proposals include: privileging the first definition as Hume’s only intended definition (e.g. 
Robinson 1962); interpreting Hume to ultimately reject both definitions (e.g. Strawson 1989, 208); 
proving the coextensiveness of the definitions (e.g. Garrett 1997, 101-111); arguing that the 
‘definitions’ are not semantic definitions (e.g. Beebee 2011). 
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revival set. ‘Lemon’ is associated both with the set of yellow, round, and tart objects and 
with the set of lemon-DNA objects. On this model, it is neither a complication nor an oddity 
that Hume’s definitions of ‘memory,’ ‘cause,’ and ‘virtue’ are ambiguous between 
different revival sets, if there are in fact multiple revival sets semantically associated with 
each of these terms. It is in this sense that Putnam’s model offers a better framework for 
understanding Hume’s definitions than the traditional model. 
         My proposal is that we interpret Hume’s definitions as vectors of the sort Putnam 
describes, and that, in addition, we regard this approach to definitions as intelligible in light 
of Putnam’s arguments. I stress ‘of the sort’ because Hume’s definitions do not exactly fit 
the format that Putnam outlines for natural-kind terms. Recall Putnam’s proposal that the 
definition of a natural-kind term specify an extension and stereotype, where the extension 
consists in the natural kind associated with the term, and the stereotype in the conventional 
notion of the characteristics of a normal member of the kind. Hume conceives of the 
semantic components of ‘memory,’ ‘cause,’ and ‘virtue’ differently.43 Instead of an 
                                               
43 I opt not to interpret Hume’s definitions as specifications of natural kinds. Hume was likely 
familiar with the concept of a natural kind through Locke’s distinction between ‘real’ and ‘nominal 
essences,’ but he did not make use of it. He distinguishes between substances and modes (T 1.1.6 
SBN 15), but, unlike Locke, he does not develop a concept of kinds of substances, or divide kinds 
of substances into real/natural and nominal/conventional. Even if Hume had made use of the 
concept of a natural kind, it is not clear that he would have considered ‘memory,’ ‘cause,’ and 
‘virtue’ to be natural-kind terms. Thus, as noted above, his definitions are more naturally interpreted 
as specifications of productive and responsive sets. The fact that ‘memory,’ ‘cause,’ and ‘virtue’ 
might not be natural-kind terms does not affect the analogy to ‘lemon’ or the applicability of 
Putnam’s analysis of that term. The main point of the analogy is that all these terms resist definition 
by necessary and sufficient conditions and instead require definition by a vector of linguistic 
categories. Putnam explicitly notes that his analysis of definition applies not only to natural-kind 
terms, but ‘to the great majority of all nouns, and to other parts of speech as well’ (1975, 242). He 
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extension and stereotype as Putnam understands them, his definitions specify a productive 
and a responsive set for each term, the former being the set of objects typically productive 
of a certain response, and the latter the set of objects actually attended with the response.44 
Thus, his definition of ‘cause’ specifies both the set of constantly conjoined pairs (the set 
of objects that typically produces the mental disposition to infer one object from another) 
and the set of objects actually attended with the mental disposition to infer one object from 
another. Similarly, his definition of ‘virtue’ specifies both the set of useful and agreeable 
qualities (the set of objects that typically produces the ‘pleasing sentiment of approbation’) 
and the set of qualities actually attended with the sentiment. If, as I noted in §4.1, 
isomorphism with a past impression typically produces liveliness in an idea, Hume’s 
definition of ‘memory’ also specifies a productive and a responsive set: the set of 
isomorphic ideas and the set of lively ideas, respectively. 
         For each of these terms, Hume identifies the productive set with the extension. As 
we have seen, he holds that isomorphic ideas are memories, even when faint, and non-
                                               
also explicitly states that the stereotype-extension format is not the only adequate format for 
defining a term (1975, 268). 
44 I adopt the distinction between productive and responsive sets from Garrett (2015, 125, 133). 
Garrett offers a strategy for delimiting the productive and responsive sets for ‘cause’ and ‘virtue’ 
in a way that renders each term’s sets coextensive. The strategy is to restrict both the productive 
and responsive sets to the experiences and responses of an individual human observer, or else to 
read them both as encompassing the experiences and responses of an idealized spectator. (1997, 
108-109; 2015, 134-135). On my reading, the productive and responsive sets for a term do not need 
to be coextensive for Hume’s definitions to be intelligible. Putnam’s arguments show that a term’s 
meaning often comprises a variety of facts, even though these facts do not jointly amount to 
anything like necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in a set. Accordingly, Hume holds 
the view that a term’s meaning sometimes comprises a productive and a responsive set. Putnam’s 
arguments imply that this view is plausible even if the two sets are not coextensive. 
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isomorphic ideas imaginings, no matter how lively (T 1.3.5.6 SBN 86). He holds that 
objects ‘really are’ causes only as long as they satisfy the requirements in his ‘rules by 
which to judge of causes and effects’—rules that ascertain constant conjunction—
independently of whether they elicit a mental disposition to draw an inference (T 1.3.15.1 
SBN 173). Similarly, he excludes celibacy, fasting, penance and other ‘monkish virtues’ 
from being virtues because they are neither useful nor agreeable, even if they elicit the 
sentiment of approbation in the ‘delirious and dismal’ (M 9.3 SBN 270). In treating the 
productive rather than the responsive set as the determinant of extension, Hume seems 
motivated by the assumption that a term’s extension is a principle-governed set. The 
objects that typically produce a certain response can be determined by induction and 
scientific reasoning; the objects that actually are attended with the response, in contrast, 
cannot be predicted without a margin of error. 
         One might challenge the Putnamian model of definition by asking why we should 
conceive of a term’s meaning as broader than its extension. Why not say, instead, that 
objects with lemon-DNA exhaust the meaning of ‘lemon’? Accordingly, if isomorphic 
ideas constitute the extension of ‘memory,’ why not say that ‘memory’ just means 
isomorphic ideas? The answer to this challenge is to emphasize that features like color, 
shape, and taste for ‘lemon’ and liveliness for ‘memory’ are sufficiently embedded into our 
usage of these terms to be semantically connected to them, not simply incidentally 
connected. By way of stressing this point, Putnam observes that it would be obligatory to 
convey that lemons are typically yellow, round, and tart when teaching someone the 
meaning of ‘lemon’ (1975, 252). Hume would likely argue that stereotypes and responsive 
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sets are components of meaning in that they constitute genuine revival sets. An average 
speaker can reasonably be expected to entertain (or be ready to entertain) ideas of yellow, 
round, and tart objects when uttering or hearing ‘lemon,’ and ideas of lively ideas when 
uttering or hearing ‘memory.’ 
         My interpretation of Hume’s definition of ‘memory’ does not require Hume to 
abandon the isomorphism criterion (as per Johnson), to stipulate a relation of 
coextensiveness between the two criteria (as per Noxon and McDonough), or to treat 
liveliness as merely a concomitant of memory (as per Traiger). Furthermore, on the present 
understanding of definition, it is not true (as per McDonough) that ‘memory’ must be 
defined according to either (1) ([accurate and inaccurate memories] vs. [mere 
imagination]) or (2) ([accurate memories] vs. [inaccurate memories and mere 
imagination]). ‘Memory’ can instead be defined as a vector comprising both the set of 
objects typically productive of a certain psychological response and the set of objects 
actually attended with that response. For Hume, (1) determines the latter set while (2) 
determines the former. 
         My interpretation also clarifies why Hume seems to pursue a scientific 
classification in tandem with a definition ‘memory,’ and why he uses ‘memory’ to refer to 
both the ‘isomorphic’ and ‘lively’ categories. It simply is the case that the meaning of 
‘memory’ comprises both categories. Insofar as the categories are scientific, ‘memory’ is 
a scientifically useful term. Hume’s approach to ‘memory’ simply reflects the semantic 
character of the term and the fact that defining it is of a piece with developing a scientific 
classification. 
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2.4. Memory and representation of the past and the self 
A conspicuous feature of Hume’s characterization of memory is that representation of the 
past is not a criterion for memory (Pears 1990, 37-39). Other philosophical accounts stress 
precisely this criterion. Thus, Aristotle writes, ‘whenever one exercises the faculty of 
remembering, he must say within himself, ‘I formerly heard (or otherwise perceived) this,’ 
or ‘I formerly had this thought’’ (Parva Naturalia, ‘On Memory’). According to Hobbes, 
the difference between memory and imagination is that, while both are instances of 
‘decaying sense,’ memory mental states ‘express the decay’ and ‘signify that the Sense is 
fading, old, and past’ (Leviathan, Chapter 2). Locke defined memory as ‘the mind’s power 
to revive perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to 
them, that it has had them before’ (II.x.2).45 
 Another apparent omission is a criterion of representation of the self. Butler and 
Reid stress this criterion in charging Locke’s theory of personal identity with circularity 
(Butler Analogy of Religion, Dissertation I; Reid 1785/2002, 277). According to Locke, 
memory of an experience is what produces the idea of identity with the subject of that 
experience. Butler and Reid reply that, since for the idea of the past experience to be a 
memory in the first place is for it to refer to our self as the subject of the experience, the 
                                               
45Copenhaver (2017) interprets Locke’s reference to an ‘additional perception of having had the 
idea before’ as a reference to a sense of acquaintance or familiarity, not to a mental representation 
of the past; if this reading is correct, memories do not need to represent the past for Locke—they 
only need to feel familiar. It may be asked why Hume abstains from positing not only a criterion 
of representation of the past but even a criterion of familiarity. I here defer this question to a future 
discussion. 
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idea of personal identity must be prior to and independent of memory, rather than produced 
by it. 
 Why does Hume not consider these seemingly relevant criteria (or any other 
features of the representational contents of memory) in his characterization of memory? In 
Chapter 1, I argued that for Hume mental representation is not an ‘original’ or explanatorily 
basic quality of the mind, but requires causal explanation (§1.3.1). And, as we have seen 
(§2.3.2), Hume devotes special attention to explaining the causes of the representation of 
the self: since impressions do not instantiate simple and identical selves, ideas do not 
represent such selves by simply copying impressions of them; hence, the causes of 
representation of the self cannot be straightforwardly attributed to copying. Similarly, the 
causes of representation of the past evade an explanation solely in terms of copying 
(§3.4.2). In both cases, the explanation must appeal to additional imaginative mechanisms. 
In contrast, the features by which Hume characterizes memory—isomorphism and 
liveliness—are much more basic. Hume suggests that these features are simply ‘evident’ 
or ‘found by experience’ (T 1.1.3.1-3 SBN 8-9). He intimates no need of explaining the 
causes of ideas’ having these features (even if, as I have suggested, liveliness can be 
causally explained [§2.3.2]). He seems to view these features either as ‘original qualities’ 
or else as so basic as not to require a special investigation into their causes. Indeed, he 
introduces memory as one of the ‘elements of [his] philosophy’ (T 1.1.4.7 SBN 13). 
When we consider the scientific aim of Hume’s characterization of memory—to 
classify mental phenomena into categories useful for scientific explanation—one possible 
reason for his omission of criteria like representation of the past and the self is that memory 
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is a much more useful category (or set of categories) when it is explanatorily basic. Original 
qualities—such the principles of association and the impression-idea distinction—provide 
the building blocks or the basic axioms of Hume’s science of the mind. By characterizing 
memory in terms of explanatorily basic features like isomorphism and liveliness, Hume 
allows memory to serve as a building block in his science. As such, memory (or the 
categories it comprises) can be put to use in a broader range of explanations. For one thing, 
Hume can avail himself of memory to explain how we form the idea of the self (§2.3.2); in 
later chapters, I suggest that memory can also explain how we form ideas and beliefs about 
tense (§3.4.2, §4.2.2). In contrast, if memory were characterized by representation of the 
past and self, it could not be used to explain the origins of these ideas, on pain of circularity. 
If we turn to the semantic aim of Hume’s theory, it may seem less clear why 
representation of the past and self are not part of the definition of memory. As we have 
seen, Hume’s criteria specify a productive and a responsive set for ‘memory.’ Given the 
intuitive association between memories and representation of the past and self, and given 
that isomorphic ideas in fact produce representation of the past and the self (§2.3.2, 3.4.2, 
§4.2.2), it can be argued that the responsive set for memory should be characterized by 
these features. In Putnam’s terms, it seems it would be obligatory to specify these 
representational contents when teaching someone the meaning of ‘memory.’ I propose that 
our best answer to this point on Hume’s behalf is to grant that Hume’s definition of 
‘memory’ (specifically, his specification of the responsive set) is not exhaustive. This lack 
of thoroughness is not egregious, however. Hume might have simply been more focused 
on the scientific aim of his theory than on the semantic; after all, he seems to explicitly 
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announce a focus on scientific aims when he characterizes his project as a ‘science of 
human nature.’ If so, it may be that Hume did not deem it crucial to his project to offer an 
exhaustive definition of ‘memory,’ and instead fixed on the semantic components that are 
most scientifically useful. His definition is still illuminating as a model, albeit one that 
could be filled in in greater detail. 
2.5. Conclusion 
The two approaches to the definition of ‘memory’ noted by McDonough bespeak a lack of 
consensus among philosophers and non-philosophers alike on the question of whether 
accuracy or subjective experience is more central to the definition of memory. As non-
philosophers, we describe pseudomemories sometimes as ‘remembering falsely,’ other 
times as ‘just imagining’ or ‘making things up.’ As philosophers, our intuitions are split 
between privileging accuracy when defining memory, on pain of allowing memories of 
events that never happened, and privileging the subjective experience of memory, on pain 
of making memory conditional on facts external to one’s subjective experience.  
Hume’s account of memory does justice to this predicament. The fact that the 
relation between his two criteria is perplexing only reflects a broader philosophical 
bewilderment on the nature of memory. Hume’s dual criteria are perplexing only at first 
sight, however. I have argued that one aim of Hume’s account is to scientifically classify 
ideas, and that his criteria coherently cross-classify ideas according to both isomorphism 
with the past and phenomenal character. In addition, I have argued that, on a conception of 
definition as a vector comprising various linguistic categories associated with a term, 
Hume’s criteria are plausible as a definition of ‘memory’ that specifies a productive set 
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(isomorphic ideas) and a responsive set (lively ideas), where the former constitutes the 
term’s extension. Hume’s definition of memory suggests a conciliatory verdict on the 
debate over the mnemonic status of pseudomemories: pseudomemories do not fall under 
the extension of ‘memory;’ yet, they have a legitimate claim to the title ‘memory’ insofar 
as they are semantically associated with the term—much as yellow, round, and tart objects 
have a claim to the title ‘lemon.’ If my arguments are sound and Hume’s account has this 
conciliatory potential, it is ultimately to Hume’s credit that he does not abandon one 
criterion to the other. 
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CHAPTER 3: TEMPORAL CONCEPTS 
3.1. Introduction 
In keeping with his content empiricism, Hume explains the idea of time as originating in 
impressions that instantiate time. Impressions instantiate time by being made up of 
successive parts. Time is simply the successive arrangement of the parts of a complex 
impression. Such impressions give rise to ideas that copy and (as a result) mirror or 
represent the successiveness that the impressions instantiate (§1.3.2). When an idea of time 
or successiveness is attached to a general term, it becomes an abstract idea or concept of 
time. 
A distinctive (and, indeed, attractive) feature of this theory is its simplicity. In 
contrast to theories in the Kantian tradition, which postulate a priori mental structures, 
Hume’s theory explains time (both our experience and conception of it) entirely in terms 
of a feature that experience instantiates, namely, successiveness. Yet, this simplicity might 
seem to come at the cost of failing to explain certain complex phenomena. It might seem 
that some features of our experience of time cannot be explained solely in terms of 
successiveness: for example, the feeling of movement or motion that attends some 
successions, but which seems irreducible to mere succession; the simultaneity of sensations 
from different sense modalities;  or the temporality of unchanging (and seemingly non-
successive) objects. Additionally, Hume’s theory of time explains only tenseless time: it 
explains how we experience and think of objects as occurring one after another, but not 
how we come to think of objects as past, present, and future.  
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 In this chapter, I address the main challenges to Hume’s theory of time by 
interpreting and developing his views on three temporal concepts: time (§3.2), simultaneity 
(§3.3), and tense (§3.4). After discussing Hume’s characterization of impressions and ideas 
of time (§3.2.1-§3.2.2) and his metaphysical ambitions (§3.2.3), I offer a solution to a 
famous challenge to Hume’s thesis that an impression of succession is identical to a 
succession of impressions (§3.2.4). I then develop a Humean account of the concept of 
simultaneity, modeled on Hume’s account of geometric equality (§3.3.1); drawing on my 
analysis of simultaneity, I offer an interpretation of Hume’s account of the ‘fiction’ of an 
unchanging enduring object (§3.3.2-§3.3.3). Finally, I discuss a proposal on how Hume 
could explain the content of the idea of tense (§3.4.1) and its origins (§3.4.2). We will see 
that Hume’s views ultimately capture the complexity of our temporal notions, not in spite 
of, but in virtue of, his commitment to tracing their contents to experience. 
3.2. Time 
 3.2.1. The impression of time 
 
A central tenet of Hume’s theories of space and time is that impressions are not by nature 
formless mental entities: they can manifest various kinds of arrangements, or, as Hume 
phrases it, they can be ‘disposed in certain manners’ (T 1.2.3.4 SBN 34). The visual 
impression of a table is made up of simple impressions of colored points arranged in a 
certain way—namely, a spatial way. The auditory impression of a melody is made up of 
simple impressions of musical notes arranged in a certain way—a successive or temporal 
  80 
 
 
way (T 1.2.3.10 SBN 36).46 Both are complex impressions—impressions made up of 
parts.47 Neither is a mere conglomeration of parts, however. Each consists of parts and a 
manner of disposition of those parts.  
These arrangements or ‘manners of disposition’ are aspects of impressions (§1.2.1). 
Spatiality is the way in which the visual impression of a table resembles the visual 
impression of a tree or the tactile impression of a book. Successiveness or temporality is 
the way in which the auditory impression of a melody resembles the visual impression of 
an object in motion or the tactile impression of a series of taps on the shoulder. Spatiality 
and temporality cannot be distinguished or separated from other aspects of impressions: 
just as an apple’s color cannot be distinguished from its shape except by a ‘distinction of 
reason,’ the temporality of a melody cannot be distinguished from its sound. 
Kemp Smith correctly observes that a manner of disposition is not reducible to a 
simple impression or a mere sum thereof, but ‘lie[s] beyond the nature of each and all of 
our simple impressions’ (1941, 273-4). He too quickly concludes, however, that a manner 
of disposition is ‘contemplated or intuited, but not sensed’—that it is ‘non-impressional’ 
                                               
46 I use ‘succession’ and its cognates to refer to a temporal series (as opposed to any kind of series). 
Hume evidently uses ‘succession’ to refer to temporal succession: the idea of time could not derive 
from the succession of our perceptions in the way Hume describes if that succession was not 
temporal.  
47 It has been argued that Hume inherited the view of time as made up of parts from Descartes 
(Lennon 1985; Baxter 2015). Hume himself argues that if time was not made up of different parts, 
‘we cou’d not conceive a longer or shorter duration’ (T 1.2.3.8 SBN 35-36). Note that this argument 
can also be applied to space. Notwithstanding the Cartesian influence and the metaphysical 
rationale for the view, Hume maintains the view primarily on empirical or phenomenological 
grounds: the impression of five notes played on a flute is divisible into parts as a matter of 
phenomenology. 
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(274). Being irreducible to simple impressions does not make manners of disposition ‘non-
impressional.’48 Manners of disposition are ‘impressional’—they are given in 
impressions—in that they are aspects of complex impressions. For Hume, impressions are 
not always simples or mere conglomerations of simples: they can be complexes involving 
parts and arrangements of those parts (Falkenstein 1997[b], 194-195; Garrett 1997, 53; 
Baxter 2008, 20).49 Appreciating that impressions in fact instantiate manners of 
disposition, and that successiveness or temporality is one such manner of disposition, is 
crucial for understanding how, consistently with Hume’s content empiricism, the idea of 
time is based on impressions that directly acquaint us with time.50  
                                               
48 Like Kemp Smith, Johnson and Bardon consider it to be problematic that, according to Hume’s 
theory, none of the simple impressions making up a succession of impressions involves an 
impression of time (Johnson 1989, 217; Bardon 2007, 56). However, if the impression of time is 
by its very nature an impression made up of parts, then the expectation that an impression of time 
should be discoverable in a simple impression is mistaken in the first place. 
49 Kemp Smith regards Hume as a mental atomist who inconsistently posits ‘manners of 
disposition’ that cannot be given in the mental atoms: ‘Hume held to the assumption, so little 
questioned in his day, of what Gibson has entitled the ‘composition theory’; the theory, namely, 
that it is in simples, to the exclusion of any supplementary factors, relational or other, that 
compounds consist. Hume holds to this theory, even in the very act of recognizing that there are in 
addition to the simples two ‘manners’ or ‘orders,’ each unique in its kind, and each a feature not to 
be found in any of the simples so ordered’ (1941, 279). It is questionable, however, that we should 
regard Hume as a mental atomist of the sort described. Rather, the very fact that Hume allows 
simple perceptions to be ‘disposed in various manners’ is evidence that he was not a mental 
atomist—at least not the kind of atomist that sees compounds as consisting in simples ‘to the 
exclusion of any supplementary factors.’ 
50 Many scholars have thought that the ideas of space and time are inconsistent with Hume’s content 
empiricism (Kemp Smith 1941, 273-4; Hendel 1963, 409; Mijuskovic 1977, 387; Waxman 1994, 
116; Frasca-Spada 1998, 75; Allison 2008, 51). Once we appreciate that for Hume space and time 
(as manners of disposition) are in fact given in impressions, however, the inconsistency disappears. 
Coventry argues that the ideas of space and time do not violate the Copy Principle because they are 
made up of simple ideas that derive from simple impressions (2010, 87); however, she fails to 
emphasize that the ideas represent not only components that are instantiated in impressions, but 
also manners of disposition of those components that are instantiated in impressions. 
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It might be thought that if only the present moment exists, then only present 
impressions exist, and present impressions on their own cannot instantiate succession; 
hence, impressions cannot instantiate succession (Bardon 2007, 55-56). The view that only 
the present moment exists has indeed been a powerful incentive for theorizing temporal 
experience to consist entirely of momentary present mental states.51 In addition, from a 
historical perspective, it is a view one might reasonably expect Hume to have held.52 
Despite the relevance of the objection, however, we have reasons not to interpret Hume’s 
theory to be constrained by this view. One of Hume’s methodological principles is that 
conclusions about experience must be prior to and determine metaphysical conclusions, 
not vice versa.53 In the Introduction to the Treatise he states that experience is the 
foundation for the science of human nature, and that this science is in turn the foundation 
for all the other sciences (T Intro.7 SBN xvi). Accordingly, an empirical investigation into 
the experience of time is foundational to any inquiry into time as a property of the external 
world. Hume restates the same principle in Book I Part II. In response to the objection that 
                                               
51 The view that only the present moment exists is known as ‘presentism.’ Philosophers like 
Augustine and Reid argue from presentism to the conclusion that the experience of time is not itself 
temporally extended (does not have past or future parts), but consists entirely of present mental 
states, specifically, of immediate awareness of present objects, memories of past ones, and 
expectations of future ones (Augustine Confessions Book XI, 26; Reid 1785/2002, 270). 
‘Retentionalist’ models of temporal experience (§3.2.4) also seem motivated, at least to some 
extent, by presentism—by a need to explain how experience, being constrained to the present, can 
represent time (see Dainton 2017[b]). 
52 Most philosophers in the early modern period were presentists. Falkenstein notes evidence of 
presentist commitments in Descartes, Malebranche, Hobbes, Berkeley, Leibniz, Bayle, Gassendi, 
Locke, and Reid (2013, 103-4). 
53 While it is not impossible to find metaphysical assumptions in Hume’s writings, such 
assumptions are fairly minimal (see Baxter 2008, 6). 
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his account of vacuum explains only how objects appear, rather than how they really are, 
he raises doubts regarding any investigation into how objects are that is not predicated on 
facts about how they appear (T 1.2.5.26 SBN 64). It would be contrary to Hume’s 
methodology to constrain his investigation of the experience of time by prior metaphysical 
notions, such as the notion that only the present moment exists.  
Hume characterizes succession by difference: for two or more impressions to be 
successive, they must not be qualitatively identical or ‘unchangeable’ but must be different 
(T 1.2.3.8-11 SBN 35-37). His grounds for this tenet are empirical.54 There are no 
experiences or impressions of successions made up of exactly resembling members. What 
seem to be such experiences—the impression of a whole note or a note that lasts for several 
beats, for instance—are always experiences of qualitatively identical objects against a 
background of other differences, so that the objects of such experiences are still constituted 
by change. 
Hume argues that any impression of time is identical to a series of successively 
disposed impressions. He observes that an impression of time always involves a series of 
successive impressions: in the absence of a successive series, as when we are asleep or 
occupied with a single thought, we have no impression of time (T 1.2.3.7 SBN 35). He 
adds that when we do have an impression of time, like the impression of a melody, the 
                                               
54 Hume seems to draw this tenet from Locke. Locke held that ideas ‘constantly change and shift’ 
and that we never have ‘one unvaried single idea in the mind, without any other, for any 
considerable time.’ Any ‘unvaried single idea’ that extends over time is always accompanied by 
other changing ideas (II.XIV.13). If we were ever to have an unvaried single idea without any other, 
such an idea would not convey a sense of time passing (II.XIV.4). Falkenstein (2017[a]) criticizes 
Hume on this point. 
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impression of time is not anything over and above the successive sounds of the notes: the 
sounds do not generate an additional impression separable from them that could be called 
an impression of time, but rather, the sounds themselves are the impression of time (T 
1.2.3.10 SBN 36-37). Finally, he states that a series of successive impressions is in and of 
itself sufficient for an impression of time: an impression of time ‘can plainly be nothing 
but different impressions disposed in a certain manner, that is, succeeding each other’ (T 
1.2.3.10 SBN 37; my emphasis). Thus, any impression of time—any temporal 
experience—consists essentially of impressions disposed successively.55 By analogy, any 
impression of space consists essentially of impressions disposed spatially. Henceforth, I 
refer to this thesis as the ‘identity thesis.’ 
 3.2.2. The idea of time 
 
The ideas of space and time originate from impressions of space and time by copying them. 
The impression of a table, a spatial disposition of simple color impressions, gives rise to 
an idea that copies and (as a result) mirrors the simple impressions and their spatial 
disposition (§1.3.2). Accordingly, the impression of a melody, a succession of simple 
sound impressions, gives rise to an idea that copies and mirrors the simple impressions and 
their successiveness.  
                                               
55 Hume’s phrase ‘impression of time’ has been thought to be inconsistent with his claim that we 
have no impression of time distinct and separable from a succession of impressions (Hendel 1963, 
412; Johnson 1989, 210-1). However, there is only an inconsistency if we interpret ‘impression of 
time’ to refer to a simple impression. If we interpret it to refer to a complex impression whose parts 
are ordered successively, the impression of time is in fact indistinguishable from a succession of 
impressions (Falkenstein 2013, 112; Fogelin 1985, 34). 
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Just like impressions, ideas are not essentially formless mental entities. Most if not 
all ideas are made up of spatially or temporally disposed parts. Hume emphasizes that ideas 
of space are literally extended (T 1.4.5.15 SBN 239-40). Some ideas can even ‘swell up to 
a considerable bulk’ (T 1.2.2.2 SBN 29-30).  
 In accordance with Hume’s theory of abstract ideas, abstract ideas of space and 
time are particular ideas (such as of a table or melody), which are attached to the general 
terms ‘space’ and time,’ where these general terms are associated with and call to mind 
other spatial and temporal ideas (§2.3.3; T 1.1.7.10 SBN 22). By being attached to general 
terms and thereby reviving other spatial and temporal ideas, the abstract ideas represent 
space and time as aspects: they represent the way in which the various ideas resemble one 
another. Both the abstract idea of space and that of time represent a point of resemblance 
across an exceedingly vast number of perceptions—in the case of space, across visual and 
tactile perceptions, and in the case of time, across perceptions of any kind. This point of 
resemblance might not be immediately obvious, especially between perceptions that are 
different in most other respects, such as the visual perception of a tree and the tactile 
perception of a book. Hume suggests that we learn to notice space qua aspect gradually: 
we first notice the resemblance between differently colored sets of dots; we might then 
notice the resemblance between differently colored and differently shaped visual 
perceptions; only at a late stage do we ‘carry the resemblance beyond objects of one sense’ 
and notice the resemblance between perceptions of different sense modalities (T 1.2.3.5 
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SBN 34).56 In pointing out this gradual development, Hume suggests that, as we learn to 
notice wider ranging resemblances, our ideas of space develop from less to more abstract: 
from ideas of particular spatial objects, to ideas of shapes, to ideas of visual and tactile 
space, to an idea of space in general. Our ideas of time develop analogously.  
By explaining the origin of the idea of time to be the succession of impressions, 
Hume’s theory has struck some commentators as circular. The alleged circularity is that 
‘succession’ is itself a temporal concept presupposing an idea of time, and that without a 
prior concept of time there could not be an awareness of successiveness in the first place 
(Rosenberg 1993, 83; Johnson 1989, 217-8). What this objection fails to recognize is that 
Hume attributes the origin of the idea of time not to a prior concept of succession, but to 
succession as an observable aspect of impressions. As an observable aspect, succession 
does not presuppose a prior concept of time. Nor does becoming aware of this aspect 
require a prior concept of time: successiveness can ‘naturally intrude on our attention’ 
insofar as it is a point of resemblance across many sets of perceptions (Baxter 2008, 20). 
 The view that the idea of time originates in successive perceptions was shared by 
several seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers, notably by some who commonly 
influenced Hume, like Locke, Malebranche, and Berkeley.57 Hume explicitly 
                                               
56 For a discussion of resemblance across vision and touch with respect to space see Waxman (2005, 
517-21) and Allison (2008, 46-49).  
57 Locke: ‘Reflection on these appearances of several Ideas one after another in our Minds, is that 
which furnishes us with the Idea of Succession: And the distance between any parts of that 
Succession, or between the appearance of any two Ideas in our Minds, is that we call Duration’ 
(II.XIV.3). Malebranche: ‘The confused memory of all these successive thoughts is the same thing 
as the judgment of our duration’ (45). Berkeley: ‘Whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of 
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acknowledged Locke’s influence on his theory (T 1.2.3.7 SBN 35). The latter posited the 
source of the idea of time to be, ultimately, the ‘train of Ideas, which constantly succeed 
one another in one’s Understanding’ and is ‘evident to any one who will but observe what 
passes in his own Mind’ (II.XIV.3). Reflection on this ‘train’ of ideas supplies the idea of 
succession, which in turn supplies the idea of duration (the distance between two parts of 
the succession), which in turn supplies the idea of time (the measurement of duration) 
(II.xiv.3, II.xiv.17). Locke rejected the view that motion is the source of the ideas of 
duration and time by arguing that we only perceive motion in the first place by the 
successiveness of our perceptions, and that we are aware of duration even when we 
perceive successiveness without motion, so that successiveness, not motion, is the ultimate 
source. He observed that some objects that we suppose to be in motion do not appear to be 
because the perceptions that represent them are not successive—for instance, our 
perceptions of an object moving in a circle at top speed are not successive, and thus they 
represent a static circle rather than a moving object (II.xiv.6-10). Hume referred to this 
observation to distinguish between the succession of perceptions and that of external 
objects, and to emphasize that it is the former that causes the idea of time, since any 
successive external objects that did not appear successive would be incapable of generating 
the idea (T 1.2.3.7 SBN 35). Though Hume adopted Locke’s view that successive 
perceptions are the source of the idea of time, he departed from Locke in arguing that the 
idea of time is inseparable from succession. For Locke, the ideas of duration and time once 
                                               
time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated 
by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties’ (Principles sec. 98). 
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acquired could be applied to any objects whatsoever, successive or not (II.XIV.24-25, 
II.XV.11). In contrast, Hume argued that the idea of time ‘can never in any propriety or 
exactness be applied to [a non-succession]’ (T 1.2.3.11 SBN 37). 
 Hume argues that we can have no idea of time as anything other than a succession. 
Recall that Hume’s content empiricism circumscribes ideas’ representational contents to 
objects or aspects that are first instantiated in impressions (§1.2). In T 1.2.3, Hume refers 
back to content empiricism and also to the principle that if two objects ‘be not different, 
they are not distinguishable; and if they be not distinguishable, they cannot be separated’ 
(T 1.2.3.10 SBN 36-37). These two principles imply that, given that time is identical to 
succession in our impressions of it, the only content that our ideas of time can have is time 
as succession. Ideas cannot distinguish between two aspects found in impressions if the 
two are identical (i.e. not different), nor can they represent any aspect not found in 
impressions. Thus, not only is it impossible for time to be experienced apart from 
succession, but also for it to be ‘conceiv’d without our conceiving any succession of 
objects’ (T 1.2.3.9 SBN 36).  
 Because for Hume time is identical to succession (both in our impressions and ideas 
of it), he uses the terms ‘time,’ ‘duration,’ and ‘succession’ interchangeably. This usage 
sets him apart from philosophers like Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who 
understood ‘duration’ as a mode or attribute of objects (even unchangeable, succession-
less objects), and ‘time’ as the measurement of this mode or attribute by its division into 
equal periods, as marked by regularly repeating motions such as those of a pendulum, the 
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moon, or the earth.58 Hume, in contrast, denies that we can have any notion of duration as 
an attribute of succession-less objects, nor, consequently, an idea of the measurement of 
such an attribute. Experience provides only one temporal notion: succession. ‘Time’ and 
‘duration’ can only correctly denote succession.59 
 Space and time form the basis for spatial and temporal relations between objects. 
An object is spatially related to another by being disposed in a spatial manner with respect 
to it, for instance, by being left or right of it. An object is temporally related to another by 
being disposed successively with respect to it, such as by being before or after it. Hume 
includes ‘contiguity in space and time’ as one of the three fundamental associations or 
‘uniting principles’ among ideas (T 1.1.4.1 SBN 10-11). The idea of an object recalls or 
‘conveys the mind to’ the idea of that object which is spatially or temporally contiguous 
with the first object (T 1.1.4.1 SBN 11). 
 Hume’s theory of time can be labelled a relational theory in that it construes time 
not as an entity that exists independently of objects (as an absolutist theory would), but, 
rather, as a relation (or, more precisely, a manner of disposition) among objects. Since time 
                                               
58 Descartes Principles of Philosophy, Part I, Sections 55-57; Locke II.XIV.17, II.XV.11; Spinoza 
Ethics Part II Def. 5 and Proposition 45 Scholium; Leibniz ‘Conversation of Philarete and Ariste’ 
p.261.  I take this comparison from McRae (1980, 119-120). 
59 The difference between ‘time’ or ‘duration’ and ‘succession’ is only connotative. Hume generally 
uses ‘time’ and ‘duration’ when referring to the successive manner of disposition as the content of 
ideas, whereas he uses ‘succession’ to refer to the same manner of disposition as a property of 
perceptions. Thus, he uses the phrases ‘idea of time’ and ‘idea of duration’ but not ‘idea of 
succession,’ and ‘succession of perceptions’ but not ‘temporal disposition of perceptions.’ 
Nonetheless, ‘time,’ ‘duration,’ and ‘succession’ denote the same thing, a certain manner of 
disposition. 
  90 
 
 
is identical to succession, time does not exist outside or independently of the objects that 
comprise the succession.60   
3.2.3. Time in objects 
It is worth clarifying that the particular and abstract ideas of time that Hume explains in 
Book I Part II are not just representations of time as a feature of perceptions; they are 
representations of time as a feature of any objects whatsoever, whether perceptions or not. 
As Hume later observes, save when we are philosophizing about the mind, our impressions 
and ideas do not represent their objects as perceptions (that is, as distinct from external 
objects); rather, ‘the very image, which is present to the senses, is with us the real body’ 
(T 1.4.2.36 SBN 205). My impression or idea of a billiard ball’s motion does not represent 
a perception succeeding another perception, but the billiard ball itself in successive spatial 
locations. 
 I here assume that the question of how we represent time as external, as well as the 
question of how we come to distinguish between time as a feature of perceptions and as a 
feature of external objects, is independent of the question of how we represent time 
simpliciter. The former questions find their answer in T 1.4.2, where Hume explains the 
formation of beliefs about external objects. 
A separate question is whether, in discussing time as something that our 
impressions and ideas represent, Hume purports to reach conclusions about time as it is in 
reality. On the one hand, he holds that our representations sometimes license inferences to 
                                               
60 The question of whether space, time, and motion are absolute or relational was a key point of 
contention in the early modern period, as the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (1715-1716) attests.   
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conclusions about reality. He frequently invokes the ‘conceivability principle:’ if 
something is conceivable, then it is possible (T 1.1.7.6 SBN 19-20; T 1.2.2.8 SBN 32; T 
1.4.5.10 SBN 236). A related principle is the ‘contradiction principle:’ if something would 
be contradictory when conceiving of it, such as a mountain without a valley, then it is 
impossible (T 1.2.2.8 SBN 32).61 More contentiously, he claims that ‘wherever ideas are 
adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions and agreements of the 
ideas are all applicable to the objects;’ this claim is part of an argument that, because our 
ideas of the parts of space and time represent those parts as finitely divisible, and because 
these ideas are adequate representations, the real parts of space and time are finitely 
divisible (T 1.2.2.1 SBN 29). In these instances, Hume suggests that at least some 
propositions about time as we represent it are also true of time as it is in reality.  
On the other hand, in his discussion of the notion of a vacuum Hume denies any 
attempt on his part to reach conclusions about the ‘real nature and operations of objects’ 
(T 1.2.5.25 SBN 63): 
… my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or explain 
the secret causes of their operations. For besides that this belongs not to my 
present purpose, I am afraid, that such an enterprize is beyond the reach of 
human understanding, and that we can never pretend to know body 
otherwise than by those external properties, which discover themselves to 
the senses. (T 1.2.5.26 SBN 64) 
 
As long as we confine our speculations to the appearances of objects to our 
senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and 
operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrass’d 
by any question … If we carry our enquiry beyond the appearances of 
                                               
61 My attribution of this principle to Hume is motivated by Lightner (1997, 116) and Ainslie (2015, 
176). 
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objects to the senses, I am afraid, that most of our conclusions will be full 
of scepticism and uncertainty. (Tn12 SBN 64) 
 
Here, Hume seems to indicate that his propositions about space and time are strictly 
confined to time as it appears, or as our impressions and ideas represent it. 
 We can reconcile these seemingly inconsistent stances by recognizing that Hume’s 
attempts to reach conclusions about reality are attempts to reach only modal conclusions—
conclusions about what is possible, impossible, and necessary. The ‘conceivability’ and 
‘contradiction’ principles explicitly license only modal conclusions. While the ‘adequacy 
principle’ might seem more metaphysically robust, even then Hume indicates that it only 
licenses conclusions as to the ‘relations, contradictions, and agreements’ of objects; we 
might interpret these terms to refer only to necessary relations between objects. Hume’s 
application of the principle suggests this interpretation. Immediately after introducing it, 
Hume proceeds to establish that the notion of infinite divisibility involves a contradiction 
(T 1.2.2.1-4 SBN 29-31); consequently, as a matter of necessity, the real parts of space and 
time must be finitely divisible. In contrast, when stating his reluctance to ‘enter into 
disquisitions concerning the real nature and operations of objects,’ Hume is expressing 
reluctance to speculate about actual (i.e. not modal) facts about reality—that is, facts about 
the ‘real nature of bodies’ or ‘the secret causes of their operation.’ Hume makes this 
statement in the context of arguing that we obtain the idea of vacuum from perceptions of 
invisible and intangible distances; the statement is a way of ‘pleading guilty’ to the 
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objection that his account does not explain ‘the cause, which separates bodies after this 
manner’ (T 1.2.5.25 SBN 63-64). Thus understood, the two stances are compatible.62 
 3.2.4. Successions of impressions and impressions of succession 
A phenomenon at the crux of many debates on temporal experience is that of the difference 
between watching the movement of a clock’s second hand and watching that of the hour 
hand. Assume both hands move continuously. The experience of watching the hour hand, 
like that of watching the second hand, is comprised of successive feelings of various 
locations of the hand. Clearly, however, the experience of the second hand involves a 
distinct feeling (be it of succession, change, or motion) that the experience of the hour hand 
does not involve. 
 This phenomenon is commonly considered proof that, as William James put it, ‘a 
succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession’ (1890, 628). In fact, 
for over a century, James’ expression has been almost axiomatic in the literature on 
temporal experience. It is taken to be evident that, since both the experience of the second 
hand and that of the hour hand consist of successive feelings, the successiveness of the 
                                               
62A different proposal by Baxter (2009, 116-7) and Ainslie (2010, 62) is to distinguish between two 
senses of ‘reality.’ ‘Reality’ can refer to facts about what objects are like beyond the realm of 
human perception—facts about Kantian noumena or ‘things-in-themselves.’ ‘Reality’ can refer 
instead to facts about objects as they are within the realm of human perception, facts we can 
discover by scientific study of those objects, in contrast to fleeting or unstable appearances of the 
objects (such as the bent appearance of a stick inside a glass of water). Baxter and Ainslie propose 
that, in suggesting we can infer conclusions about reality on the basis of our representations, Hume 
is referring to the second sense of ‘reality;’ when expressing his reluctance to draw these inferences, 
he is referring to the first sense. While an in-depth discussion of this proposal is beyond the scope 
of this chapter, Hume’s statement that infinite divisibility is ‘really impossible and contradictory, 
without any farther excuse or evasion’ seems to resist the qualification that Baxter and Ainslie 
recommend. 
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feelings cannot be what explains the feeling of succession that obtains only when watching 
the second hand. Something more than a succession of feelings is necessary for a feeling 
of succession.63 
 If James’ distinction is correct, Hume’s theory of temporal experience is essentially 
misguided. James’ distinction directly opposes Hume’s identity thesis, which states that 
the referents of these inverted phrases are one and the same. Insofar as the clock hands 
constitute evidence for James’ distinction, then, they constitute counterevidence for 
Hume’s theory. 
 I will argue that Hume has a way out of this difficulty in Locke’s analysis of the 
experience of motion.64 Before turning to this argument, I want to suggest that, in fact, 
Locke’s analysis offers a promising alternative to some of the standard accounts of the 
phenomenon in the contemporary literature. The account James himself championed 
appeals to a Kantian ‘unity of consciousness:’ unlike the successive feelings of the hour 
hand, the successive feelings of the second hand are unified or experienced together (1890, 
608-610, 628-629). The notion that unity of consciousness is what is at stake in these cases 
                                               
63 For a discussion of James’ expression and its role in the contemporary literature on temporal 
experience, see Hoerl (2013).  
64 A different proposal on Hume’s potential response to James’ challenge is Falkenstein’s (2017[a]). 
Falkenstein interprets Hume to hold the view that ‘only one part of time ever exists and this part is 
unextended’ (2017[a], 48). On his reading of Hume, both the experience of the second hand and 
that of the hour hand consist in perceptions coming in and out of existence. What distinguishes one 
from the other is that the former involves ‘a more effortless, rapid or precognitive form of 
perceiving that something has moved’ (50). My main misgiving on this proposal is that, as I noted 
in §3.2.1., Hume is not committed to the view that  ‘only one part of time ever exists.’ Hume’s 
characterization of time as the manner in which perceptions are disposed naturally suggests that the 
perceptions that constitute time all exist. 
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takes such deep root in the philosophical tradition that it is commonly appealed to as 
uncontroversial;65 indeed, it is the starting point for the retentionalist approach to temporal 
experience.66 While a proper criticism of this line of explanation is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, it is not difficult to see why Humeans, at the very least, would be 
motivated to look for an alternative. Hume rejects any ‘real bond’ between perceptions (T 
1.4.6.16 SBN 259). The only bonds between perceptions that he acknowledges are 
resemblance, contiguity, and causation, and these bonds amount simply to ways in which 
ideas—not impressions—are generally associated (T 1.1.4.1 SBN 10-11). 
A second standard account appeals to temporal limits to experience. On this 
account, experience has limited duration; for an experience to comprise any two events, 
the two events cannot be separated by a longer stretch of time than the finite stretch of time 
of experience. This finite stretch of time is commonly called the ‘specious present.’ 
Accordingly, the experience of the hour hand does not constitute an experience of 
succession because changes in the hour hand are separated by a duration longer than that 
of the specious present; thus, instead of an experience of the changes, we have only an 
experience of the hand at one location and a memory of it at another. In contrast, because 
changes in the second hand are separated by a duration shorter than that of the specious 
                                               
65 See, e.g., Bardon 2007, 56; Dainton 2011, 389; Yaffe 2011, 399. 
66 Since the late nineteenth century, a standard approach to temporal experience is to characterize 
it as a unified present experience, the constituents of which are simultaneous, but which nonetheless 
has temporal depth. James expressed this notion by describing the ‘specious present’ as ‘a saddle-
back, with a certain breadth of its own’ (1890, 609, 630); Brentano by stating that present sensations 
have a ‘proteraesthesis’ or ‘original association’ to immediately preceding sensations (1988, 79, 
90); and Husserl by proposing that every moment of experience is ‘retentional’ in that it retains 
immediately preceding moments (1928, 50-51). 
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present, they fall within the temporal bounds of an experience and thus constitute an 
experience of change or succession.67 
 This line of explanation might seem harmonious with Hume’s theory of temporal 
experience. Strictly speaking, the specious-present account is inconsistent with Hume’s 
identity thesis in that it maintains that some successions of experiences (namely, those that 
exceed the specious present) are not experiences of succession. Nevertheless, one might 
argue that Hume’s theory can be reconciled to it with only some minor amendments. 
Specifically, one might distinguish Hume’s identity thesis into two prongs: (1) that every 
impression of succession is a succession of impressions and (2) that every succession of 
impressions is an impression of succession. Hume need only abandon the second of these 
prongs to reconcile his theory to James’ distinction by way of the specious-present 
proposal.68 Notwithstanding its appeal, however, the notion of the specious present is not 
without difficulties—these include the question of what sort of empirical evidence the 
                                               
67 Many versions of the specious-present account (e.g. James’ version) postulate mental unity in 
addition to temporal limits. Since there are also versions of it do not appeal to mental unity, 
however, I here treat the specious-present account as distinct from the mental-unity account (see, 
e.g. Broad 1923, 352; Russell 1927, 205; Hoerl 2013, 387-388; Dainton 2017[a], 114-115). 
68 A possible complication is that for Hume durations are always successions (as per the first prong 
of the identity thesis) and, moreover, successions always involve change. Thus, for two impressions 
to be separated by any duration, they must be separated by a succession of different impressions. It 
might be thought that the changes in the hour hand are not separated by a succession of different 
impressions; hence, the duration between one change in the hour hand and the next is always the 
same as that between one change in the second hand and the next—namely, no duration. This 
complication can be addressed by arguing that for Hume objects like the hour hand are always 
experienced against a changing background (see previous section and note 7); in this way, changes 
in the hour hand would in fact be separated by a succession of different impressions. It can then be 
argued, using the specious-present approach, that this succession exceeds the bounds of the 
specious present, and hence we do not experience the hour hand changing. 
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notion admits of, as well as the question of how experiences occupying different specious 
presents combine to form continuous streams of experiences (see Dainton 2017[b]).  
Locke’s account of the clock-hands phenomenon has received little attention.69 Yet, 
at least from a Humean perspective, it offers a compelling alternative to the standard 
contemporary accounts. In particular, Locke’s account seems to presuppose less by way of 
metaphysical or transcendental laws; it postulates neither a unity of consciousness nor a 
specious present to experience. In this respect, it is the kind of minimalist explanation that 
Hume would be inclined to endorse. 
                                               
69 Discussions of Locke’s account include Odegard (1978), Yaffe (2011), and Benovsky (2012). 
Odegard argues that Locke is committed to the notion of the specious present (141-142). While I 
cannot properly address his argument here, however, it is worth noting that Odegard gives no 
textual evidence of the commitment, but, for reasons that can be questioned, takes the commitment 
to be implicit in Locke’s references to ‘experiences of succession.’ Yaffe claims that Locke rejects 
‘our capacity to get the idea of succession from the sensory perception of motion’ (392); he also 
attributes to Locke the view that ‘our sensory ideas are not capable of representing succession’ 
(398). I believe both these claims are lacking in textual evidence. In the passage that Yaffe cites in 
support of the first claim (II.XIV.6), what Locke denies is that motion (as opposed to succession 
more generally) is the ultimate source of our idea of succession; Locke explicitly states that ‘motion 
produces…an idea of succession,’ only it does not do so qua motion but in virtue of being a kind 
of succession. In support of the second claim, Yaffe refers to Locke’s view that the speed of the 
succession of our perceptions has certain bounds, which he interprets to mean that for Locke 
sensation is ‘halting’ in that it consists of static snapshots. This interpretation can be questioned 
(for an alternative interpretation, see below); indeed, Locke states that ‘in the impressions made 
upon any of our senses, we can but to a certain degree perceive any succession; which, if exceeding 
quick, the sense of Succession is lost’ (II.XIV.184); the very contrast Locke depicts between cases 
in which we do sense succession and cases in which we do not implies a capacity for the sensation 
of succession. My interpretation of Locke here has more affinities with Benovsky’s reading. I 
follow Benovsky in holding that for Locke an experience of motion (as in the case of a second 
hand) is essentially an experience the parts of which are ‘appropriately linked,’ where the 
appropriate link is temporal proximity or contiguity (98-99, 104). However, while Benovsky 
interprets this link as a condition for an experience of succession, I interpret it as a condition for an 
experience of motion. As I note below, Locke clearly states that an experience can be an experience 
of succession even when its parts are not thus linked. 
  98 
 
 
As we saw earlier, Locke, like Hume, takes the idea of time to derive from the 
succession of perceptions in a mind. In advancing this view, Locke considers and rejects 
the possibility that the idea of time derives instead from ‘our observation of motion by our 
senses’ (II.xiv.183).70 Locke argues against this possibility by examining the nature of our 
experience of motion. He characterizes the experience of motion as the experience of a 
‘constant succession’ (II.xiv.7; my emphasis). The experience of motion always involves 
successive perceptions; more specifically, it involves perceptions that succeed one another 
constantly. Locke further observes that those successions of perceptions that are not 
experiences of motion still convey the idea of time. He concludes that succession, not 
motion, is the ultimate source of that idea. Motion occasions the idea of time only in virtue 
of being one kind of succession. 
 Locke supports his characterization of the experience of motion by discussing a 
number of examples. The examples fall into two categories: (1) cases in which one has no 
successive perceptions and (2) cases in which one has no constantly successive perceptions. 
In both kinds of cases, it seems an experience of motion would have obtained but for the 
lack of successive or constantly successive perceptions. As an example of (1), Locke 
discusses the experience of an object moving rapidly along a circular path—so rapidly that 
we see a static circle rather than a moving object (II.xiv.8). He also discusses the experience 
of a bullet passing through the opposite walls of a room (II.xiv.10).71 The reason we do not 
                                               
70 The target of Locke’s argument is the Aristotelian view that time is the measurement of motion. 
71 Each of these examples is relevant for Locke’s argument in that each concerns an object that fails 
to produce successive perceptions. The examples are different in other ways, however. A 
perplexing feature of the circular-motion example is that, in addition to seeing a static object in 
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experience motion in these cases, Locke claims, is that the motion in the external world is 
too fast to register successive perceptions in the mind.  
As an example of (2), Locke discusses the experience of being ‘becalmed at sea, 
out of sight of land, in a fair day’—so ‘becalmed’ that the sea, the sun, and the ship appear 
at rest. In addition, he discusses none other than the experience of ‘the hands of clocks, and 
shadows of sun-dials’ (II.xiv.11). In these cases, the motion in the external world is ‘so 
slow, as not to supply a constant train of fresh ideas to the senses’ (II.xiv.11; my emphasis). 
While the object does register qualitatively different successive perceptions, the different 
perceptions are not continuous, but take place ‘a good while one after another’ (II.xiv.7). 
Locke’s analysis here draws on his view that perceptions in the mind are always changing. 
Even when our sensations are not changing, the ideas ‘of our own thoughts’ are. Locke 
stipulates that the experience of a slowly moving object is one where the changing ideas of 
our own thoughts ‘come into our minds, between those offered to our senses by the moving 
body’ (II.xiv.11; my emphasis). In other words, while the object registers qualitatively 
different successive perceptions, these perceptions are interrupted by other non-sensory 
perceptions; between one sensory perception and the next different sensory perception, 
there is a perception which is qualitatively indistinguishable from either one, but which is 
marked by a change in our thoughts. It is only when the different sensory perceptions 
succeed one another constantly—that is, without the kind of interruption just described—
that an experience of motion obtains.  
                                               
place of a moving object, we see an object that does not exist (namely, a circle). For a discussion 
of the history of the example, see Larivier and Lennon (2002). 
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It is worth noting that, even though Locke focuses on the experience of motion, 
the distinction between succession and constant succession is broader. Consider, instead 
of a slowly changing visual object like an hour hand, a slowly changing sound. Locke 
would say that, unlike the experience of a rapidly changing sound, the experience of the 
slowly changing sound is not a constant succession. Thus, even though he focuses on the 
experience of motion, he is in fact highlighting a broader distinction that we can observe 
across many different sense modalities. 
Much of Locke’s discussion of the experience of motion concerns the relationship 
between perceptions in the mind and external objects. Locke claims that external objects 
can succeed one another at faster or slower speeds than perceptions succeed one another in 
the mind. His statement that ‘there seem to be certain bounds to the quickness and slowness 
of the succession of those ideas one to another in our minds’ concerns the speed of our 
perceptions relative to the speed of external objects (II.xiv.184-185). Objects that succeed 
one another at a speed above a certain limit will not register successive perceptions (as the 
examples of (1) show), while objects that succeed one another at a speed below a certain 
limit will not register constantly successive perceptions (as per the examples of (2)). 
Incidentally, Locke’s talk of ‘bounds’ might evoke the notion of the specious present; 
however, Locke’s ‘bounds’ are limits to the speed of perceptions, not to the duration of an 
experience. This dimension of Locke’s discussion does not concern us here. What is crucial 
is that for Locke the experience of motion requires constantly successive perceptions. This 
characterization of the experience of motion is independent of his more metaphysically-
fraught claims on the relative speeds of perceptions and external objects. 
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I propose that Locke’s account of the experience of motion can be Hume’s response 
to James’ challenge. The difference between the experience of the second hand and that of 
the hour hand is that the different perceptions of the second hand succeed one another 
constantly, while those of the hour hand do so with interruptions; only the former comprise 
an experience of motion. A striking feature of Locke’s account is that, unlike most other 
explanations of the phenomenon, it does not introduce a distinction between successions 
of perceptions and perceptions of succession. Locke states clearly that the experience of a 
slowly moving object is still an experience of succession—albeit of interrupted succession 
(II.xiv.12). In this way, Locke’s account affords Hume a way to maintain the identity thesis 
against the alleged counterevidence: what is at stake in the phenomenon of the clock hands 
is not the experience of succession, but the experience of motion. The phenomenon proves 
that a succession of feelings is not always a feeling of motion, but not that it is not always 
a feeling of succession. 
In §3.2.1, I discussed the example of listening to a musical melody—Hume’s own 
choice of example (T 1.2.3.10 SBN 36)—to illustrate Hume’s view that time is the 
successive arrangement of perceptions. The experience of the melody is an experience of 
time because it is made up of successive parts. Time is an aspect of the experience, namely, 
its successiveness. Locke’s analysis clarifies an important circumstance in this example: 
experiences like that of a melody can manifest not only time, but motion as well; they do 
so when they are made up of constantly successive parts. In other words, time and motion 
are two distinct aspects of the experience. It seems to me that discussions of experiences 
like that of a melody or of watching a second hand often fail to disambiguate on which of 
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these two aspects is in question, that is, on whether the experience is being discussed as an 
experience of time or of motion.72 Once we appreciate that the two are distinct, it becomes 
clear that what is missing in the experience of the hour hand is the experience of motion, 
not the experience of time. 
It might seem that, in fact, Hume explicitly endorses Locke’s account. In the course 
of presenting his theory of temporal experience, Hume refers to the example of circular 
motion and cites Locke’s view that ‘perceptions have certain bounds … beyond which no 
influence of external objects on the senses is ever able to hasten or retard our thought’ (T 
1.2.3.7 SBN 35). As Larivier and Lennon have argued, however, Hume mentions Locke in 
this passage not in order to explain the experience of motion, but in order to corroborate 
his thesis that time is made up of temporal minima (Larivier and Lennon 2002, 515, 520). 
It is thus not obvious (at least not on the basis of this passage) that Hume endorses Locke’s 
view. My proposal is only that he could endorse it. 
3.3. Simultaneity 
 3.3.1. The impression and idea of simultaneity 
I interpret Hume’s term ‘co-existence’ to be equivalent to ‘simultaneity.’ ‘Simultaneity,’ 
as we commonly understand it, denotes existence at the same time.73 Hume’s uses of ‘co-
                                               
72 Broad, for instance, fails to distinguish between experiences of motion and experiences of change 
(i.e. succession) in his discussion of the clock-hands phenomenon. He discusses the experience of 
the second hand as an experience of something ‘moving or changing’ (1923, 351). My point here 
is that the experience of the second hand is an experience of something changing insofar as it is 
successive, and an experience of something moving insofar as it changes continuously. The fact 
that the experience of the hour hand is not an experience of motion (because it does not change 
continuously) does not entail that it is not an experience of change.  
73 See the Oxford English Dictionary’s entry for ‘simultaneity.’ 
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existence’ throughout the Treatise clearly indicate a reference to the same notion; since 
Hume never uses ‘simultaneity’ or its cognates, it is most natural to assume that he does 
not assign ‘co-existence’ a separate meaning. In addition, Johnson’s dictionary (1755) 
assigns ‘co-existent’ and ‘simultaneous’ the same meaning: existing at the same time.74 
 ‘Simultaneity’ or ‘existence at the same time’ is clearly a relation between two or 
more objects; yet, upon closer inspection, it is not clear what this relation amounts to 
exactly in Hume’s theory of time. Specifically, there seem to be at least two ways that we 
might interpret the nature of simultaneity.  
First, we might understand simultaneity to be the relation of existing at the same 
moment or part of time. Since for Hume time is identical to a succession of objects, 
moments or parts of time can be nothing other than the objects making up the succession 
(Baxter 2008, 22). If moments are the objects making up a succession, for two objects to 
exist at the same moment is for them to co-constitute a complex object that is a member of 
a succession and that comprises them both. Here, it is important to realize that for Hume 
objects cannot exist at the same moment by being located in some moment or part of time 
extrinsic to themselves: time is the manner in which objects are disposed (T 1.2.3.7); there 
are no parts of time extrinsic to objects and in which they can be located, but rather, objects 
                                               
74 See the dictionary’s entries for ‘co-existent’ and ‘simultaneous.’ Baxter (2008) suggests that ‘co-
existence’ refers to a rough coordination in time while ‘simultaneity’ refers to a precise 
coordination (41). However, in light of the considerations raised above, it is not clear that 
interpreting the terms as different in meaning is warranted. Baxter’s distinction between rough and 
precise coordination in time is legitimate; however, this distinction only warrants a distinction 
between two kinds of simultaneity/co-existence: rough and precise simultaneity/co-existence. It 
does not warrant interpreting the terms to have different meanings, especially when the terms are 
most naturally used and read as equivalent. 
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themselves are the parts of time. Thus, for instance, the segments of a lightning stroke exist 
at the same moment in virtue of co-constituting a complex object (the lightning stroke) that 
is successive with other objects. If simultaneity is the relation of existing at the same 
moment, then, it is the relation of co-constituting a complex object in a succession of 
objects. 
This interpretation requires further refinement to account for the fact that moments 
can be temporally complex or temporally simple. Moments can be temporally complex in 
that they can be made up of successive parts. However, Hume argues that no moment is 
infinitely divisible. Every succession is ultimately made up of temporally simple moments: 
moments that are not composites of successive parts (T 1.2.2.4). A temporally simple 
moment might still be divisible, but only into non-temporal parts. A lightning stroke, for 
example, might divide into spatial parts—the various segments of the stroke—even if it 
does not divide into temporal parts. If we interpret simultaneity as existence at the same 
moment, simultaneity requires not only that the simultaneous objects co-constitute a 
complex object in a succession: they must co-constitute a temporally simple object. 
Suppose that two objects—two successive notes in a melody, for instance—co-constitute 
a temporally divisible object, but not a temporally indivisible one. Insofar as each object 
belongs to a distinct moment of the complex object, the two do not ultimately exist at the 
same moment of time. Hence, the two are not simultaneous. Simultaneity would thus 
require not only the co-constitution of an object, but the co-constitution of a temporally 
simple object. 
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On this interpretation of the nature of simultaneity, simultaneity is reducible to a 
mereological relation—the relation of comprising a member of a succession. This 
characterization of simultaneity is consonant with the contemporary notion that 
simultaneous objects belong together in a ‘simultaneity plane.’ In contrast, the second 
alternative is to understand simultaneity as an irreducible relation. Rather than understand 
simultaneity in terms of the composition of moments, we might understand it as a temporal 
relation of its own—a relation that experience simply manifests and that is not definable in 
terms of other relations or properties. When we perceive the branches of a lightning stroke 
to be simultaneous, their simultaneity is simply the way they appear, in the same way that 
distance and contiguity are ways in which objects appear. Simultaneity, contiguity, and 
distance are temporal relations in that time, as a manner of disposition, comprehends these 
various relations; yet, they are not reducible to more basic properties of time.75  
 The second of these interpretations is ultimately more consistent with Hume’s 
theory. We can appreciate why by examining Hume’s criticism of the geometrical standard 
of equality. Hume criticizes geometrical standards in the course of rejecting the argument 
that geometrical demonstrations entail the infinite divisibility of space; insofar as these 
demonstrations rely on notions like perfect equality, which are only fictions, according to 
Hume, they cannot establish that space is infinitely divisible (T 1.2.4.17 SBN 44-45). In 
this discussion, Hume considers two ways of understanding the nature of geometric 
equality (equality being a relation between two figures, such as two lines). On the first 
                                               
75 Baxter seems to propose a similar interpretation in construing co-existence as a primitive relation 
(2008, 37). 
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characterization, equality consists in having the same number of points (T 1.2.4.19 SBN 
45). Recall that for Hume space is ultimately made up of indivisible points (§3.2.3); we 
might then understand two lines to be equal when the numbers of such points in each are 
equal. Hume rejects this characterization of equality: 
But tho’ this answer [i.e. that equality consists in having the same number 
of points] be just, as well as obvious; yet I may affirm, that this standard of 
equality is entirely useless, and that it never is from such a comparison we 
determine objects to be equal or unequal with respect to each other. For as 
the points, which enter into the composition of any line or surface, whether 
perceiv’d by the sight or touch, are so minute and so confounded with each 
other, that ’tis utterly impossible for the mind to compute their number, such 
a computation will never afford us a standard, by which we may judge of 
proportions. No one will ever be able to determine by an exact numeration, 
that an inch has fewer points than a foot, or a foot fewer than an ell or any 
greater measure; for which reason we seldom or never consider this as the 
standard of equality or inequality (T 1.2.4.19 SBN 45). 
 
Hume argues that the perception of equality is never a comparison between the number of 
points in two lines. We would not be able to compute the numbers of points in two lines in 
order to compare them. Even if the lines are made up of a determinate number of points, 
these points are too ‘minute’ and ‘confounded with one another’ for us to be able to 
enumerate them. Thus, even though ‘having the same number of points’ is a ‘just’ 
definition of equality, this definition does not correspond to the way we perceive and 
determine equality in practice.76 Instead, Hume argues that the perception of equality is the 
perception of a certain ‘appearance:’ 
                                               
76 Hume also considers a characterization of equality as congruence, but he argues that this 
characterization is at bottom the same as the number-of-points characterization (T 1.2.4.21 SBN 
46-7). 
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There are many philosophers, who refuse to assign any standard of equality, 
but assert, that ’tis sufficient to present two objects, that are equal, in order 
to give us a just notion of this proportion. All definitions, say they, are 
fruitless, without the perception of such objects; and where we perceive 
such objects, we no longer stand in need of any definition. To this reasoning 
I entirely agree; and assert, that the only useful notion of equality, or 
inequality, is deriv'd from the whole united appearance and the comparison 
of particular objects. For ’tis evident, that the eye, or rather the mind is often 
able at one view to determine the proportions of bodies, and pronounce them 
equal to, or greater or less than each other, without examining or comparing 
the number of their minute parts. (T 1.2.4.22 SBN 47). 
 
Hume here suggests that equality is not analyzable in terms of other relations or 
properties—especially not mereological properties like having the same number of 
points—but is simply an ‘appearance that spatial figures have in the eye’ (T 1.2.4.24 SBN 
47). Equality is something we just notice upon comparing two figures. 
 This analysis of equality suggests that Hume would likewise resist a 
characterization of simultaneity as existing at the same moment (that is, as comprising a 
temporally indivisible object in a succession). The indivisible moments that make up a 
succession are just as ‘minute’ and ‘confounded with one another’ as the indivisible points 
that make up a line (T 1.2.4.24 SBN 28-29). We are not capable of discriminating 
temporally indivisible moments; hence, when we perceive two objects to be simultaneous, 
we do not do so by determining that they both belong to the same such moment. Instead, 
their simultaneity is their ‘appearance to the eye’—an appearance that is not reducible to 
other relations or properties. In short, the nature of simultaneity is analogous to that of 
spatial equality. 
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 The analogy further suggests that, just as the mereological characterization of 
equality is ‘just’ in Hume’s lights, the mereological characterization of simultaneity is also 
just—it is problematic only in that it does not correspond to the way we actually perceive 
simultaneity. In addition, just as equality (as an appearance) is never exact, so simultaneity 
(as an appearance) is never exact (T 1.2.4.23-24 SBN 47-48). The reason that equality is 
never exact, according to Hume, is that any two lines that appear equal can always be found 
to be unequal upon a more rigorous comparison: for instance, we might find that one line 
is 1mm longer than the other upon measuring the lines with a ruler; if we then measure the 
ruler itself with a more exact instrument, we might find that the difference is of 0.9mm; if 
we then test this estimate with an even more exact instrument, we might find the difference 
to be 0.89mm; and so on. In the same way, simultaneity as an appearance is never exact, 
but always admits of subsequent corrections. Just as the notion of exact equality is a ‘mere 
fiction’ for Hume (T 1.2.4.24 SBN 47-49), the notion of exact simultaneity is also a fiction. 
Hume argues that we imagine a perfect standard of equality (i.e. exact equality) because 
the process of correcting our perceptions of equality time after time leads the mind to 
imagine an end to these corrections: a perfect standard that establishes definitively that two 
lengths are equal. Similarly, the process of correcting our perceptions of simultaneity also 
leads the mind to imagine a perfect standard of simultaneity. 
 If simultaneity is an ‘appearance,’ impressions of simultaneity are impressions that 
manifest that appearance, such as the impression of the branches of a lightning stroke, or 
the joint impressions of a lightning stroke and of the sound of rain. Ideas of simultaneity 
are ideas that copy and (as a result) mirror these impressions. Abstract ideas of simultaneity 
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are ideas that are attached to terms like ‘simultaneity,’ ‘co-existence,’ or ‘existing at the 
same time,’ and which thereby represent simultaneity as an aspect or point of resemblance 
across many different sets of objects. 
 3.3.2. Enduring objects: the co-existence thesis 
Hume’s theory of time implies that, because time can be neither experienced nor conceived 
as anything other than a succession of different objects (§3.2.1-2), an unchangeable object 
cannot be temporal—it can only be temporally simple. Hume recognizes that this 
implication is counterintuitive: we tend to think that objects like the lamppost outside my 
window endure, even if they are not successions of different objects. Hume explains the 
intuition that such objects are temporal as a fiction of the imagination: the streetlight does 
not endure, but our minds feign or make up the notion that it does (T 1.2.5.29 SBN 65; T 
1.4.2.29 SBN 200-201). 
 I will offer an interpretation of how this fiction arises in the next section (§3.3.3). 
Before doing so, I want to address an existing interpretation by Baxter (2008). A critical 
component of Baxter’s interpretation is the suggestion that, on Hume’s view, a temporally 
simple object can co-exist with a succession of objects. As evidence that Hume holds this 
thesis, Baxter cites the following passages: 
… when we consider a stedfast object at five-a-clock, and regard the same 
at six; we are apt to apply to it that idea [the idea of time] in the same manner 
as if every moment were distinguish’d by a different position, or an 
alteration of the object. The first and second appearances of the object, 
being compar’d with the succession of our perceptions, seem equally 
remov’d as if the object had really chang’d. To which we may add, what 
experience shews us, that the object was susceptible of such a number of 
changes betwixt these appearances… (T 1.2.5.29)  
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I have already observ’d [in the above passage], that time, in a strict sense, 
implies succession, and that when we apply its idea to any unchangeable 
object, ’tis only by a fiction of the imagination, by which the unchangeable 
object is suppos’d to participate of the changes of the co-existent objects, 
and in particular of that of our perceptions. (T 1.4.2.29) 
 
Baxter reads the above passages as stating that an unchangeable object, though temporally 
simple, can nevertheless coexist with a changing object that does have temporal parts 
(2008, 31-32). An unchangeable lamppost can coexist with a succession of thoughts, or 
with a clock as it changes from 5:00 to 6:00. Baxter then argues that the reason the mind 
feigns temporally simple objects to be temporal is that, because such objects tend to be co-
existent with successions (even if they are not themselves successions), it is easy for the 
mind to confound their co-existence with succession with actual succession (Baxter 2008, 
31-41). 
 For brevity, I will refer to the thesis that a temporal simple can co-exist with a 
succession as the ‘co-existence thesis’ (CT). CT might seem paradoxical: if an object like 
the lamppost has no temporal breadth, how can it co-exist with a succession of different 
objects? Baxter argues that, despite initial appearances, CT is internally consistent. His 
argument relies on a nuanced interpretation of ‘co-existence.’ He implies ‘co-existence’ to 
be opposite to ‘succession:’ for instance, in his statement ‘temporal parts are successive, 
not coexistent’ (31) and in his formal definition of the term as the negation of any earlier- 
or later-than relation between two or more objects (39). At the same time, he implies co-
existence to be distinct from ‘an equivalence relation of simultaneity’ (41). Unlike the latter 
type of relation, co-existence consists in a ‘rough coordination’ between the relata, rather 
than in a precise one (41). In other words, co-existence is distinct from the sort of perfect 
  111 
 
 
standard of simultaneity discussed in §3.3.1. Using this notion of coexistence, Baxter 
presents a formal proof to show that CT is internally consistent (38-41). 
 As Falkenstein (2017[b], unpublished) notes, a problem with Baxter’s defense of 
the plausibility of CT is that the formal definition of co-existence is purely negative; it 
postulates objects to be co-existent just as long as they are not disposed in succession. It 
would follow that temporally unrelated objects—an event in a fictional book and a 
historical event, for instance—are co-existent. Falkenstein proposes an alternative 
definition of co-existence as containment within a simultaneity plane (the first 
characterization considered in the previous section), and notes that this definition entails 
that CT is inconsistent. He argues that Baxter’s argument is ultimately inconclusive in that 
it relies on a seemingly arbitrary definition of co-existence. 
 My analysis of simultaneity (i.e. co-existence) yields a middle position on the 
question of the plausibility of CT. If simultaneity is an ‘appearance’ analogous to equality, 
it is metaphysically and phenomenologically plausible that some temporal simples can co-
exist with some temporal complexes. For example, a temporal simple like a lightning stroke 
might be simultaneous with two successive sounds if the sounds are such that they seem to 
happen in an instant: the lightning stroke would be related to the two sounds by the sort of 
appearance that constitutes simultaneity. Yet, my analysis also suggests that it is 
phenomenologically inaccurate to suppose that a temporal simple can co-exist with a 
succession of objects if the succession exceeds a certain length. When the succession 
exceeds a certain length, the temporally simple object no longer seems related to the entire 
succession by an appearance of simultaneity. The experience of a lamppost from 5:00 to 
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6:00 does not manifest the appearance of a temporally simple object co-existing with all of 
the movements in the changing clock. Instead, it manifests the appearance of a temporally 
complex lamppost, the temporal parts of which are simultaneous with different movements 
in the clock. I conclude that, although the co-existence thesis is plausible, which temporal 
simples co-exist with which temporal complexes is an empirical matter; more specifically, 
it would be contrary to experience to suppose that a temporal simple can co-exist with a 
succession regardless of the succession’s length. 
 In contrast to Falkenstein’s view, my view is that CT is plausible because co-
existence consists in an ‘appearance’ (not in a relation of containment in a simultaneity 
plane) and because a temporal simple can be related to a (short) succession by this 
appearance. In contrast to Baxter’s view, however, I hold that the relation described in T 
1.2.5.29 (i.e. the relation between a temporally simple object and a clock’s movements 
from 5:00 to 6:00) is not a relation of co-existence, because it does not manifest the sort of 
appearance characteristic of co-existence. 
 I noted earlier that Baxter gives evidence that Hume held CT. Indeed, the passages 
Baxter cites suggest that Hume held the unqualified version of CT—that a temporal simple 
can co-exist with a succession even when the succession is as long as the succession from 
5:00 to 6:00. This evidence can be reassessed, however.77 Of the passages Baxter cites, the 
passage that most strongly suggests the unqualified version of CT is T 1.4.2.29, where 
Hume states, ‘... ’tis only by a fiction of the imagination, by which the unchangeable object 
                                               
77 Rocknak (2013, 130-137) also challenges the evidence for the CT reading in arguing that Hume 
rejects the possibility of perceiving constant or invariable objects. 
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is suppos’d to participate of the changes of the co-existent objects [i.e. the changes from 
5:00 to 6:00]).’ That Hume asserts CT in this sentence is not as clear as Baxter supposes. 
Hume could be referring to co-existence between the unchangeable object and the changes 
as part of the ‘fiction of the imagination,’ that is, as part of what ‘is supposed.’ In other 
words, it is ambiguous whether Hume is proposing that the objects co-exist or whether he 
is instead proposing that we feign that they co-exist. The other passages that Baxter cites 
in support of his reading (i.e. T 1.2.5.29, T 1.2.3.7, and T 1.4.2.33) do not explicitly 
mention a relation of co-existence between temporal simples and temporal complexes.  
 More importantly, even if Baxter were correct in interpreting Hume to hold the 
unqualified version of CT, it is not clear that the thesis is essential to Hume’s account of 
the fiction of endurance (or to his theory of time more generally). In §3.3.3, I offer an 
interpretation of the formation of the fiction of endurance that does not rely on CT. Thus, 
if we assume that Baxter’s reading of the foregoing passages is correct, I hope to have 
shown at the very least that the unqualified version of CT is neither a thesis that Hume 
should have held nor one that he needed to hold for the purposes of explaining the fiction 
of endurance. 
 3.3.3. Enduring objects: the formation of the fiction 
On Baxter’s interpretation of Hume’s account of how we form the fiction of an enduring 
unchangeable object, CT (unqualified) plays a crucial role in the account. My denial that 
Hume holds CT (unqualified) thus raises a need for an alternative interpretation of the 
fiction. 
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 Hume uses ‘fiction’ to refer to an idea that the imagination feigns or invents, 
specifically, the idea of an object having some feature or aspect even though the object 
cannot be experienced as having that aspect (Traiger 1987, 386; Ainslie 2015, 66; Cottrell 
2016, 49-50). He regards the notion of an enduring steadfast object as a fiction because 
steadfast objects cannot be experienced as having duration. Hume explains that fictions 
arise from our imagination confounding two resembling (or otherwise closely associated) 
ideas: when two ideas, X and Y, resemble each other, the imagination, confounding them, 
feigns that an aspect of X applies to Y, even if Y is incompatible with that aspect (Traiger 
1987, 385-6; Baxter 2008, 44; Ainslie 2015, 79-80; Cottrell 2016, 52). On this explanatory 
model, our imagination feigns that an unchangeable object has duration because the idea 
of it somehow resembles and is easily confounded with that of a succession of objects. 
Baxter explains the relevant resemblance as the resemblance between the following ideas: 
the idea of an unchangeable object coexisting with a succession (even a lengthy succession) 
and the idea of several qualitatively identical objects each coexisting with each member of 
a succession (45). On a rejection of CT (unqualified), these ideas and their resemblance 
cannot be the source of the fiction because we would not have the first idea (or, if we have 
it, the idea is part and parcel with the fiction, rather than its source). What resemblance, 
then, induces the imagination to confound an unchangeable object with a succession? 
 I propose that the resembling ideas giving rise to the fiction are, first, the idea of an 
unchangeable object, and, second, the idea of a series of qualitatively unchangeable but 
numerically distinct objects against a background of changes in a clock. 
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In the lamppost case, we form an idea of the lamppost as a single unity (Idea 1), and a 
second idea of it as a series of qualitatively identical, but numerically distinct parts, each 
of which co-exists with movements of the clock (Idea 2). We form Idea 1 by abstraction: 
insofar as an experience of an array of objects can be distinguished into discrete parts, we 
can form ideas of those parts as single unities. We form Idea 2 by abstraction as well—by 
distinguishing between the various parts that constitute the experience of the lamppost 
against a changing background. Idea 1’s lamppost is unchangeable and temporally simple. 
Idea 2’s lamppost is made up of successive parts. The ideas’ resemblance induces the 
imagination to feign that the lamppost as a single unity is also successive. In this way, we 
come to imagine the lamppost as unchangeable yet enduring. Thus, Hume can account for 
the origin of the fiction of endurance in two resembling ways of thinking of an object: as a 
single unity, on the one hand, and as a succession of qualitatively identical objects against 
a changing background, on the other. 
 
lamppost 
5:00 
lamppost 
5:30 
lamppost 
6:00 
lamppost 
Idea 1 Idea 2 
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3.4. Tense 
 3.4.1. The idea of tense 
By the ‘idea of tense,’ I refer to the idea of what J. Ellis McTaggart calls the ‘A series.’ 
McTaggart distinguishes between two ways of conceiving of time. We might conceive of 
time as a series of positions that are related to each other by earlier- and later-than relations; 
he calls this series the ‘B series.’ We might instead conceive of time as a series where, in 
addition to earlier- and later-than relations, positions have the characteristics of being past, 
present, or future—the ‘A series.’ The concept of the B series is a concept of tenseless 
time; on the A series concept, in contrast, time is essentially divided into past, present, and 
future (1908, 458).  
For present purposes, I assume only (and uncontroversially) that we have an idea 
of the A series. I do not assume any position on the vexed issue of whether this idea 
corresponds to reality, or on the similarly vexed issue of which of the two conceptions of 
time best captures the essence of time.  
Hume’s theory of time explains only the idea of a B series—it explains the idea of 
a series of successive objects, but not that of a series of past, present, or future objects. 
Given the prominent role the idea of the A series plays in our mental lives, however, a 
complete theory of the psychology of time must account for its nature and origins. 
Moreover, given how puzzling the empirical origins of this idea seem to be, accounting for 
the idea is especially crucial for content empiricists. 
The Treatise section that most closely broaches the subject of tense is T 2.3.7, ‘Of 
contiguity and distance in space and time.’ In that section, Hume aims to explain not the 
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content or origin of ideas of past, present, and future, but their effects on the imagination 
and the passions—for instance, why ideas are fainter the further their objects are into the 
past or the future, and why ideas of past objects are fainter than ideas of equally removed 
future objects. In what follows, I propose a specification of the content of the idea of the A 
series that is harmonious with Hume’s discussion in that section. In the next section, I 
propose a theory of the origin of the idea. My aim is to dispel doubts about the feasibility 
of a Humean theory of the idea of tense.  
Before turning to the content of the idea of the A series, it is important to distinguish 
the idea of the A series from the idea of time’s directionality. We represent time as 
directional or anisotropic in that we represent it as having a beginning-to-end order. A 
succession like ‘do re mi fa sol’ cannot be replicated by the same notes ordered in the 
reverse because the order is significant. In contrast, our idea of space is isotropic in that we 
do not think of space’s parts as ordered from first to last; we do not think of the North 
American continent as beginning in the Atlantic and ending in the Pacific, or vice versa. 
While our notion of time as directional influences our notion of tense—it leads us to 
represent past, present, and future as a beginning-to-end sequence—the two notions are 
distinct. We can represent time as directional without representing it as divided into past, 
present, and future—and vice versa. 
 In the course of explaining why ideas of future objects have stronger emotional 
effects than ideas of past objects, Hume posits as a feature of the imagination that ‘from 
the consideration of any object [we] pass more easily to that, which follows immediately 
after it, than to that which went before it’ (T 2.3.7.7 SBN 430). In other words, the idea of 
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a member of a succession transitions much more easily to the idea of the subsequent 
member than to that of the precedent. Having heard five successive notes, for instance, the 
first five notes of Mozart’s ‘Turkish March,’ a representation of the second of these notes 
leads immediately to a representation of the third, yet we can only follow it with a 
representation of the first by exerting some effort. In this respect, time is unlike space: the 
idea of a member of a spatial arrangement leads just as easily to the idea of the member to 
the left as to the idea of the one to the right. Hume does not explain why the imagination 
functions in this order; a possible explanation is that causation, one of the most extensive 
principles of association, is asymmetrical. While more explanation is required, this feature 
of the imagination seems a likely source of the idea of time as directional (even if the 
feature itself has a source in more basic features).78 
 I propose that the Humean idea of the A series is the idea of a succession of objects 
where one object is salient in degree of liveliness. Such an idea represents a succession as 
divided into the salient object (the present), the objects earlier to the salient object (the 
past), and the objects later to the salient object (the future). Thus, my idea of a succession 
of musical notes is an idea of an A series when, in addition to representing the succession, 
the idea represents a note in the succession as salient, or as especially lively. 
 Thus, the idea of a present object is the idea of the salient member in a succession; 
that of a past object the idea of an object earlier to the salient object; that of a future object 
the idea of an object later to the salient object. I represent sitting at my desk as present by 
                                               
78 Note that, on this proposal, the idea of time’s directionality derives not from the ease of 
transitioning from one impression to another, but from the ease of transitioning from an idea 
representing a member of a succession to the idea representing the subsequent member. 
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representing it, first, as part of a succession involving various events like waking up and 
going outside, and second, as salient (that is, livelier) relative to those other events. I 
represent going to kindergarten as past by representing it as earlier to a salient event like 
sitting at my desk. I represent travelling on a self-driving car as future by representing it as 
later to sitting at my desk.  
T 2.3.7 lends support to this specification of the idea of the A series: 
There is an easy reason, why every thing contiguous to us, either in space 
or time, shou’d be conceiv’d with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel 
every other object, in its influence on the imagination. Ourself is intimately 
present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality. 
But where an object is so far remov’d as to have lost the advantage of this 
relation, why, as it is farther remov’d, its idea becomes still fainter and more 
obscure, wou’d, perhaps, require a more particular examination. 
 
’Tis obvious, that the imagination can never totally forget the points of 
space and time, in which we are existent; but receives such frequent 
advertisements of them from the passions and senses, that however it may 
turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is necessitated every 
moment to reflect on the present. ’Tis also remarkable, that in the 
conception of those objects, which we regard as real and existent, we take 
them in their proper order and situation, and never leap from one object to 
another, which is distant from it, without running over, at least in a cursory 
manner, all those objects, which are interpos’d betwixt them. When we 
reflect, therefore, on any object distant from ourselves, we are oblig’d not 
only to reach it at first by passing thro’ all the intermediate space betwixt 
ourselves and the object, but also to renew our progress every moment; 
being every moment recall’d to the consideration of ourselves and our 
present situation. ’Tis easily conceiv’d, that this interruption must weaken 
the idea by breaking the action of the mind, and hindering the conception 
from being so intense and continu’d, as when we reflect on a nearer object. 
The fewer steps we make to arrive at the object, and the smoother the road 
is, this diminution of vivacity is less sensibly felt, but still may be observ’d 
more or less in proportion to the degrees of distance and difficulty. (T 
2.3.7.1-2 SBN 427-428) 
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This passage might suggest that Hume defines the present by reference to the self—or, 
more precisely, that for Hume something is present by being ‘contiguous to us,’ or 
contiguous to the self. However, insofar as the self can be past or future (T 1.4.6.20 SBN 
262), contiguity to the self cannot be what makes an object present. Going to kindergarten 
and traveling on an electric car can be contiguous to my self—that is, to past and future 
parts of my self—yet not be present. 
I read the passage, instead, not as defining the present or the idea of the present, but 
as already presupposing a notion of tense—specifically, a notion of a present-tense (in 
contrast to a past or future) self. The passage needs to be interpreted alongside a similar 
passage in Hume’s discussion of sympathy: 
’Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves is always 
intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a 
conception of our own person, that ’tis not possible to imagine, that any 
thing can in this particular go beyond it. (T 2.1.11.4 SBN 317) 
 
Hume restates two crucial points from this earlier passage in T 2.3.7: first, the observation 
that ‘ourself’ (the impression or idea of ourselves) is ‘intimately present to us;’ second, the 
observation that this ‘impression or idea of ourselves’ is highly lively. In observing that 
the self is ‘intimately present to us,’ Hume means that an idea of a present-tense self is 
always intimately present (i.e. immediate) to us.79 While we sometimes represent the self 
                                               
79 The adjective ‘present’ is often used ambiguously to refer either to present-tense or to a quality 
of immediacy. Hume seems to use it in the second sense when describing the self as ‘intimately 
present;’ however, as I argue above, what he is describing as ‘intimately present’ is the idea of a 
present-tense self. Unless otherwise noted, throughout this chapter I use the term ‘present’ to refer 
to present-tense. 
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as past or future, we always have an idea of it as present-tense. It is the idea of the self as 
present-tense that is highly lively: as T 2.3.7.2 explains, ideas of past and future selves are 
fainter in proportion as they are removed from ‘our present situation,’ so that, presumably, 
ideas of very distant selves or parts of the self cannot be said to be ‘highly lively.’ It is also 
the idea of the self as present that transfers liveliness to ideas of contiguous objects but not 
to ideas of objects that are removed from this present self in space or time. Note that, were 
Hume not referring specifically to an idea of a present-tense self in these passages, it would 
not be clear how the idea of the self would be highly lively, or, even if it were lively, how 
it would transfer liveliness to ideas of present objects but not to ideas of remotely past or 
future objects.80 Hence, a notion of tense (of a present-tense self) already informs Hume’s 
explanation of the effects of ideas of tense on the imagination and the passions. Given these 
considerations, I interpret T 2.3.7.1-2 as follows: 
There is an easy reason, why every thing contiguous to us [i.e. to what we 
regard as our present-tense selves], either in space or time, shou’d be 
conceiv’d with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object, 
in its influence on the imagination. Ourself is intimately present to us [i.e. 
we always have an idea of the self as present-tense] and whatever is related 
to self [i.e. the self we represent as present-tense] must partake of that 
quality [i.e. liveliness] …  
 
’Tis obvious, that the imagination can never totally forget the points of 
space and time, in which we [our present-tense selves] are existent …  
 
                                               
80 The locution ‘the consideration of ourselves and our present situation’ at T 2.3.7.2 clearly 
suggests that the idea of self at work in enlivening ideas of present but not future or past objects is 
an idea of a present-tense self. The first sentence of T 2.3.7.2 treats ‘the points of space and time, 
in which we are existent’ as semantically equivalent to ‘the present;’ since the self can exist in the 
past and the future, by ‘we’ Hume refers specifically to we-in-the-present. 
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It is beyond the scope of my present aims to unravel the many interpretive ambiguities in 
these passages, or to address well-known puzzles about Hume’s account of the self. For 
the purposes of explaining the idea of the A series, I limit my reading of the passages to 
the conclusion that they already presuppose a notion of tense. 
While T 2.3.7 does not provide an account of the idea of tense, some of Hume’s 
observations corroborate the account I have proposed. The notion that ‘we take [objects 
that we regard as real and existent] in their proper order and situation’ is consonant with 
my specification that ideas of objects as past, present, or future represent them as members 
of a succession. Moreover, the notion that the idea of our present-tense self, as well as the 
ideas of objects contiguous to it, are ‘conceiv’d with a peculiar force and vivacity’ dovetails 
with my suggestion that when we represent an object as present we represent it as salient 
in degree of vivacity. To be sure, T 2.3.7 does not assert that the ideas of present-tense 
objects represent the objects as peculiarly lively—it asserts only that the ideas themselves 
are peculiarly lively. Yet, as noted in §1.3.2, there is a close affinity between an idea’s 
properties and the properties of the objects it represents, since having certain properties 
better enables an idea to mirror objects that have those properties. Thus, the notion that 
ideas of present-tense objects are peculiarly lively seems harmonious with my specification 
of the content of those ideas as peculiarly lively objects. 
 3.4.2. The origin of the idea of tense 
Provided that the foregoing specification of the idea of tense is plausible, we have yet to 
determine its origin. It might seem that T 2.3.7 offers the following explanation: the idea 
of the self enlivens the ideas of the objects contiguous to the self; as a result, the ideas of a 
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certain set of objects are especially lively; this liveliness, in turn, results in the ideas 
mirroring especially lively objects (i.e. in their assuming the objects’ causal or functional 
role), and hence representing especially lively objects. However, as I observed above, T 
2.3.7 already presupposes that the mind has a notion of tense in that the idea of the self that 
it appeals to is the idea of a present-tense self. We still need an explanation of how we form 
the idea of a present-tense self in the first place. If so, it is simpler to look for the origin of 
ideas of tense in a place other than the idea of the self—that is, in a principle that explains 
both how we form ideas of the self as past, present or future and how we form ideas of any 
other object as past, present, or future. 
 Unlike time and simultaneity, tense is not an aspect that impressions instantiate. 
Impressions are never disposed as members of a succession where one member is 
especially lively with respect to the rest. Phenomenologically, every member of every 
succession of impressions seems indistinguishable from the rest in its degree of liveliness. 
In listening to a melody, for instance, each note impression seems to ‘strike upon the mind’ 
with just as much liveliness as the rest. It might be tempting to suggest that each impression 
in the succession is especially lively at a different time. However, insofar as this suggestion 
requires a time extrinsic to the impressions, it is incompatible with Hume’s theory of time. 
Moreover, as McTaggart famously argues, this suggestion would be paradoxical in that it 
would imply an infinite regress of times: a time in which the impression is present, then a 
time in which the time the impression is present is present, then a time in which the time in 
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which the time [the impression is present] is present is present, and so on (McTaggart 1908, 
468-469).81 
Since impressions do not instantiate tense, the causes of the representation of tense 
cannot be straightforwardly attributed to an idea’s copying an impression that instantiates 
tense (§1.3.2). In his account of relative ideas, Hume suggests that ideas can represent 
objects as relata as a result of the imagination combining ideas of the objects with ideas of 
relations (T 1.2.6.9 SBN 68). For instance, by combining the idea of a prime number with 
the idea of the relation ‘larger than all other prime numbers,’ the imagination forms an idea 
of ‘the largest prime number,’ which is not a copy of the largest prime number (Garrett 
2006, 305). I propose that the imagination forms the idea of an object as past, present, or 
future in the same way: by combining the idea of the object with ideas of relations like 
‘successive with,’ ‘earlier than,’ ‘later than,’ ‘livelier than,’ or ‘less lively than.’ 
 What processes induce the mind to form ideas of tense, or to attribute ideas of the 
aforementioned relations to objects? A viable general principle as to the causes of ideas of 
tense is the following: when an idea of a succession is itself simultaneous with an 
impression of a member of the succession, the idea represents that member as especially 
lively. I will refer to this principle as the ‘tense principle’ (TP). 
Suppose I have an idea of a succession a member of which is of sitting at my desk. 
This idea might have originated from a corresponding impression of succession (i.e. as a 
                                               
81 More specifically, McTaggart argues that, if we account for an object’s changeable tense 
properties by positing times in which it has those properties, we would then need to explain how 
those ‘times’ themselves have changeable tense properties; doing so would then require us to posit 
second-removed ‘times,’ which would in turn require us to explain how those ‘times’ have 
changeable tense properties, which would require us to posit third-removed ‘times,’ and so on.   
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memory), from an inferential process, or even from a non-inferential imaginative process. 
TP prescribes that, if the idea is simultaneous with an impression of sitting at my desk, the 
idea attributes a salient degree of liveliness to sitting at my desk as opposed to the earlier 
and later members of the succession. The idea thus represents sitting at my desk as present, 
the preceding objects as past, and the succeeding objects as future. 
Some clarificatory remarks about TP are in order. First, TP does not posit a 
condition for an idea’s being present, but only for its representing tense. An idea might 
represent a succession and be simultaneous with an impression of one of the objects in the 
succession, yet not itself be present (or represented as present by another idea)—for 
instance, an idea I had as a child. TP prescribes that such an idea represents its object as 
present, but not that the idea is itself present. 
Second, TP posits a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the representation 
of tense. An idea can represent tense without meeting the condition specified by TP. An 
idea of an event in a distant place might represent it as present without being simultaneous 
with an impression of the event. I propose TP as an account of the basic process that 
generates the idea of the A series. Higher-order processes can apply the concept of the A 
series to produce further representations without involving the TP process. 
Third, in keeping with my argument in §3.3.1, the simultaneity in question consists 
in an ‘appearance’ analogous to equality, not in a relation of existing at the same moment. 
Because the idea of a succession is itself made up of temporal parts (§3.1.2), it cannot be 
confined to a temporally indivisible moment, and hence cannot be simultaneous with an 
impression of a member of the succession in the sense of existing at the same moment. As 
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I have shown, however, simultaneity is best understood as an appearance. The idea of a 
succession and the impression of a member of the succession can be simultaneous in the 
sense of manifesting this appearance. 
Fifth and last, TP might be an ‘original quality’ alongside the principles of 
association (§1.3.1). An explanation might be demanded as to why simultaneity with an 
impression causes an idea to represent the impression’s object as especially lively. Hume’s 
methodological dictum that some features of the mind do not admit of further explanation 
suggests that such a demand might be misplaced. Just as ideas’ association on the basis of 
resemblance does not admit of explanation, ideas’ representation of presentness on the 
basis of simultaneity with impressions could be a regularity we observe but whose roots 
are beyond the scope of scientific investigation. 
Even though Hume himself does not advance TP or any comparable principle, and 
even though I have not here evaluated TP’s merits against those of alternative explanations, 
TP is at the very least an indication of the potential of Hume’s psychology to encompass 
an account of the origin of the idea of tense.  
3.5. Conclusion  
Hume’s view that experiences of time do not just represent time, but are themselves 
instances of time, anticipates contemporary extensionalist approaches to temporal 
experience—approaches that view experience as temporally extended (Dainton 2011, 
2017[a], 2017[b]). Hume’s own extensionalism is integrated with content empiricism: it is 
motivated by, and it lends support to, Hume’s commitment to tracing the contents of all 
mental representations to experience. Given that impressions instantiate time, the contents 
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of our temporal concepts are grounded in impressions that instantiate those contents. In 
this respect, a reassessment of Hume’s theory like the one I have offered presents an 
especially sharp counterpoint to the Reidian-Kantian assumption—common among both 
contemporary philosophers and Hume scholars—that temporal concepts cannot be 
understood in terms of experience alone. 
 As a step in grounding temporal concepts in experience, Hume argues that time is 
identical to succession. In this chapter I have argued that this thesis is not as crude as it 
might initially appear. Hume can account for the most often-noted counterexample—the 
difference between slowly and rapidly changing objects—by invoking Locke’s distinction 
between constant and interrupted successions. He can also characterize simultaneity as an 
appearance analogous to geometric equality. Furthermore, he can explain how we imagine 
unchanging non-successive objects as temporal by observing our propensity to confound 
two resembling ways of viewing objects—as unities or as parts of temporal complexes. 
Finally, he can explain the idea of tense as the idea of a succession a member of which is 
salient in degree of liveliness, and, in addition, formulate a general principle regulating the 
causes of ideas of tense—what I have called the ‘tense principle.’ As we will see in the 
next chapter, when Hume’s theories of belief and epistemic value are also taken into 
account, a more extensive theory of knowledge of the past comes into view. 
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CHAPTER 4: KNOWLEDGE OF THE PAST 
4.1. Introduction 
My aim in this chapter is to explain how Hume’s theories of memory and time, as clarified 
in the previous chapters, fit within Hume’s theories of belief and knowledge. I show that 
Hume’s views on these various subjects in fact comprise a cohesive epistemology. In the 
first part of the chapter, I show that Hume’s theories of memory and belief, together with 
the ‘tense principle’ (§3.3), imply that for Hume memories are beliefs about the past 
(§4.1.1). I also show that Hume’s theory of causal inference can be applied to explain non-
mnemonic belief about the past (§4.2.2). In the second part of the chapter (§4.3), I address 
the question of the epistemic status of these beliefs—whether Hume can account for their 
epistemic value. Hume’s views on epistemic normativity are notoriously difficult to 
interpret and continue to be at the center of many scholarly debates. I aim to show that, as 
I have explained them, beliefs about the past and the processes giving rise to them raise no 
unique skeptical challenges. The numerous theoretical resources that interpreters have 
unveiled for explaining the epistemic merit of other beliefs can be applied to beliefs about 
the past as well. Thus, while it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to develop an 
interpretation of Hume’s theory of epistemic normativity, I show that the theory of belief 
about the past here developed can be consolidated with existing interpretive approaches. 
Hume’s theories of memory, time, and belief about the past cohere with and reinforce the 
positive naturalistic epistemology for which Hume is currently recognized. 
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4.2. Belief about the past 
 4.2.1. Belief 
Hume uses ‘belief’ to refer primarily to belief in matters of fact. Matters of fact are facts 
‘concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities,’ which can be discovered only 
through empirical observation (T 1.3.7.2 SBN 94), in contrast to ‘demonstrative facts,’ 
which are facts about objects that ‘depend entirely on the ideas’ and can be discovered by 
simply contemplating ideas (T 1.3.1.1 SBN 69). It is not clear whether Hume regards 
demonstrative facts as objects of belief, or instead of a distinct state of ‘knowledge’ or 
‘assurance’ (T 1.3.1.2 SBN 70). He suggests that belief in demonstrative facts consists in 
an inability to conceive the contrary of the fact (T 1.3.7.3 SBN 95). For example, the belief 
that all triangles have three sides consists in the impossibility of thinking of a triangle 
without three sides. This kind of belief will not concern us here. Most of our beliefs about 
the past are beliefs in matters of fact. Although demonstrative facts can concern the past, 
our belief in them does not help to explain what is distinctive about beliefs about the past 
(as opposed to beliefs with other contents). Henceforth, I restrict ‘belief’ to belief in matters 
of fact. 
 Hume suggests that sensations and memories are always attended with belief (T 
1.3.5.7 SBN 86). He spends much of Book I, Part III explaining the conditions under which 
an idea of the imagination is attended with belief (T 1.3.7-13). While the details of Hume’s 
theory of belief have been interpreted differently, a clear theme of the theory is the 
assimilation of belief in ideas of the imagination (including belief in the conclusions of 
inductive inferences) to the belief that attends sensations and memories: ‘all probable 
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reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation’ (T 1.3.8.12 SBN 103). Belief in one case 
seems to have a common nature with belief in the other. More specifically, Hume suggests 
that belief in all these cases consists in the liveliness of a perception: 
...the belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is 
nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present (T 1.3.5.7 SBN 
86) 
 
An opinion, therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin’d, a lively 
idea related to or associated with a present impression (T 1.3.7.5 SBN 96). 
 
This assimilation of belief to a sensory quality is in fact one of Hume’s most important 
innovations (see, e.g. Kemp Smith 1941, 43-44, 210-211; Owen 2003; Marusic 2017). 
Hume consciously breaks with the scholastic notion that belief consists in predicating, or 
in combining ideas (T 1.3.7.n20 SBN 96), as well as with the Cartesian notion that belief 
consists in an act of the will (T Appendix 20 SBN 623-4). 
Since my aim is to examine the nature, causes, and justification of belief about the 
past in particular, I will here sidestep much of the scholarly debate on how to interpret 
Hume’s views on the nature of belief in general. One debate, for instance, is whether belief 
should be interpreted as an occurrent or dispositional feature of the mind: as a feature of 
the way a mind is at a given moment, or as a feature of how it is prone to be over time.82 
My analysis will remain neutral between the different positions in this debate. I will assume 
only: (1) that memories are always attended with belief (as per Hume’s statement above); 
                                               
82 The occurrent interpretation is the standard interpretation. The most in-depth defense of the 
dispositional interpretation is Loeb (2002), but see also Everson (1988), MacNabb (1951, 69-81), 
Price (1969, 186-8), Armstrong (1973, 70-72), and Stroud (1977, 74). For a defense of the occurrent 
interpretation against Loeb’s arguments, see Marusic (2010). 
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(2) that a suitable association to an impression or memory causes an idea of the imagination 
to be attended with belief (as per Hume’s observations in T 1.3.8). These assumptions are 
compatible with belief being either an occurrent or dispositional feature. 
 In what follows, I use ‘belief’ as shorthand for ‘a perception that is attended with 
belief.’ I discuss two kinds of belief about the past: mnemonic and non-mnemonic. Since 
for Hume memory is always attended with belief, a memory that represents the past—as 
most memories do—constitutes a belief about the past. The challenge to explaining these 
mnemonic beliefs is not explaining how memories come to be attended with belief—for 
Hume, memories’ belief (i.e. their liveliness) is a brute fact about them—but explaining 
how they come to represent the past. Recall that memories do not represent the past as a 
matter of brute fact (§2.4); an explanation of how they do so is required (§4.2.2). Non-
mnemonic beliefs about the past are ideas of the imagination that represent the past and are 
attended with belief. The primary cause of these beliefs is causal reasoning. I will discuss 
the main kinds of causal inferences that result in non-mnemonic beliefs about the past 
(§4.1.2). I here assume (uncontroversially) that sensations do not represent the past; hence, 
I do not discuss sensory belief about the past. 
4.2.2. Mnemonic belief about the past 
In Chapter 3, I proposed that the content of an idea of tense is a succession of objects where 
one object is salient. In addition, I proposed that what causes an idea to represent an object 
as salient is its simultaneity with an impression of that object. Thus, when an idea of a 
succession of objects is simultaneous with an impression of a member of the succession, 
the idea represents that member as salient. I referred to this principle as the ‘tense principle’ 
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(TP). In representing an object as salient, other objects as earlier to the salient object, and 
other objects as later, the idea represents present, past, and future, respectively (§3.4). 
 We can explain why most (if not all) memories represent objects as past by 
understanding them to be ideas that represent successions and that are themselves 
simultaneous with impressions of members of those successions. My memory of walking 
to my desk recently, for instance, represents it as past by representing it as part of a 
succession of events (such as walking to the desk, sitting down, and typing this sentence) 
and being itself simultaneous with an impression of a member of the succession (i.e. typing 
this sentence). Similarly, my memory of going to kindergarten represents it as past by 
representing it as a member of a succession (a succession culminating with typing this 
sentence) and being simultaneous with an impression of a member of the succession (i.e. 
typing this sentence). TP prescribes that, thus understood, memories represent their objects 
as past (i.e. as earlier to typing this sentence, which they represent as present). 
 It seems prima facie plausible to understand the representational contents of 
memories in this way. In Chapter 1, we saw that impressions generally give rise to ideas 
that represent the objects or states of affairs that they (the impressions) present (§1.2.4). 
Since impressions in fact present the successions described above, the mind naturally has 
ideas of these successions. These ideas are memories in virtue of their isomorphism to the 
impressions and their liveliness. In addition, as Hume observes in T 2.3.7.2, the 
representation of matters of fact is always holistic in that it encompasses objects’ 
spatiotemporal locations:  
’Tis obvious, that the imagination can never totally forget the points of 
space and time, in which we are existent; but receives such frequent 
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advertisements of them from the passions and senses, that however it may 
turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is necessitated every 
moment to reflect on the present. ’Tis also remarkable, that in the 
conception of those objects, which we regard as real and existent, we take 
them in their proper order and situation, and never leap from one object to 
another, which is distant from it, without running over, at least in a cursory 
manner, all those objects, which are interpos’d betwixt them. When we 
reflect, therefore, on any object distant from ourselves, we are oblig’d not 
only to reach it at first by passing thro’ all the intermediate space betwixt 
ourselves and the object, but also to renew our progress every moment; 
being every moment recall’d to the consideration of ourselves and our 
present situation.  
 
Ideas never represent matters of fact in isolation, but always represent them ‘in their proper 
order and situation’ by representing their temporal and spatial relations to other objects. A 
similar point is suggested in the ‘systems of realities’ passage in T 1.3.9.3. In particular, 
ideas seem to always represent matters of fact in relation to the present point of time, by 
representing them as members of a succession leading to or starting from that point. 
Memories are no different in this respect.  
 It might be objected that this account over-intellectualizes the representational 
capacities of ideas. While it would be unproblematic to suggest that ideas represent 
successions that span certain limits (such as walking to the desk, sitting down, and typing 
this sentence) it seems like an exaggeration of our intellectual capacities to suggest that 
ideas represent successions spanning many years in a person’s life (like a succession from 
going to kindergarten to typing this sentence). It is important to recognize, however, that 
in representing objects as members of long-ranging successions ideas need not depict these 
successions in their entirety, but need only ‘run over them in a cursory manner.’ In his 
account of abstract ideas, Hume observes that ideas can represent many more objects than 
  134 
 
 
they depict by means of a ‘power’ or ‘readiness’ to elicit depictions of those objects (T 
1.1.7.7 SBN 20-21). An idea can represent the class of all triangles, even though it depicts 
only a particular triangle, by being associated with the term ‘triangle,’ and thereby being 
disposed to elicit a depiction of any other particular triangle as the situation requires it; in 
virtue of being so disposed, the idea plays the causal-functional role of the class of all 
triangles, and thus represents it (§1.3.2). Hume describes this representational capacity as 
representation by ‘abridgment:’ an idea abridges the depiction of many objects to the 
depiction of one or a few, since it can represent the remaining objects by a disposition to 
depict them. The same abridgment occurs in our mental representation of large numbers, 
long sequences of words, or highly complex ideas like those of government, church, or 
negotiation (T 1.1.7.12-14). As Hume observes, we find ‘but few inconveniences to arise’ 
from representing objects in this way (T 1.1.7.7 SBN 20-1).  
Thus, my memory of going to kindergarten might depict only going to kindergarten, 
typing this sentence, and a few connecting events, but still represent the entire succession 
by being disposed to elicit depictions of any other event in it as the situation requires it; in 
virtue of this disposition, the idea plays the causal-functional role of the succession, and 
thus represents it (§1.3.2). What distinguishes this memory from the memory of a more 
recent event is that the former is disposed to elicit depictions of a greater number of 
connecting events: for instance, were one to claim that the creation of Google was prior to 
my going to kindergarten, my memory of kindergarten would immediately raise a depiction 
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of the correct sequence, while a memory of a more recent event might not.83 Thus, we need 
not over-intellectualize our representational capacities in suggesting that ideas routinely 
represent long-ranging successions: in the same way ideas represent general kinds and 
large numbers, ideas represent long-ranging successions by abridgment—by depicting 
some members of the succession and representing the rest by a disposition to depict them.  
 In sum, mnemonic beliefs about the past are the product of three circumstances: 
first, an idea’s representation of a succession of objects (this idea itself arises from 
impressions that present the succession of objects); second, the idea’s liveliness; and third, 
the idea’s simultaneity with an impression of an object in the succession (as per TP, this 
simultaneity entails the idea’s representation of that object as present and of the preceding 
objects as past). 
 As we saw in Chapter 2, Hume’s theory of memory raises the question of how we 
can know that some ideas are isomorphic with past impressions (§2.3.2). Our analysis of 
mnemonic belief here suggests that, when we believe that a memory is isomorphic with a 
past impression, we often entertain a mnemonic belief. Indeed, Hume explicitly mentions 
that some of our ideas represent other ideas (T 1.1.1.11 SBN 6-7; 1.3.8.16 SBN 106). He 
labels the idea of an idea a secondary idea, and the idea that is its object a primary idea (T 
1.1.1.11 SBN 6-7). He also observes that secondary ideas can be memories of primary 
ideas: they can have superior degrees of liveliness and be isomorphic with the primary idea 
(T 1.3.8.16 SBN 106). (Note that, while ideas are typically lively as a result of an 
                                               
83 See T 1.1.7.8 for an analogous explanation of how the abstract idea of a triangle represents the 
correct range of the set (i.e. all triangles), as opposed to representing only a subset (e.g. all 
equilateral triangles). 
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association to an impression, Hume takes pains to explain that a connection to a primary 
idea can be a source of liveliness for a secondary idea [T 1.3.8.15-16]). When the primary 
idea is itself a memory, the secondary idea is a memory of a memory. As per T 2.3.7.2, 
secondary memories represent primary memories not in isolation, but ‘in their proper order 
and situation,’ that is, as members of successions leading to the present point of time. In 
representing these successions, secondary memories can, and often do, represent 
impressions that are earlier to the primary memories in the succession and isomorphic with 
them. Given its liveliness, the secondary memory constitutes a mnemonic belief in the 
primary memory’s isomorphism with the past impression. Thus, our beliefs about 
memories’ isomorphism with past impressions have epistemic standing qua mnemonic 
beliefs; I discuss the epistemic justification of mnemonic beliefs in §4.2. 
Note that, although a tertiary idea is required for the mind to know that the 
secondary idea is a memory (i.e. that it is isomorphic to a past idea), it is not required for 
knowing that the primary idea is a memory. The secondary idea is sufficient as a basis for 
belief in the primary idea’s isomorphism (whether or not we realize that the secondary idea 
is itself isomorphic). This belief has epistemic value, and is thus an instance of knowledge, 
in accordance with the considerations in §4.2.2. In other words, knowing that a primary 
idea is isomorphic does not imply an infinite regress of higher-order ideas. 
 4.2.3. Non-mnemonic belief about the past 
Hume holds causal inference to be the primary cause of non-mnemonic beliefs about 
matters of fact: ‘of this nature [causal inference] are all our reasonings in the conduct of 
life: on this is founded all our belief in history: and from hence is derived all philosophy, 
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excepting only geometry and arithmetic’ (A 10 SBN 650). Most non-mnemonic beliefs 
about the past can be attributed to causal inference.  
 In a causal inference, the mind transitions from an impression or memory to the 
idea of an object not present to the memory or senses; the mind would, for instance, 
transition from an impression of fire to an idea of heat, even though it has no impression 
of heat. Hume famously observes that this inference depends on a constant conjunction 
between experiences of a certain type of object and experiences of another type of object: 
it is only insofar as our impressions of objects resembling fire have been constantly 
followed by impressions of objects resembling heat that, upon an impression of fire, the 
mind transitions to an idea of heat (T 1.3.6.2-T 1.3.6.3 SBN 87-88). Hume argues, even 
more significantly, that this transition is not itself the result of reasoning, but of an 
associative act of the imagination, of ‘a wonderful and unintelligible instinct’ (T 1.3.16.9 
SBN 178-9). The transition results not only in an idea, but also in an enlivening of that 
idea—that is, in the idea’s being attended with belief (T 1.3.8.2 SBN 98-99). 
 This generic account of causal inference explains many ordinary non-mnemonic 
beliefs about the past. We might, for instance, form the belief that it rained upon seeing 
puddles in the street. Since impressions of puddles have been constantly preceded by 
impressions of rain, an impression of a puddle naturally raises an idea of rain. The idea of 
rain represents its object (i.e. the rain) ‘in its proper order and situation,’ that is, as part of 
a succession where the rain is earlier to the puddle. If the idea of the rain is itself 
simultaneous with an impression of the puddle (or with an impression of another object 
later in the succession), then, as per TP, the idea represents the rain as past. The idea is a 
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belief on account of being enlivened through its association with the impression of the 
puddle. In sum, a causal inference from an impression or memory often results in an idea 
that (a) represents the usual concomitant of the object given in the impression or memory, 
(b) represents it as part of a succession, (c) is simultaneous with an impression of an object 
in that succession, and (d) is a belief. This idea constitutes a non-mnemonic belief about 
the past. 
 Hume argues that inference from testimony—forming a belief in an object or event 
on the basis of a human report of it—is a type of causal inference: 
It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion 
together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, 
are founded merely on our experience of their constant conjunction; it is 
evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of 
human testimony, whose connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little 
necessary as any other. (E 10.5 SBN 111-112) 
 
He notes that inferences from testimony involve a transition from the impression/memory 
of an object (namely, a report) to the idea of a second object (namely, the event reported), 
where there is no ‘discoverable’ connection between the two (i.e. we cannot find a 
connection by inspecting the objects alone). Following the Newtonian directive to ‘explain 
all effects from the simplest and fewest causes,’ Hume maintains that the same explanation 
for other inferences of this sort applies to the inference from testimony: namely, the 
inference is the product of an experienced regularity and of an associative act of the 
imagination. Hume’s account has been interpreted as requiring that each of us repeatedly 
confirm the truth of reports we encounter before we are able to believe in the truth of a new 
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report (e.g. Coady 1992, 82; Lipton 1998, 15).84 As it has been noted, however, this 
characterization of Hume’s view oversimplifies much of what he says (e.g. Traiger 1993, 
Welbourne 2002, Gelfert 2010). Hume does observe that we are accustomed to find a 
‘conformity between testimony and reality’ or between ‘reports and facts,’ and that this 
experienced regularity conditions our inferences from testimony (E 10.5 SBN 111-112; E 
10.8 SBN 113); however, he emphasizes that our experiences with human nature and social 
conventions are also crucial to the conditioning at the root of the inferences: 
Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree; had not men commonly 
an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to 
shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I say, discovered by 
experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we should never repose 
the least confidence in human testimony. (E 10.5 SBN 111-2)  
 
The links … that connect any fact with a present impression [i.e. of a 
historical report]... are all of the same kind, and depend on the fidelity of 
Printers and Copists. (T 1.3.13.6 SBN 146) 
 
When we receive any matter of fact upon human testimony, our faith arises 
from the very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects, and from 
effects to causes; nor is there any thing but our experience of the governing 
principles of human nature, which can give us any assurance of the veracity 
of men. (THN 1.3.9.12, 78; my emphasis) 
 
These passages suggest that for Hume inferences from testimony draw on a wealth of 
experiences—experiences not only of the truth of individual reports, but of common human 
                                               
84 A variation of this reading is that Hume requires that each of us repeatedly confirm the truth of 
certain types of report before we can believe in the truth of a report of that type. Another variation 
is that this repeated confirmation is required for the justification of the belief in the report. In any 
event, the different versions of the reading see Hume as positing a sort of ‘enumerative induction’ 
as the basis of belief (or justified belief) in testimony.  
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character traits, linguistic practices, and social norms. Human subjects are immersed in 
these experiences from early childhood (we ought not attribute to Hume the view that we 
collect these experiences like data!). Indeed, as it has been suggested, these experiences 
form the basis both of our trust in testimony and of our language acquisition and 
development (Welbourne 2002, 415; Shogenji 2006, 340). Moreover, these experiences 
dispose us to infer a report’s truth instinctively, rather than explicitly, much as the person 
coming across a river instinctively infers the danger of drowning, without any conscious 
reflection on past experiences: as Hume puts it, ‘experience may produce a belief and a 
judgment of causes and effects by a secret operation, and without being once thought of’ 
(T 1.3.8.13 SBN 103-4).85 86 
 Inferences from testimony, together with linguistic representations of time and 
time-keeping conventions, are responsible for a large stock of our non-mnemonic beliefs 
about the past. They are responsible for most of our beliefs about history. Hume credits 
these inferences with ‘peopling the world’ (T 1.3.9.4 SBN 108); without them, given how 
limited our individual experiences are, we ‘should be for ever children in understanding’ 
(‘Of the Study of History,’ 1741/1987, 566). An inference from a report to an idea of an 
                                               
85 As this passage suggests, Hume uses ‘inference’ and ‘reasoning’ to refer to any mental transition 
from the perception of an object to that of another, where the the second object is not present to the 
memory or senses. The process need not involve conscious reflection. 
86 Hume also mentions sympathy as a mechanism that aids the inference from reports to their truth: 
my sympathy for another person ‘gives an authority to that opinion, which is recommended to me 
by his assent and approbation’ (T 3.3.2.2 SBN 592). Note that Hume is not claiming that sympathy 
alone is responsible for our acceptance of testimony (a claim that would conflict with his account 
in the foregoing passages from the Enquiry and Book I of the Treatise); he is only claiming that 
sympathy aids the acceptance by ‘drawing along the judgment’ and ‘giving authority’ to the 
testimony. 
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event in the past might proceed in the following manner. Upon reading a newspaper article 
with a 1945 date, for instance, the mind transitions from the impression of the article to an 
idea of the events it reports. The idea is a belief owing to its association with the impression. 
In addition, in associating the events with the term ‘1945,’ the idea represents the events 
along with the temporal situation that the term signifies—that is, it represents them as 
earlier to the present and to events from the 50’s, 60’s, and subsequent decades, and as 
temporally proximate to events from the end of World War II. The idea represents this 
temporal situation through depictions of some of the particular temporal relations as well 
as a readiness to depict other such relations. 
Consider now the following beliefs: the belief that events in other planets are 
temporally related to events in the Earth, the belief that perceptions in other minds are 
temporally related to our own, and the belief that particle-level events are temporally 
related to observable events. These beliefs cannot be straightforwardly attributed to either 
memory or causal inference. We have no impressions of events in other planets, 
perceptions in other minds, or particle-level events; hence, we cannot automatically 
represent them as present (as TP would indicate) or infer their temporal situation on the 
basis of an experience of constant conjunction (since we have no experiences of them). 
These beliefs seem to be symptoms of a more general tendency to believe that time is all-
encompassing—that all existing objects or events are temporally related to one another, or, 
in other words, that all existing objects are arranged along a successive series or ‘stream of 
time.’ This tendency, in turn, can be attributed to a process of imagining patterns to be 
maximally complete and uniform.  
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Hume appeals to this process—which I will call ‘pattern extension,’ or PE—twice 
in the Treatise. He first mentions it in accounting for the source of our ideas of geometrical 
notions like perfect equality, a perfectly straight line, or a perfectly flat surface. As we saw 
previously (§3.3.1), our perceptions of equality—where equality is an ‘appearance’ or 
aspect in objects—exhibit a pattern of admitting of corrections: the perception that two 
lengths are equal might be followed by the perception that one is 1mm longer than the other 
after inspecting them more closely or measuring them with a ruler; this latter perception, 
in turn, might be followed by another perception that the difference is of 0.9mm after 
measuring the ruler itself with a more exact instrument; this latter perception might itself 
be followed by another perception; and so on. While we ultimately lack perceptions of two 
lengths as exactly or perfectly equal, or of the exact difference between them, the 
imagination extends the corrective pattern just noted beyond the corrections that we 
actually do or can execute and formulates the notion of a final corrective standard—perfect 
equality—as a completion of that pattern. In the same way, it formulates notions of other 
geometrical standards, like perfect straightness and flatness (T 1.2.4.23-25 SBN 47-49). 
Hume also sees the process as playing a role in the formation of the idea of continued 
existence. He observes that, seeing as our sensory impressions exhibit a pattern of 
coherence, and seeing as their continued existence would render that pattern much more 
complete and uniform, the imagination naturally inclines towards that notion. He compares 
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this imaginative amplification of mental patterns to the way in which ‘a galley put in 
motion by the oars, carries on its motion without any new impulse’ (T 1.4.2.22 SBN 198).87 
Perceptions—both impressions and ideas—clearly exhibit a pattern of 
successiveness. A perception never appears as a single, a-temporal perception: it always 
succeeds and precedes other perceptions. As Hume remarks, ‘[perceptions are in a 
perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our 
perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight’ (T 1.4.6.4 SBN 252-3). 
Moreover, as we have seen, memories and beliefs resulting from causal inference always 
represent objects as spatiotemporally related to a host of other objects. Given the 
imaginative process just described, a possible explanation for the tendency to believe that 
time is all-encompassing is that the mind extends the pattern of successiveness and 
temporal relationality to encompass all existing objects, even objects for which we have 
no impressions, like events in other planets. 
4.3. Knowledge of the past 
 4.3.1. Epistemic value 
In both philosophical and ordinary parlance, ‘knowledge’ refers to beliefs that possess a 
certain type of value: epistemic value. Hume follows Locke in assigning to ‘knowledge’ a 
different, more technical sense: the representation of a relation between ideas, where the 
relation ‘depends entirely on the ideas’ and can be intuited or demonstrated (T 1.3.1.1-2 
                                               
87 Hume takes pains to differentiate PE from causal reasoning. In causal reasoning, we form a belief 
in the existence of an object (e.g. the rain) on the basis of, and in conformity with, a certain degree 
of regularity (e.g. rain followed by puddles). In PE, we form a belief that bestows a maximum 
degree of regularity upon objects on the basis of a lesser degree of regularity (T 1.4.2.21 SBN 197-
8). 
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SBN 69-70; T 1.3.11.2 SBN 124; Locke Essay IV.i.2).88 Despite this assignation, Hume 
often seems to revert to the everyday sense of the term (e.g., T 1.3.8.13 SBN 103-4; T 
1.4.7.14 SBN 272-3; T 3.2.5.11 SBN 522-523; E 1.8 SBN 9-10). His frequent references 
to knowledge as a laudable personal quality are also more consistent with the everyday 
sense of ‘knowledge’ than with the technical (e.g. T 2.2.1.4 SBN 330; T 3.3.6.6 SBN 620; 
P 2.11). Hume explicitly notes that the technical senses of ‘knowledge’ and ‘probability’ 
are detached from ordinary usage (T 1.3.11.2 SBN 124). The sense of ‘knowledge’ in the 
title of this dissertation is the ordinary one: Hume has a theory of knowledge of the past in 
that he has a theory of beliefs about the past and of their epistemic value. 
 As previously noted (§4.1), I will not here undertake the enormous task of 
reinterpreting Hume’s views on epistemic value. Instead, I will argue that if many current 
interpretations of Hume’s epistemology are correct then Hume can in fact explain the 
epistemic value of beliefs about the past. My discussion in the next sections is informed by 
a number of assumptions. 
 First, I will assume that, although the epistemic value of beliefs is distinct from the 
epistemic value of sources of belief, the key to providing a theory of the former is to provide 
a theory of the latter. A theory of the epistemic value of beliefs must be general: it must 
allow us to distinguish between epistemically good and bad beliefs across a broad range of 
situations. The most fitting approach to establishing general principles about the epistemic 
value of beliefs is to establish principles about the value of their sources (i.e. the mental 
                                               
88 Unlike Locke, however, Hume does not regard belief in the external world as ‘knowledge’ in the 
technical sense of the term (Locke, IV.II.14). 
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processes that generate them). We can generalize beliefs to be epistemically good (at least 
prima facie or defeasibly) when they stem from epistemically good sources. Thus, it has 
been standard for theories of epistemic value to focus on belief-producing processes rather 
than individual beliefs. Historically, for instance, the epistemic value of sense-based beliefs 
has generally been assessed by reference to the senses as a faculty. Hume’s views take this 
focus as well. For example, when Hume questions the epistemic value of inductive beliefs 
and beliefs in the external world in T 1.4.7, he does so on the grounds that the mental 
processes that generate them do not yield consistent beliefs on the whole (T 1.4.7.4 SBN 
265-266). Similarly, he distinguishes between good and bad inductive beliefs in T 1.3.13, 
T 1.3.15, and E 10 by explaining good and bad ways of forming them. 
 Second, as is already apparent, I will assume that Hume does in fact have views on 
the value of various beliefs and belief-producing processes. He implies that his 
epistemology is not purely descriptive, but aims to answer questions about how we ought 
to reason and what we ought to believe. Hume explicitly announces a normative aim of 
this sort in T 1.3.13 and T 1.3.15: the aim of establishing ‘rules by which we ought to 
regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects’ (T 1.3.13.11 SBN 149, my 
emphasis). The primary aim of E 10 (‘Of Miracles’) is also a normative one: to put ‘an 
everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion [i.e. belief in miracles]’ (E 10.2 SBN 
110). In both these places, Hume seems to be working towards a principled distinction 
between good and bad inductive beliefs. The subject matter of T 1.4.7 and E 12 is 
skepticism about our basic cognitive processes. Although Hume’s approach to this subject 
is far from clear, there is evidence that he is interested not simply in the psychological 
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underpinnings of skepticism, but also in its content—that is, in the very question of whether 
our cognitive processes are in fact devoid of epistemic value. Hume motivates the question 
at length by outlining multiple arguments in favor of skepticism (T 1.4.7.1-8 SBN 263-
269; E 12.1-22 SBN 149-159). He also recommends ‘mitigated skepticism’ and a certain 
‘careless’ way of doing philosophy as ‘reasonable’ and as conducive to ‘a system of 
opinions that might stand the test of the most critical examination’ (E 12.24-26 SBN 161-
163; T 1.4.7.14 SBN 272-3). He thus seems invested in addressing the normative 
epistemological challenges skepticism raises, even if his answers are ambiguous. 
 It is worth stressing that, even though we can distinguish between a naturalistic 
project of explaining how judgments about value are rooted in our psychology and a 
normative project of identifying which beliefs and belief-producing processes are in fact 
good or bad, these projects are not mutually exclusive. I here follow other scholars in the 
view that, while Hume is certainly engaged in the naturalistic project, he is not engaged in 
it to the exclusion of all normative aims (e.g. Falkenstein 1997[a]; Loeb 2006; Qu 2015). 
In addition, it is worth noting that Hume’s normative aims are consistent with anti-realism 
about value. It is standard to read Hume as an anti-realist about moral value—as someone 
who denies that moral properties like vice and virtue exist independently of our minds 
(specifically, of our sentimental responses). It may be that Hume is also an anti-realist 
about epistemic value. Even then, as Cohon (2008) emphasizes, anti-realism would be 
consistent with there being facts about value (only these facts are mind-dependent) and 
with making true and false statements about them (96-125). 
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 Third, I will assume that in the above-noted sections Hume is concerned with the 
epistemic value of beliefs and belief-producing processes, and not (or at least not only) with 
other kinds of value. Hume characterizes the ‘truth’ of ideas about matters of fact as their 
‘correspondence to the real existence of their objects’ (T 2.3.10.2 SBN 448-9). His account 
of curiosity, or the ‘love of truth,’ as well as many other remarks throughout his writings, 
imply that truth is a human value—at least when it concerns matters of enough importance 
to us that being in doubt about them would make us uneasy (T 2.3.10.11-12 SBN 452-
453).89 In the above-noted sections, Hume is concerned with the truth of beliefs and the 
truth-conduciveness of belief-producing processes. For instance, he describes the rules in 
T 1.3.15 as ‘rules by which we may know when objects really are causes or effects to each 
other’ (T 1.3.15.2 SBN 173, my emphasis); in E 10, the likelihood of falsehood in a piece 
of testimony is the crucial factor for assessing whether or not one should believe it (E 10.13 
SBN 115-6); and in T 1.4.7, the skeptical challenge is characterized by a lack of adequate 
criteria for distinguishing truth (T 1.4.7.3 SBN 265). It is also worth adding that, as Qu 
(2014) argues, Hume distinguishes between different kinds of normativity, for example, 
when he writes: 
A person may be affected with passion, by supposing a pain or pleasure to 
lie in an object, which has no tendency to produce either of these sensations, 
or which produces the contrary to what is imagin’d. A person may also take 
false measures for the attaining his end, and may retard, by his foolish 
conduct, instead of forwarding the execution of any project. These false 
judgments may be thought to affect the passions and actions, which are 
connected with them, and may be said to render them unreasonable, in a 
figurative and improper way of speaking. But tho’ this be acknowledg’d, 
                                               
89 For elaboration on why truth is an epistemic value for Hume, see Schafer (2014) and Garrett 
(2015, 152-164). 
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’tis easy to observe, that these errors are so far from being the source of all 
immorality, that they are commonly very innocent, and draw no manner of 
guilt upon the person who is so unfortunate as to fall into them … No one 
can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character (T 3.1.1.12 
SBN 459-60). 
 
Here, Hume suggests that we can condemn something in two distinct ways: for being an 
‘error’ or being ‘foolish,’ on the one hand, and for being blameable or immoral, on the 
other. He thus implies two distinct kinds of normativity and two distinct kinds of value. 
Moreover, ‘foolish’ and ‘erroneous,’ like ‘true’ and ‘false,’ clearly fall under the category 
of epistemically normative assessments (part of what makes the person’s conduct ‘foolish’ 
is its origin in ‘false judgments’). Given that Hume does have a notion of epistemic value 
as a distinct kind of value, and given his concern with truth in the sections noted, it is most 
natural to interpret his assessments in those sections as epistemically normative. 
Fourth, in interpreting Hume’s views on the epistemic value of the various mental 
processes that generate beliefs, it helps to note a type-token distinction. It is one thing to 
ask whether memory and causal inference are epistemically good as types of processes—
that is, whether typical instances of them are epistemically good. It is a different thing to 
ask whether particular instances (tokens) of these processes are. Even if memory and causal 
inference are epistemically good as types, clearly, some particular instances of memory 
(faint memories, for instance) or causal inference (such as inferences based on unreliable 
testimony) would still be epistemically questionable. Thus, supposing one developed a 
theory of the epistemic value of memory and causal inference as types, one might still need 
a theory of what distinguishes good and bad tokens of these types. Hume does not draw 
this distinction himself. However, the distinction clarifies the different ways in which 
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Hume discusses epistemic value. Some of Hume’s discussions, such as T 1.4.7 and E 12, 
address the epistemic value of types of processes—the skeptical challenges discussed in 
these sections concern ‘our very faculties’ (E 12.3 SBN 149-50; also E 12.5 SBN 150-151 
and T 1.4.7.1-3 SBN 263-265). At the same time, T 1.3.13, T 1.3.15, and E 10 address the 
epistemic value of tokens of inductive inference. Hume’s focus there is on distinguishing 
between good and bad instances of inductive inference; he does not even raise the question 
of whether inductive inference is epistemically good by its very nature (i.e. qua type).  
The type-token distinction can be expressed in Humean terms. A type of process is 
a set of individual processes that resemble each other in some respect (e.g. in being causal 
inferences); to use previous terminology, the type is the revival set of the term ‘causal 
inference.’ The mind can represent types via an idea of a token and a disposition to form 
ideas of other tokens (it achieves this disposition by associating the token with the term 
‘causal inference’). Even though the mind needs an idea of a token to represent the type, it 
can nonetheless discover facts about the type (including facts about the value of the type) 
via this general representation, in the same way that it can discover facts about triangles in 
general (T 1.1.7.8 SBN 21).  
An important interpretive question is whether Hume could consistently deny that a 
type of process has epistemic value yet consistently go on to distinguish between 
epistemically better and worse tokens of the type. Scholars who read Hume as a skeptic 
about the value of inductive inference as a type must reconcile the skepticism with Hume’s 
distinctions between the value of token inductive inferences (i.e. with his viewing some 
token inferences as better than others). As Winkler (1999) observes, ‘inductive skepticism 
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seems to be inconsistent with inductive discrimination’ (1999, 201). Since I will not here 
adopt the reading of Hume as skeptic, I will not explore the answer to this question in 
depth. It is worth noting, however, that the answer depends on how one interprets the nature 
of epistemic value in Hume. Some scholars have proposed that a criterion of consistency 
or coherence among tokens can allow Hume to distinguish between better and worse tokens 
of inductive inference, even if inductive inference by its own nature has no epistemic 
value.90 On the other hand, however, epistemologists have traditionally understood 
epistemic value not as consistency per se, but as some kind of positive relation to truth: as 
a feature of belief or belief-producing processes that is conducive to truth. On this view of 
epistemic value, consistency in and of itself (i.e. independently of considerations about 
truth) cannot endow tokens of inductive inference with epistemic value. It is also not clear 
what factors would endow tokens with varying degrees of epistemic value (i.e. more and 
less positive relations to truth) in the event that inductive inference as a type had no 
epistemic value. Given that, as we have seen, Hume’s normative assessments of both type 
                                               
90 Specifically, the proposal is to emphasize, first, that the types of processes under consideration 
are, as Hume puts it, ‘natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and 
understanding is able, either to produce, or to prevent’ (E 5.8 SBN 46-47). That is, the processes 
are unavoidable. Second, the processes can operate more or less consistently. For example, as 
Hume explains in his account of general rules, inductive inference can generate both lower-level 
beliefs (a belief in the occurrence of a miracle, for instance) and higher-level beliefs about the 
reliability of the inferences yielding the lower-level beliefs. The second kind of belief can condemn 
the first: inductive inferences at higher and lower levels can be, and often are, ‘set in opposition to 
each other’ (T 1.3.13.12 SBN 149-150). One might then propose that tokens of inductive inference 
are epistemically better or worse depending on their consistency with other higher-order or more 
regular tokens of inductive inference. Moreover, since inductive inference is unavoidable, the 
distinction between epistemically better and worse tokens of it would be legitimate (rather than 
arbitrary or speculative) even for a skeptic about its type epistemic value (for proposals that 
approximate this broad description, see Millican 2002, Winkler 1999, and Falkenstein 1997[a]).  
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and token processes are at least partly based on considerations about truth, a reconciliation 
between type-level skepticism and token-level value distinctions appears doubtful.91 
At the same time, even if a theory of token-level value distinctions presupposes the 
view that the type has epistemic value, the token theory can be independent of the type 
theory from a meta-theoretical perspective—independent in the sense that no specific 
theory of type value is required (beyond the general thesis that the type is valuable) to 
develop a theory of token-level value distinctions. One can develop the token theory from 
a perspective that assumes the epistemic value of the type, without first having any 
particular view on what accounts for the value of the type. To ponder the nature of type 
epistemic value is to entertain the possibility of skepticism about our basic mental 
processes: it is to ask whether memory and causal inference have epistemic value by their 
very natures. Few people ponder this question, yet most people nonetheless discriminate 
between good and bad token processes. Statisticians develop models for good inductive 
inferences without first developing an account of why induction itself is epistemically 
good. Were a statistician to develop an account of the value of induction itself, the 
adequacy of that account would not compromise the adequacy of his token-level theories. 
Analogously, a film critic might have a good theory of what makes particular films 
aesthetically good without first having a good theory of what makes film as a type of 
medium aesthetically good. I propose that we regard Hume’s views on type and token 
epistemic value as independent of each other in this sense: the adequacy of his token 
                                               
91 Another approach to this potential tension is to read Hume as shifting between skeptical and non-
skeptical perspectives in his writing, even though these perspectives are ultimately incompatible 
(e.g. Fogelin 1998; Strawson 1985, 12-13; Popkin 1966, 98).  
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theories is contingent only on a broad understanding of the relevant type as valuable—not 
on the specific content of his type theories or on how adequate those theories are. 
4.3.2. Type epistemic value 
Our discussion in 4.1. suggests four main types of processes responsible for belief about 
the past: memory, causal inference, PE (the process of imagining patterns to be maximally 
complete and uniform), and, finally, TP (the process whereby simultaneity with an 
impression causes an idea to represent the impression’s object as salient). Although these 
processes normally operate in conjunction, they are responsible for different aspects of the 
ensuing beliefs. For example, memory, causal inference, and PE on their own would 
generate only representations of tenseless successions; it is only in virtue of the influence 
of TP that they generate representations of tense. 
I see the task of explaining the epistemic value of these types of processes as the 
task of responding to the possibility of skepticism about them. Hume addresses skepticism 
about basic processes most directly in T 1.4.7 and E 12. My analysis in what follows draws 
from both these texts indiscriminately. Although it is a matter of debate whether Hume’s 
views on skepticism change between these texts, my reading is limited to what is common 
or consistent between them; it is thus neutral with respect to the alleged dissimilarities.92  
Hume’s distinction between ‘antecedent’ and ‘consequent’ skepticism in E 12 
indicates two approaches to explaining the epistemic value of basic belief-producing 
processes. The first approach (that of Descartes in Meditations) is to begin from a default 
                                               
92 It has been common in the literature to read T 1.4.7 and EHU 12 as equivalent in content (e.g. 
Wilbanks 1968, 89; Fogelin 1992, 117; McCormick 1999). More recently, Qu (2016, 2018) argues 
that Hume’s views change with respect to the ‘Title Principle’ (see below).  
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position of doubt about the value of the processes (antecedent skepticism), and establish 
their value against this doubt by ‘deducing it from some original principle, which cannot 
possibly be fallacious or deceitful’ (E 12.3 SBN 149-50). In other words, the approach is 
to prove the epistemic value of the processes from scratch. Hume criticizes this approach 
on the following grounds: 
Neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above 
others, that are self-evident and convincing: Or if there were, could we 
advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we 
are supposed to be already diffident. The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it 
ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) 
would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state 
of assurance and conviction upon any subject. (E 12.3 SBN 149-50). 
  
Hume observes that, were we to doubt the epistemic value of our basic cognitive processes, 
there would not be anything that we could not doubt (i.e. an ‘original principle’), and even 
if there were, we would have no epistemically trustworthy means of drawing further 
conclusions on its basis (since our cognitive processes are assumed to be untrustworthy). 
Thus, the Cartesian approach leads to an ‘incurable’ skepticism about our cognitive 
processes. Hume then notes that a moderate version of this approach (one that prescribes 
not doubt but caution about our processes) would be ‘reasonable’—a comment that implies 
that for him the original Cartesian version is not reasonable (E 12.4 SBN 150). In rejecting 
the Cartesian approach, Hume implies that our basic cognitive processes have epistemic 
value prima facie: their value can reasonably be impugned upon further inquiry (in fact, 
Hume proceeds to present strong philosophical reasons for impugning it) but it cannot 
reasonably be impugned as a default starting position (Garrett 2007, 5; 2015, 243-244). 
Hume’s view is not that the Cartesian approach would be ‘unreasonable’ only for the vulgar 
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or the philosophically un-inclined. Rather, it would be unreasonable for ‘any human 
creature,’ because no human creature could sustain a default universal doubt on the 
epistemic value of her cognitive processes, and even if she could, she could not overcome 
that doubt. 
Hume’s rejection of the Cartesian approach in this brief paragraph might seem too 
quick. Hume seems to be offering a reductio in favor of rejecting the Cartesian approach 
and attributing prima facie epistemic value to our cognitive processes: unless we do so, we 
cannot avoid skepticism. One might wonder, however, whether skepticism is really absurd 
enough of a result to invalidate an approach. Fortunately, Hume’s position can be 
buttressed in light of recent arguments in epistemology that defend the prima facie 
epistemic value of beliefs that result from basic cognitive processes.93 Michael Huemer, 
for example, defends the principle of ‘phenomenal conservatism,’ which grants prima facie 
justification to many of our beliefs: 
If it seems to S as if P, then S thereby has at least prima facie justification 
for believing that P (2001, 99). 
 
While the details of Huemer’s view and his full defense of it cannot be explored here, the 
following line of defense seems compelling: 
If my goal is to have true beliefs and avoid having false ones, and if P seems 
to me to be true, while I have no evidence against P, then from my own 
point of view, it would make sense to accept P. Obviously, believing P in 
this situation will appear to satisfy my epistemic goals of believing truths 
and avoiding error better than either denying P or suspending judgment 
(2001, 104). 
 
                                               
93 Other arguments fitting this general description include Chisholm’s defense of foundationalism 
(1980), Pryor’s (2000) defense of ‘dogmatism,’ and Wright’s (2004) defense of ‘entitlement.’ 
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We can offer a similar defense of Hume’s view that our basic cognitive processes have 
prima facie epistemic value. From a starting position where we have no positive evidence 
either for or against the processes’ value, trusting the processes is a more reasonable 
outlook to adopt than mistrusting them or suspending trust. At the very least, intuitively, 
the processes seem epistemically sound; moreover, trusting them is ‘attainable,’ whereas 
the alternatives are not. 
Hume’s rejection of the Cartesian approach has important implications for his 
stance on the epistemic value of memory. Specifically, Hume would reject a requirement 
that we must prove the veridicality or epistemic value of memory from scratch (i.e. without 
relying on memory or other processes whose value is not certain). A lack of positive, 
memory-independent evidence for the veridicality of memory is not in and of itself a reason 
to suspend belief in the epistemic value of memory. Instead, for the reasons just noted, 
Hume would adopt the view that memory has epistemic value prima facie. Accordingly, 
mnemonic beliefs (including beliefs about particular memories corresponding to their 
source impressions) have epistemic value prima facie. 
Hume engages more thoroughly with the second approach to explaining the 
epistemic value of belief-producing processes. This approach consists in establishing 
epistemic value not against a default position of doubt, but against doubt that arises out of 
an investigation on the nature of the processes (‘consequent skepticism’) (E 12.5 SBN 150-
151). Hume’s own investigation throughout the Treatise and Enquiry generates what have 
seemed to many of his readers (and to Hume himself, at times) to be devastating doubts 
about the epistemic value of these processes. The main result of the investigation, as Hume 
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summarizes it, is that ‘the memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them 
founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas’ (T 1.4.7.3 SBN 265). As the 
sentences leading up to this statement indicate, ‘the understanding’ here refers specifically 
to causal inference, ‘the senses’ to the processes responsible for belief in external objects, 
and ‘memory’ to the processes responsible for belief about the past. Hume’s investigation 
has shown, more precisely, that causal inference consists in the imagination enlivening 
some ideas on the basis of habit. The process responsible for belief in external objects, in 
turn, consists in the imagination enlivening some ideas on the basis of a series of ‘fictions’ 
(as per T 1.4.2). While Hume does not elaborate on the process responsible for belief about 
the past, he clearly conceives of it as a similar imaginative process: ‘those lively images, 
with which the memory presents us’ cannot be ‘received as true pictures of past 
perceptions’ without the involvement of the imagination (T 1.4.7.3 SBN 265). I have 
proposed that TP is the imaginative process that explains belief about the past (§3.4.2). 
Hume describes the imaginative nature of each of these processes as ‘trivial’ (T 1.4.7.3 
SBN 265). He also notes that the connection between these processes and truth is unclear 
(the paragraph begins with the remark, ‘by what criterion shall I distinguish [truth]?’). 
Indeed, at least at first blush, the result that these processes are imaginative in the way 
Hume describes seems to deflate their epistemic value. 
What is more, Hume’s investigation has revealed specific evidence of the 
‘fallaciousness’ of these imaginative processes (T 1.4.7.4 SBN 265-266; E 12.5 SBN 150-
1). Some of the most fundamental beliefs they generate are directly contrary to reason. The 
belief that we are in immediate contact with external objects—that our very perceptions 
  157 
 
 
are external objects—is contrary to the reasoning that our perceptions are sense-dependent, 
whereas external objects are not, and hence we cannot be in immediate contact with the 
latter (T 1.4.2.44-5 SBN 210-211; E 12.8-9 SBN 151-2). In addition, the belief that external 
objects exist is contrary to a causal inference to the conclusion that the ‘secondary qualities’ 
of objects (i.e. colors, sounds, tastes, and smells) are not external, a conclusion that in turn 
implies that none of their qualities (not even ‘primary qualities’ like extension and solidity) 
are external (T 1.4.4.15 SBN 231; E 12.15 SBN 154-5). This conflict raises the problem of 
how to reconcile the epistemic value of the two imaginative processes involved—causal 
inference and the fiction of the external world (T 1.4.7.4 SBN 265-6). Furthermore, 
Hume’s analysis of the idea of necessary connection has shown that, contrary to what we 
imagine, necessary connection is never a property of an object, but only a feeling of 
determination in the mind (T 1.4.7.5 SBN 266-7). 
While Hume does not mention them in the sections on skepticism, his investigation 
has revealed still further cases where imaginative mechanisms produce false or otherwise 
unreasonable beliefs. PE produces the geometrical notion of perfect equality, but this 
notion is ‘a mere fiction of the imagination, and useless as well as incomprehensible’ (T 
1.2.4.24 SBN 48; my emphasis). Imaginative fictions lead us to ‘falsly imagine’ we have 
an idea of a vacuum (T 1.2.5.14 SBN 58); similarly, they lead us to ‘fancy we have’ an 
idea of successionless time when we have no such idea (T 1.2.5.29 SBN 65). 
Faced with the evidence against the epistemic value of imaginative processes, 
Hume considers, as a possible solution, whether we can distinguish between ‘the trivial 
suggestions of the fancy’ and ‘the general and more established properties of the 
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imagination,’ and endorse only the latter (T 1.4.7.7 SBN 267-268). Of all imaginative 
processes, inductive reasoning is among the most ‘general and established.’ Hume deems 
the solution unsatisfactory. He had earlier argued that, when we apply inductive reasoning 
to our own cognitive processes to determine the probability that they will yield true beliefs, 
the application generates an indefinite number of subsequent applications, and these in turn 
entirely annihilate the original beliefs (i.e. the outputs of our cognitive processes) (T 1.4.1.6 
SBN 182-3). Inductive reasoning thus implies a ‘total scepticism’ (T 1.4.7.7 SBN 267-
268). What counters this result is not any ‘general’ or ‘established’ process, but the 
difficulty of executing the successive applications—a difficulty that is only a ‘trivial’ 
property of the imagination (T 1.4.1.10 SBN 185; T 1.4.7.7 SBN 267-8). Thus, rejecting 
trivial processes in favor of general and established ones would commit us to skepticism. 
Because endorsing the trivial processes uniformly would also carry grave consequences—
these processes are responsible for many ‘errors, absurdities, and obscurities’—Hume 
describes the choice between endorsing them and rejecting them as a ‘dangerous dilemma’ 
and as a choice between ‘a false reason and none at all’ (T 1.4.7.7 SBN 267-8). For these 
reasons, the ‘trivial’-‘established’ distinction does not offer a satisfactory approach to 
epistemic value. 
How Hume can establish the epistemic value of our basic belief-producing 
processes in the face of these doubts remains one of the most contested issues in the 
scholarship. One point on which many scholars agree, however, is that Hume can 
ultimately escape the threat of skepticism. Indeed, even though individual interpretations 
of how this escape is achieved can be challenged, the sheer volume of interpretations to 
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this end suggests that Hume has many theoretical resources at his disposal to avoid a 
skeptical scenario. And Hume, like most philosophers, is eager to avoid such a scenario—
a scenario that he explicitly deplores in T 1.4.7 and that would terminate his scientific 
pursuits. My aim in what follows is a modest one: rather than offer a new interpretation of 
Hume’s answer to these doubts, I will argue that the resources that have been unearthed by 
existing interpretations can be applied to the processes that produce belief about the past; 
these resources allow Hume to maintain the processes’ epistemic value against the 
foregoing doubts. 
For simplicity of exposition, we might sort interpretations of Hume’s theory of 
epistemic value into three broad categories: empirical-foundation interpretations, 
systematicity interpretations, and psychological-character interpretations. Note, however, 
that the boundaries between these categories are not precise, and that some individual 
interpretations might properly be included in more than one category. 
 The best recent example of an empirical-foundation interpretation is Boehm’s 
(2013).94 Boehm proposes that experience is a foundation of epistemic value for Hume: it 
has ‘normative authority’ (205). What gives it this status is the quality of force and vivacity; 
Boehm identifies force and vivacity with a ‘sense of presentness’ and a ‘sense of reality’ 
(213). Boehm then observes that, on Hume’s account of causal inference, the inferential 
                                               
94 Boehm credits Kemp Smith’s interpretation as a precursor to her own; according to Kemp Smith, 
‘it is experience—and custom only in so far as it conforms to and is the outcome of experience—
which is, and ought to be, the ultimate court of appeal’ (1941, 382). However, in contrast to Kemp 
Smith, Boehm explains the authority of experience by its liveliness or ‘sense of presentness,’ 
whereas Kemp Smith explains it by its naturalness (defined as inevitability, irresistibility, and 
indispensability) (1941, 87, 486).   
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mechanism is such that experience plays an essential role in determining the belief it 
produces: the mind transitions from the impression or memory of an object to the idea of a 
second object in conformity with past experience of the conjunction of the two objects; 
moreover, the source of the idea’s vivacity (and hence of its belief-quality) is also 
experience (namely, the impression or memory) (206, 219). Boehm then argues that, given 
that experience has normative authority, and given the role it plays in determining the 
products of causal inference, beliefs resulting from causal inference have epistemic value. 
While Boehm focuses on causal inference, her analysis suggests a more general criterion 
for the epistemic value of a belief-producing process: that the process be constrained by 
experience to produce a predetermined belief. 
 Boehm’s interpretation can be applied to explain the epistemic value of memory 
and TP, in addition to causal inference. Since the category of ‘experience’ encompasses 
memory, memory has the same kind of foundational epistemic value as sense experience 
(214-215).95 TP, in turn, meets the criterion of being constrained by experience in the way 
Boehm describes: what an idea represents as present is determined by experience, 
specifically, by the impression with which it is simultaneous.96 
                                               
95 Even if we were to resist the notion that memory belongs in the same epistemic category as sense 
experience, Boehm’s interpretation would still account for its epistemic value: memory meets the 
criterion of being constrained by experience, since memory produces ideas that are isomorphic with 
antecedent impressions. 
96 One possible objection to Boehm’s interpretation is that it cannot account for the epistemic value 
of some basic belief-producing processes. PE, for instance, since it consists in imagining patterns 
to be more complete than we have observed them to be, does not seem to be governed by experience 
in the same way as causal inference. More significantly, the processes responsible for belief in 
external objects also seem governed by experience to a lesser extent. 
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 Systematicity interpretations propose that the epistemic value of a process, on 
Hume’s view, has to do with its ability to promote systematicity and orderliness in the 
mind. More specifically, Morris (2006) argues that consistency or coherence is not only a 
criterion for the epistemic value of token processes (a proposal I noted earlier in §4.2); it is 
also a criterion for the epistemic value of types (89-91). The reason causal inference has 
epistemic value, while superstition or repetition do not, is that the products of the former, 
unlike those of the latter, tend to ‘fit into a coherent and stable system of realities,’ a system 
that encompasses impressions, memories, and other coherent and well-confirmed beliefs 
(90). Another criterion that has been proposed under this head is reliability. Schmitt (1992) 
proposes that a process has epistemic value when it is reliable; a process’ reliability, in 
turn, consists in its tendency to produce true beliefs (54, 71). Since, according to Schmitt, 
we assess reliability from the vantage point of our other beliefs (including sensory, 
inductive, and imaginary beliefs), the processes we judge to be reliable are ultimately those 
whose outputs are consistent with our other beliefs (73-75, 83). Similar reliabilist 
interpretations have been proposed by Beebee (2006, 71-74) and Qu (2015, 193-228). A 
third criterion related to systematicity is reflexivity. Baier (1991) proposes that a process 
has epistemic value when it can ‘successfully turn on itself’ or ‘bear its own survey:’ that 
is, when it generates beliefs of its own epistemic value. Causal inference, specifically, has 
epistemic value in virtue of the fact that it can be used to understand how causal inference 
works and to approve of some of its tokens and disapprove of others—Hume uses causal 
  162 
 
 
inference in precisely this way in developing his ‘rules by which to judge of causes and 
effects’ (90-100). A similar interpretation is proposed by Korsgaard (1996, 62-63).97 
 Memory, TP, and PE are sufficiently systematic to have epistemic value under these 
criteria. Not only is memory highly regular and reliable—mnemonic beliefs tend to cohere 
with each other as well as with non-mnemonic beliefs—it also generates beliefs about its 
own veracity (in the form of memories of other memories corresponding to past 
impressions). Thus, memory meets the criterion of reflexivity. The same can be said of TP. 
It not only generates coherent beliefs; it also generates beliefs about its own operations 
occurring over a tensed sequence of time: in reflecting on our beliefs about tense, we form 
second-order beliefs about the pastness, presentness, and futureness of the first-order 
beliefs. TP endorses itself in that it applies the same tense properties to its own operations. 
Finally, the beliefs PE generates (such as beliefs in perfect geometrical standards and the 
belief in the comprehensiveness of space and time) seem coherent. Insofar as we imagine 
PE itself to operate in a maximally uniform way—we imagine that our mental processes 
respond in the same way to all patterns—PE also meets the criterion of reflexivity. 
On psychological-character interpretations, Hume’s criterion for the epistemic 
value of a process consists in a psychological quality.98 Thus, Garrett proposes that the 
liveliness or belief-quality of ideas is a criterion of epistemic value because the mind 
                                               
97 Korsgaard reads Hume as a skeptic—she attributes to him the view that the understanding fails 
the criterion of reflexivity (1996, 62-63). Baier, in contrast, holds that for Hume causal inference 
meets the criterion; it is only ‘solitary intellectualist reason’ that does not (1991, 96-97, 284-285). 
98 Kemp Smith’s interpretation can also be included under this head. Kemp Smith sees the 
naturalness of a process (its inevitability, irresistibility, and indispensability) as the basis of its 
epistemic value (1941, 87, 486). 
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naturally judges lively ideas to be true, and thus approves of them, when reflecting on them 
(2015, 152-159). Cognitive processes that produce such ideas have a default claim to 
epistemic value, although additional reflection on the processes (including the skeptical 
reflections of T 1.4.7 and E 12) can weigh against their claim (2015, 230, 236-7). The 
epistemic value of reasoning processes in particular is ultimately decided by Hume’s ‘Title 
Principle:’ ‘Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be 
assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate on us’ (T 1.4.7.11 SBN 
270; Garrett 1997, 234-235; 2015, 227-231). Garrett interprets ‘propensity’ as any 
‘inclination or tendency,’ including tendencies of the imagination, such as causal inference, 
as well as desires and aversions, such as curiosity (2015, 228-229). The Title Principle 
indicates that the inductive reasoning that would lead to a ‘total scepticism’ through the 
indefinite application onto itself lacks epistemic value because it is neither lively nor linked 
to human propensities; in contrast, and for the corresponding reason, positive philosophical 
or scientific reasoning has epistemic value (2015, 229-231). Along similar lines, Loeb 
proposes that Hume’s criterion for epistemic value is stability: a belief-producing process 
has epistemic value to the extent that it produces beliefs that are stable within the cognitive 
system in which it operates (2002, 33, 60-98). Loeb characterizes beliefs as dispositions; 
more precisely, he argues that beliefs are ‘stable’ or ‘settled’ dispositions in that they are 
not volatile, or not likely to change abruptly (5, 33, 65-74). He adds, however, that an 
otherwise stable belief can become unstable by coming into conflict with other beliefs (88-
89). Thus, depending on the cognitive system in which it operates, a belief-producing 
process might generate beliefs that are stable or unstable in that system; when these beliefs 
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are stable, according to Loeb, the process has epistemic value. Loeb observes that, although 
our basic belief-producing processes generate beliefs that would be unstable in a fully 
reflective cognitive system (such as a system conscious of all the aforementioned skeptical 
doubts), Hume did not regard fully reflective systems as superior to less-than-fully 
reflective ones, and that for him processes can have epistemic value even if their outputs 
are stable only in unreflective systems (91-98).99 
Memory, causal inference, TP, and PE seem paradigmatic of the psychological 
character that these interpretations describe: lively, rooted in universal propensities, and 
producing (at least for the most part) stable beliefs. Psychological-character interpretations 
thus provide another way forward in avoiding skepticism and in accounting for these 
processes as sources of knowledge. 
I have not stopped to analyze how, on each of these interpretations, Hume 
overcomes the specific skeptical doubts aforementioned—a task that would require 
significant exegesis. It has commonly been suggested, however, that, rather than answer 
the doubts, Hume would preempt the need to answer them by questioning the epistemic 
value of the processes giving rise to them. Loeb, as we saw, suggests that Hume does not 
regard the fully reflective systems in which the doubts arise as epistemically preferable to 
less reflective ones. Similarly, Schmitt notes,  
                                               
99 A different kind of ‘psychological-character’ criterion is Owen’s (1999): Belief-producing 
processes have normative authority when they can be considered virtues—when we morally 
approve of them because they are ‘pleasant and useful to ourselves and others’ (1221-222). This 
criterion allows Hume to prefer the belief-producing processes characteristic of philosophy to those 
characteristic of superstition or radical skepticism. However, because Owen does not use the term 
‘epistemic value’—instead, he presents his criterion as a criterion of ‘justification’—his 
interpretation might not account for epistemic value as distinct from other kinds of value. 
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Even if, relying on our science, we reach consequent skepticism, it does not 
follow that our operations are in fact unreliable. All that follows is that 
certain beliefs that result from our operations tell us that it is unreliable. 
These beliefs may be quite mistaken consistently with the reliability of these 
operations. (1992, 78-79)  
 
More recently, Ainslie (2015) draws attention to Hume’s concern with ‘reflective 
interference:’ a phenomenon where deliberate reflection on one’s cognitive processes 
disrupts the operation of those processes (14). Reflective interference means that our 
doubts about the epistemic value of our cognitive processes might not accurately represent 
the normal operation of those processes. Ainslie proposes that, in light of this phenomenon, 
Hume rightly refrains from acquiescing in the skeptical implications of these doubts (15). 
These insights are in keeping with Hume’s remark that ‘a true sceptic will be diffident of 
his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction’ (T 1.4.7.14 SBN 272-
3). 
 4.3.3. Token epistemic value 
One way we might interpret Hume’s approach to token epistemic value is as relying on the 
same criteria discussed above (criteria for the epistemic value of types) to explain the value 
of token processes as well. Indeed, scholars often interpret Hume’s criteria for epistemic 
value without distinguishing between type and token value. This interpretive strategy is 
corroborated by Hume’s discussion of the epistemic value of token inductive inferences in 
T 1.3.13, T 1.3.15, and E 10. One can interpret these sections as proposing considerations 
related to empirical foundation, systematicity, and psychological character as criteria for 
token epistemic value as well as type. Hume seems to suggest that specific tokens of 
inductive inference may or may not meet these criteria, or may meet them to greater and 
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lesser extents. Specifically, inductive inferences that are swayed by prejudice (T 1.3.13.7-
12 SBN 146-150), by the passion of surprise and wonder (E 10.16 SBN 117), or more 
generally by a failure to consider all the relevant evidence (E 10.4 SBN 110-111) can be 
said to have weaker empirical foundations, to be less reliable, and to produce less coherent 
and stable beliefs; scholars have thus interpreted Hume’s discussion of these cases as 
applications of the aforementioned criteria (e.g. Boehm 2013, 221; Morris 2006, 90; Loeb 
2002, 106). The same criteria can be used to distinguish epistemically good and bad tokens 
of memory. Memories induced by wishful thinking, for instance, may be considered 
epistemically bad on account of weak empirical foundations, coherence, reliability, and 
stability. 
 Another way we might interpret Hume’s approach to token epistemic value is as 
positing a criterion of authenticity. Hume suggests this criterion in his discussion of 
prejudice. It is paradigmatic of inductive inference that the mind transitions from the 
impression of an object to an idea of a constant concomitant. In a prejudiced inductive 
inference, the mind transitions from the impression of an object to an idea of only an 
accidental (i.e. not constant) concomitant. To use Hume’s example, a prejudiced person 
might continue to expect lack of wit from Irishmen on the basis of an accidental 
conjunction between the two, even after she has had experiences of witty Irishmen and 
knows the connection to be accidental (T 1.3.13.7 SBN 146-7). Similarly, a man suspended 
from an iron cage expects to fall even though he knows the impression of height is only 
accidentally connected to falling (T 1.3.13.10 SBN 148-9). Prejudiced inductive inferences 
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are inauthentic in that they diverge from the mechanism that is paradigmatic of inductive 
inference: 
When we take a review of this act of the mind [prejudice], and compare it 
with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we 
find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish’d 
principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our rejecting it. (T 1.3.13.12 
SBN 149-150) 
 
Hume hints at a similar criterion in his discussion of testimony. He there observes that 
experience is ‘our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact [i.e. causal inference]’ 
and that experience can be more or less regular (E 10.3 SBN 110). His dictum that we 
should ‘proportion our belief to experience’ (E 10.4 SBN 110-111) seems motivated by the 
consideration that, given the nature of causal inference as guided only by experience, 
inferences that are proportional to experience are more authentic—they better exemplify 
the mechanism at the root of inductive inference. We might thus attribute to Hume the view 
that the epistemic value of token processes is a matter of their authenticity to the type. 
When applied to memory, the criterion implies that memories have epistemic value 
depending on how well they exemplify the mechanisms that are paradigmatic of memory—
namely, retention of liveliness and isomorphism with past impressions. 
The criterion of authenticity needs some refinement. It might be argued that 
authenticity is not a sufficient criterion for token epistemic value, insofar as tokens of 
epistemically bad types of processes would not have epistemic value even if authentic to 
the type. Another criterion (i.e. that the type of process be epistemically good) is needed. 
A second difficulty is the possibility that some processes might be inauthentic to the type 
yet meet the criteria that account for type epistemic value (empirical foundation, reliability, 
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etc.). Since it is not clear what processes would fit this description (or if they even exist), 
however, I will defer the task of refining the authenticity criterion in light of this possibility 
to another discussion. 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has brought into focus the fact that for Hume ideas always represent existing 
objects ‘in their proper order and situation’—that is, as located spatially and temporally in 
relation to other objects. More specifically, ideas represent existing objects in relation to 
the present point of time. Memories and inductive beliefs both represent objects as located 
in successions leading to or starting from a present object. Thus, representations of time 
and tense are ubiquitous in our mental lives. While this account renders our ordinary mental 
representations highly complex, this complexity is both accurate and consistent with 
Hume’s basic principles about the mind; Hume’s notion of ‘representation by abridgment,’ 
in particular, explains how this complexity is possible. 
 The chapter has also presented grounds to conclude that for Hume the types of 
processes responsible for belief about the past (including memory, causal inference, TP, 
and PE) have epistemic value and thus produce knowledge, rather than mere belief. In 
particular, Hume holds that the processes have epistemic value prima facie: their value is 
not contingent on a Cartesian proof of their veridicality. In addition, Hume can avail 
himself of the epistemically normative notions that his texts often adumbrate (such as 
empirical foundation, reliability, reflexivity, and stability, among others) to account for the 
ultima facie merit of these processes: their ability to withstand specific skeptical doubts. In 
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this way, knowledge of the past fits squarely within the positive naturalistic epistemology 
that many scholars have aptly attributed to Hume. 
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CONCLUSION 
Hume’s theory of knowledge of the past comprises theories of mental representation, 
memory, temporal experience, temporal concepts, belief, and epistemic value. One of its 
distinctive themes is a stripped-down characterization of memory in terms of two simple 
criteria—the phenomenal character of an idea and its correspondence to the impression 
from which it derived. In contrast to standard approaches to memory, Hume does not posit 
representation of the past as a constitutive feature of memory, but instead views memory 
as an explanatorily basic scientific category. A second distinctive theme is the theory’s 
commitment to content empiricism: the principle that ideas represent only objects or 
aspects that impressions instantiate. In keeping with this principle, Hume ultimately traces 
the contents of our temporal concepts to aspects instantiated in impressions. Content 
empiricism motivates and is reinforced by a third theme: the identification of time with 
succession. Hume understands impressions as mental entities that are disposed or arranged 
in spatial and successive manners. Temporal experiences are complex impressions made 
up of successive parts. All our temporal notions reduce to (or can be understood in terms 
of) the successiveness we find in experience. Finally, a fourth theme of Hume’s theory is 
its assigning what might seem like a surprisingly extensive scope to the contents of our 
ordinary representations of time and the past. Whenever we represent an object in the past 
or future we represent the entire succession from that object to what we regard as the 
present. Thus, our ideas’ contents commonly span long successions—as long as a year, a 
decade, and even many decades. While this capacity might seem mysterious, Hume can 
explain it as an instance of ‘representation by abridgement,’ the same mechanism that 
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accounts for our ability to represent entire classes of objects (the class of all humans, for 
instance) and highly complex objects, like a nation or the universe. 
 Consider, again, Reid’s challenge that the ‘theory of ideas’ cannot produce an 
argument of ‘real weight’ for the veridicality of our ideas of the past (1785/2002, 290). 
Hume’s discussion of antecedent skepticism indicates that, if an argument of ‘real weight’ 
is one that does not presuppose the epistemic value of basic cognitive processes like 
memory and causal inference, the demand for such an argument is misplaced in the first 
place: it is more reasonable to regard these processes as prima facie epistemically valuable, 
and to evaluate them only upon subsequent reflection, than to attempt to prove their 
epistemic value against Cartesian doubts (in this respect, Hume’s view is much closer to 
Reid’s own defense of ‘common sense’ than Reid supposes). While subsequent reflection 
on these processes in fact generates powerful skeptical doubts, it is far from clear that Hume 
ultimately endorses these doubts, especially considering that he seems to endorse 
epistemically normative criteria that would support the epistemic value of the processes, 
like reliability, reflexivity, and stability. Ultimately, Hume’s support of scientific methods, 
his disavowal of skepticism, and his praise of historical knowledge as ‘extending our 
experience to all past ages’ should be seen as reflective of his epistemology, not only of 
his ‘vulgar’ or unphilosophical moments (‘Of the Study of History,’ 1741/1987, 566) 
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